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This dissertation evaluates position of prosumers, authors and 
corporations in the information society especially from the 
viewpoint of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights. Prosumers are understood as private natural persons who 
do not use content for commercial purposes whereas authors 
are understood as the traditional droit d´auteur copyright 
theory postulates. It has been argued that role of legal persons, 
corporations, has increased as it pertains to copyright. Therefore also 
their position shall be evaluated and compared to rights of authors 
and especially prosumers from fundamental rights perspective. The 
book also evaluates collective administration of rights, position 
of intermediaries and some other topics. As fundamental rights 
acknowlded protection to prosumers and authors but do not in 
principle extend their scope to corporations, the book argues that 
alternative manners but exclusive rights should be considered to 
secure rights of prosumers and authors in the information society. 
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ABSTRACT
This dissertation is an article based dissertation evaluating position of prosumers, 
authors and corporations in the information society especially from the viewpoint 
of Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Prosumers 
are understood as private natural persons who use content protected by copyright 
for non-commercial purposes. Similarly authors are understood, following the 
traditional droit d´auteur copyright theory, as individual natural persons creating 
content protected by copyright. As it has been argued that role of legal persons, or 
corporations, has increased as it comes to administering copyright, also their position 
shall be evaluated and compared to rights of authors and especially prosumers. 
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, similarly as copyright 
theory based on exclusive rights, postulates that content should be both created 
and used. However, significant amounts of illegal uses of content on the Internet 
constantly take place. Thus the main aim is to evaluate whether something prevents 
use of content on the Internet and to what extent it may be justified from the 
viewpoint of Article 27 of the UDHR. Preventing or denying use should not be in 
the interest of anyone. 
In this respect the book analyses article 27 of the UDHR suggesting that the 
right to science and culture as enshrined in its subsection 1 allows use of content. 
Although subsection 2 of the article 27 of the UDHR does not grant exclusive rights 
to authors, rights of authors shall be evaluated from the viewpoint that exclusive 
rights are being applied. In practice this means evaluating possibilities to administer 
use of content through exclusive rights and in this respect power relations between 
prosumers, authors and legal persons. Collective administration of rights, position 
of intermediaries and applicability of platform fees shall also be examined. 
Main method for evaluation is legal dogmatic method from fundamental right 
perspective. It could also be described as a traditional legal doctrine approach 
describing and systematizing legal sources and arguments containing philosophical 
insight. Regarding systemizing and interpreting norms, Dworkin’s theory of rules 
and principles shall be applied. The book has also an interdisciplinary approach as 
it compares individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory to basics tenet from the 
field of communicational studies.
The findings indicate that not only prosumers, but also authors seem to have 
small role as it comes to administering use of content. Instead role of legal persons 
seems to be more significant. As fundamental rights protect natural persons such as 
prosumers and authors, but in principle do not extend their scope to legal persons, 
and especially to larger corporations, rigorous and strict reading of copyright law 
often causes challenges from the viewpoint of fundamental rights. Thus the book 
argues that alternative manners but exclusive rights should be considered in order to 
secure rights of prosumers and authors as it comes to use of content on the Internet. 
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1.1. AIM OF THE STUDY
It has been argued that communication is at the core of information society. 
Possibilities to communicate content and information on digital devices have seen 
an unprecedented increase, especially in open networks such as the Internet.1 Hence, 
residents of the developed world have the means to easily and freely obtain and 
share existing knowledge in its different forms. This simple fact makes all individuals 
both producers and users of content, i.e. prosumers who are understood in this 
book as private natural persons acting for non-commercial purposes.2 
Article 27 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (hereafter UDHR) 
and Article 15 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (hereafter ICESCR)3 also provide a right for everyone to use information 
and content in different forms. Article 27(1) of the UDHR states that “Everyone 
has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the 
arts and to share in scientific advancement and its benefits” whereas Article 15(1)
(a)(b) correspondingly provides everyone a right to “(a) to take part in cultural 
life” and “(b) to enjoy the benefits of scientific progress and its applications”.4 The 
rights granted in Article 27(1) of the UDHR and Article 15 1(a) of the ICESCR are 
understood in this dissertation to be identical and shall therefore be referred to 
1 Ideologically one has often referred to Marshall McLuhan’s concept of the “Global village” where physical distance does 
not constitute real hindrance to the real-time communicative activities of people. See e.g. Marshall McLuhan, Ihmisen 
uudet ulottuvuudet, Werner Söderström Osakeyhtiö, Porvoo, 1968. A translation from Marshall McLuhan’s Understanding 
Media: The Extensions of Man (First Ed. McGraw Hill, New York, 1964). See also Wikipedia’s definition for Global 
village: Available at:  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Global_village_%28term%29. See also Frank Webster, Theories of the 
Information Society, third edition, Routledge 2006 (hereafter Webster), p. 8 ff and e.g. Antti Hautamäki (eds.), Suomi 
teollisen ja tietoyhteiskunnan murroksessa, Tietoyhteiskunnan sosiaaliset ja yhteiskunnalliset vaikutukset, A publication 
of SITRA (154), Helsinki 1996, available at: http://www.sitra.fi/julkaisut/tietoyhteiskunta/sitra154.pdf. 
2 Regarding prosumers see e.g. Alvin Toffler, The Third Wave, Pan Books Ltd 1981, p. 275 – 295, David Ticoll, Alex Lowy 
and Ravi Kalakota, Joined at the Bit: The Emergence of the e-Business Community, published in Don Tapscott, Alex 
Lowly and David Ticoll, Blueprint to the Digital Economy, McGraw-Hill 1998, p. 24 and Kari Lietsala–Esa Sirkkunen, 
Social Media, Introduction to the Tools and Processes of Participatory Economy. Tampere 2008, p. 18 (available at, 
http://tampub.uta.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/65560/978-951-44-7320-3.pdf?sequence=1), Frank Webster, Theories of the 
Information Society, third edition, Routledge 2006,  p. 17 – 19 and Seppo Sisättö, Internet taskussa, Mobiiliin sähköiseen 
yhteiskuntaan, Inforviestintä Oy, Tampere 2004, p. 15 ff. Use of content by private persons have also been acknowledged 
also in the official documents as e.g. in the statement of the Constitutional Law Committee (7/2005) of Finland.  Regarding 
legal literature see e.g. Tuomas Mylly, Tekijänoikeuden ideologiat ja myytit, Lakimies 2/2004, p. 241 -242. 
3 Thus although the name of the book refers only to the Article 27 of the UDHR, corresponding references to Article 15 
of the ICESCR shall be made.
4 See The Universal Declaration of Human rights as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 10 December 1948 
and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Adopted and opened for signature, ratification 
and accession by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI), of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976, in 
accordance with article 27. 
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as the right to science and culture.5 As later shall be explained in more detail, the 
rarely quoted right to science and culture provides exceptional possibilities to share 
and receive – or in terms of copyright use – content on the Internet.
However, it is commonly known among copyright researchers that the right to 
science and culture has been consistently presented side by side and as an opposing 
right with a provision providing protection for authors.6 Indeed, Article 27(2) of 
the UDHR states that “Everyone has the right to the protection of the moral and 
material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of 
which he is the author.” Similarly, Article 15(1)(c) of the ICESCR recognizes the 
right to “benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting 
from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he is the author.” The 
right granted in these articles shall be referred in this book as a right protecting 
essential economic interests of authors or simply the rights of authors.7 
A functional system conforming to the UDHR must simultaneously fulfil both 
the right to science and culture and the rights of authors. However, it is questionable 
whether this is the case in Western countries. “Internet piracy” is an often -used 
expression describing the illegal use of copyrighted content on the Internet. However, 
“piracy” on the Internet is already itself a paradoxical concept as copyright does 
not aim to create “piracy” or prevent use but on the contrary it aims to enable 
use of copyrighted content. Consequently, massive amounts of illegal users imply 
that copyright does not function as intended. Therefore, this dissertation evaluates 
possibilities to fulfil the right to science and culture and rights of authors as provided 
by Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCER. 
An attempt has been made to write this book in a way that is comprehensible to 
all interested parties. Given the focus of this book on the evaluation of fundamental 
rights, the reader must be familiar with traditional fundamental rights analysis. 
Therefore, this introduction may serve as a short primer for current fundamental 
rights analysis. Some readers may also intuitively feel that to the extent to which 
the relationship between right holders and prosumers is evaluated in this book 
is purely academic and has no practical relevance because one has never issued 
licenses to natural persons who have traditionally been considered as end-users. 
However, such intuition is faulty given that prosumers are not end-users, but 
instead users. The history, normative background and practice of copyright law have 
specifically concentrated on evaluating the relationship between right holders and 
users.8 Millions of prosumers using content illegally (“internet piracy”) and millions 
5 The term has been adopted from Lea Shaver’s article “The Right to Science and Culture”. See Shaver, Lea Bishop, The 
Right to Science and Culture (March 6, 2009). Wisconsin Law Review, Vol. 2010 (hereafter Shaver), p. 154. Available 
at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1354788 or http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.1354788. 
6 See e.g. Shaver, p. 134 – 136 and Pirkko-Liisa Haarmann 
7 It should be mentioned that rights of authors are evaluated in this book as economic rights and consequently the book 
does not evaluate so-called moral rights of authors.
8 No right to “end-use” either exists and consequently no corresponding licenses for “end-using” could be granted. It could 
also be mentioned that Article 3(i) in a proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective 
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of freer licenses are concrete proof that there is also the will to use and license 
content by authors and prosumers. Moreover, given that both the fundamental 
rights and continental droit d’ auteur copyright theories view natural persons at 
the core of fundamental rights analysis, evaluating the relationship between authors 
and prosumers from the fundamental rights perspective may be justified. In an 
information society, the role of natural persons as users with regard to the field of 
copyright has been emphasized.9
This evaluation focuses on the use of content on the Internet, which is understood 
as an open network.10 Open networks are perceived to be networks theoretically 
allowing for free participation in order to obtain and share information in different 
forms without technical restrictions. As it has been argued that the role of legal 
persons (often referred to as corporations) in copyright has become more profound, 
relationships between authors and legal persons, including relationships between 
prosumers and legal persons, shall be considered herein. However, because legal 
persons in principle fall outside fundamental rights protection, analysis in the book 
does not directly concern relationships between legal persons. Finally, it should be 
mentioned that some of the interpretations this book provides may be somewhat 
surprising, given that very little attention has been previously given to the right to 
science and culture as enshrined in Article 27(1) of the UDHR. For example, the 
right to use content is rarely brought up in the literature despite the fact that Article 
27(1) of the UDHR specifically provides it. Herein, fundamental rights and Article 
27(1) of the UDHR are considered alongside more traditional copyright discussion 
to add depth and relevance to current copyright discussion.
1.2. STRUCTURE
Analysis of the right to science and culture and authors’ rights is first conducted from 
the viewpoint of fundamental rights.11 Thus, this book first evaluates basic tenets 
management of copyright and related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the 
internal market, Brussels, 11.7.2012, COM(2012) 372 final (hereafter Directive on Collectives) separates natural person 
as a user and a consumer by stating that “’user’ means any natural personor legal entity who is carrying out acts subject 
to the authorisation of rightholders, the remuneration of right holders or the payment of compensation to right holders 
and who is not acting in the capacity of a consumer.”
9 It should be remembered we all as natural persons have always easily been creators of content as e.g. even a drawing of 
a child may be protected by copyright. However, new technologies have emphasized our role also as users of content in 
a manner that has not been possible before.
10 Also EU Commissions Declaration on Net Neutrality emphasises “open and neutral character of the Internet”. See last page 
of the Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 25 November 2009, amending Directives 
2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/EC on 
access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC on the 
authorisation of electronic communications networks and services. 
11 See also Prof. Laurence R. Helfer, Collective Management of Copyrights and Human Rights: An Uneasy Alliance Revisited, 
published in Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, Second edition, edited by Daniel Gervais. Kluwer 
Law International 2010 (hereafter Helfer), p. 86: “The key to understanding this [human rights] framework is to identify 
the purposes of recognizing authors’ moral and material interests as human rights. According to the Committee [in 
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related to fundamental rights in general, the right to science and culture and rights 
of authors as fundamental rights in chapters 2 – 4. It also compares economic rights 
of authors to basic research results from the field of communication as copyright 
is often connected to communication. In this respect an attempt is made herein to 
find alternative manners to perceive the economic rights of authors, especially the 
right of reproduction, in a modern information society.12 In chapter 5, the right to 
science and culture shall be compared with the rights of authors. The rights of authors 
shall be evaluated in the light of individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory and 
especially its application as a property right, although the referred articles in the 
UDHR and the ICESCR do not grant exclusive rights to authors. This is because 
copyright is often perceived as a property right in Western countries. However, if 
property right is applied to secure essential economic rights of authors, the authors 
themselves should be able to conclude transactions with prosumers. If concluding 
transactions is not possible, authors cannot expect to obtain compensations for use 
of their property. For this reason, chapter 6 evaluates whether it is plausible to expect 
prosumers and authors as natural persons to conclude individual transactions with 
each other as it pertains to use of content on the Internet. This was also evaluated 
in the second article of this book, “Challenges Related to Applicability of Exclusive 
Rights on the Internet – Platform fees as an Alternative?”13 The article concluded 
that authors and prosumers as natural persons are often not able or interested in 
concluding direct individual transactions with each other.
This finding indicated that claims arguing that copyright is primarily used for 
protecting private business interests instead of individual authors are plausible.14 
This would be questionable if legal persons do not enjoy fundamental rights 
protection. Consequently, chapter 7 focuses on evaluating the role of legal persons 
as right holders from the viewpoint of fundamental rights, especially in relation to 
the right to science and culture. Short references are also made to such fundamental 
General Comment 17], such rights serve two essential functions. First, they ‘safeguard the personal link between authors 
and their creations and between people or other groups and their collective cultural heritage’. Second, they protect ‘basic 
material interests which are necessary to enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living’. ... Stated differently, 
once a country guarantees creators these two core rights – one moral and the other material – any additional intellectual 
property protections the country provides ‘must be balanced with the others rights recognized in the Covenant’, and must 
give ‘due consideration’ to ‘the public interest in enjoying broad access to authors’ productions’.” 
12 See Olli Vilanka, Communicative Approach to Copyright, published in Journal of International Commercial Law and 
Technology (JICLT), vol 9, No 1 (2014), available at: http://www.jiclt.com/index.php/jiclt/article/view/200. 
13 See Olli Vilanka, Challenges Related to Applicability of Exclusive Rights on the Internet – Platformfees as an 
Alternative, published in JFT 3/2013, p. 1 – 34.
14 Regarding claims of industry influence on copyright see e.g. Tuomas Mylly, Intellectual Property and European Economic 
Constitutional Law, The Trouble with Private Informational Power. Vaajakoski 2009, passim (hereafter Mylly) and Lawrence 
Lessig, Free Culture, How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control Creativity, The 
Penguin Press, New York 2004, p.9, and passim. Also Gervais has stated that copyright is primarily for “professionals” 
to “organize markets for certain types of works of art or the intellect.” See Daniel Gervais, Collective Management of 
Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, published in Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, 
second edition, (eds.) Daniel Gervais, Kluwer Law International BV 2010 (hereafter Gervais 2010), p. 10 - 15. See also 
Jukka Kemppinen, Digitaaliongelma, Kirjoitus oikeudesta ja ympäristöstä, Lappeenrannan teknillinen yliopisto, Digipaino 
2006, p. 59.
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rights as the right to privacy and to the right to life, liberty and security of person, due 
to the possibility of criminal sanction. The chapter concludes that it is challenging 
to extend fundamental rights protection to legal persons.
Chapter 8 follows by evaluating the position of intermediaries.15 The analysis 
focuses on evaluating whether intermediaries could ask permissions on behalf of 
prosumers to use content. It was concluded that this would be challenging in an 
open network as intermediaries should ask permissions from right holders prior 
to use. Indeed, it would be difficult for an intermediary to predict what content a 
certain prosumer is going to use in an open network.
Chapter 9 examines whether collective administration of content could 
provide a functional solution as it pertains to the use of content on the Internet. 
Consequently, the chapter evaluates collective administration from the viewpoint 
of fundamental rights. The basis for the evaluation was conducted in the article, 
“Rough Justice or Zero Tolerance? – Reassessing the Nature of Copyright in Light 
of Collective Licensing (Part I)”, which critically examined the nature of collective 
administration of content as opposed to individual administration.16 The chapter 
finds it challenging to argue that collective administration could be identified with 
individual administration and consequently it was difficult to extend fundamental 
rights protection to collective administration. 
Despite the theoretical problems related to collective administration, chapter 10 
evaluates the ability of Nordic collective licenses to provide a functional solution for 
securing rights as provided by Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR. The 
background for the chapter was evaluated in an article “Nordic Extended Collective 
Licensing – a Solution for Educational and Scientific Users and Prosumers to Copy 
and Make Content Available on the Internet”. This article evaluated possibilities of 
collective administration and especially collective licensing to enable use of content 
on the Internet.17 It was found that licenses offered to prosumers provide only limited 
possibilities to use content on the Internet. This indicates that collective licenses 
do not provide comprehensive solutions as it pertains to the right to science and 
culture as provided by Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR.
Finally, chapter 11 evaluates whether platform fees could provide solutions to 
secure rights granted in Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR. It was 
concluded that a platform fee system would not be as challenging from the viewpoint 
of fundamental rights as a system based on exclusive rights. It was also difficult to 
15 Author of this book has also published a book examining linking on the Internet. See Olli Vilanka, Linkittäminen, 
tekijänoikeus ja verkkojulkaiseminen, Lakimies 4/2006, p. 608 – 627. However, it shall not be annexed to be part of book 
as such as it has been written in Finnish. 
16 Olli Vilanka, Rough Justice or Zero Tolerance? – Reassessing the Nature of Copyright in Light of Collective Licensing 
(Part I), published in in “In Search of New IP Regimes”, a publication of IPR University Center 2010 (hereafter Vilanka 
2010). 
17 Olli Vilanka, Nordic Extended Collective Licensing – a Solution for Educational and Scientific Users and Prosumers to 
Copy and Make Content Available on the Internet, published in Business Law Forum 2012, Vantaa 2012. The article 
formed a sequel (“Part II”) in relation to the third article.
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find justifications preventing the use of platform fees if they are able to secure both 
the right to science and culture and rights of authors.
The book concludes by considering it problematic to fulfil the right to science and 
culture and author’s right through exclusive rights as it pertains to use of content on 
the Internet. Prosumers and authors as natural persons simply do not seem to be 
interested in concluding individual transactions with each other. Concluding such 
transactions is challenging and often even impossible. Conversely, as it is challenging 
to extend fundamental rights protection to legal persons, it becomes problematic 
to protect their interest in relation to the fundamental rights of prosumers. For 
this reason, it is recommended that measures other than exclusive rights should 
be applied to protecting the right to science and culture and rights of authors on 
the Internet.
1.3. MAIN SOURCES
This book refers to fundamental rights as an umbrella term for human and 
constitutional rights.18 In more detail, the book regards the Universal Declaration 
of Human Rights19 and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights20 as main sources. Although several states may have chosen to ratify it as 
part of their legislation, the UDHR does not bind states per se. However, nations 
often implement international treaties to their constitutional law since “domestic 
bills of rights and international human rights law perform the same basic function 
of stating limits on what governments may do to people within their jurisdictions.”21 
ICESCR also creates enforceable rights claims against those countries that have 
signed and ratified the treaty.22 As of July 2011 ICESCR had 160 signatories. 
Relevant legal literature, especially “General Comments” provided by the 
Committee on the Economic, Social and Cultural Rights shall be used when 
interpreting the referred instruments. The Committee on the Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights is a body of eighteen human rights experts monitoring the 
18 Thus in this book “fundamental rights” refer to all rights, whether civil, political, economic, social or environmental 
rights, which has been defined as “fundamental rights” in the International human rights conventions. See similarly 
Tuomas Ojanen, The European Way, The Structure of National Court Obligation under EC Law. A Doctoral Dissertation. 
Saarijärvi 1998 (hereafter Ojanen), p. 97, footnote, 4: “The terms “fundamental rights” and “human rights” are so vast in 
their implications that it is hard to define them in words.”
19 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights as adopted by the United Nations General Assembly 10 December 1948. 
20 International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, adopted and opened for signature ratification and accession 
by General Assembly resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966, entry into force 3 January 1976 in accordance with 
article 27. 
21 See Stephen Gardbaum, Human Rights as International Constitutional Rights, The European Journal of International Law 
Vol. 19 no. 4 © EJIL 2008, p.750.
22 Shaver, p. 176 – 177 and Shaver, Lea Bishop and Sganga, Caterina, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright 
and Human Rights (July 21, 2009). Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 27, 2009 (hereafter Shaver and Sganga) , 
p. 639. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437319.
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implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights.23 General Comments are non-binding documents, but give guidance on how 
the referred fundamental rights should be interpreted. Furthermore, European 
Convention on Human Rights (1950, hereafter ECHR)24 also provides a source 
for rights. Indeed, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) has stated that it ensures 
the respect of fundamental human rights and uses ECHR as a major source of 
fundamental rights.25 In its Stauder and Internationale Handelsgesellschaft rulings 
the ECJ also reaffirmed the primacy of European Community law over member 
state laws.26 As the ECJ has not eliminated the effects of national constitutional laws 
but acknowledges them as inspirations of “the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States and “guidelines”,27 references to appropriate paragraphs of the 
Constitution of Finland (11.6.1999/731, hereafter CF) and its preliminary material 
shall also be made herein.28 In this respect, the book has a “Finnish flavor”. However, 
Finland has widely ratified the referred international conventions (e.g. the ICESCR 
in 1976) to its legislation and consequently the analysis should provide guidelines 
also for readers from other countries.29 
1.4. METHODOLOGY 
The main method of this book is legal dogmatic, especially from a fundamental right 
perspective.30 It could also be described as a traditional legal doctrine describing 
and systematizing legal sources and arguments, which also contains philosophical 
insight and tools.31 
As it pertains to the systemization and interpretation of fundamental rights, 
current theory on legal norms as rules, principles and policies shall be applied to 
23 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par.1):.12/14/1990, 
fifth session, CESCR General Comment 3 (hereafter General Comment No 3) and Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, General Comment No.17 (2005) (hereafter General Comment No. 17). See also Helfer, .p. 77.
24 The European Convention on Human Rights, Rome 4, November 1950 and its five protocols.
25 See Case C-29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419 paragraph 7 where the Court states that fundamental rights are 
“enshrined in the general principles of Community law.” See also Ojanen, p. 107.
26 See Case C-29/69 Stauder v City of Ulm [1969] ECR 419 and Case C-11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft BmhH 
v Einfuhr- under Vorratstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel [1970] ECR 1125. 
27 See Case C-4/73 Nold v Commission [1974] ECR 491 and Ojanen, p. 97 ff.
28 See The Constitution of Finland, 11 June 1999 (731/1999, amendments up to 1112/2011 included), available (in English) 
at: http://www.finlex.fi/fi/laki/kaannokset/1999/en19990731.pdf. 
29 See e.g. Martin Scheinin, Ihmisoikeudet Suomen oikeudessa, a doctoral dissertation. Jyväskylä 1991 (hereafter Scheinin), 
p. 8-9. For example, the Constitution of Finland encompasses the rights provided by the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights (adopted by the United Nations General Assembly on 10 December 1948) although it is not a treaty, which can be 
ratified as such. See e.g. Martin Scheinin, Yhteiset ihmisoikeutemme, Suomen YK-liitto ry, Helsinki 1998, p. 6 and 54, 
available at: http://www.om.fi/uploads/54begu60narbnv_1.pdf. 
30 Regardin methodologies in general see Ari Hirvonen, Mitkä metodit? Opas oikeustieteen metodologiaan. Helsinki 2011 
(hereafter Hirvonen).
31 Hannu Tapani Klami, Comparative Law and Legal Concepts – The Methods and Limits of Comparative Law and its 
Connection with Legal Theory ,Vammala 1981, p. 93.
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evaluate the right to science and culture to rights of authors.32 Also other literature 
developing the rule/principle approach shall be used.33 
In Dworkin’s division, legal rules apply in an all-or-nothing fashion.34 This means 
that a rule either applies to a certain case or does not. If it does, it must be followed 
and if two rules conflict, one of them must be invalid. In such cases of conflicting 
rules, resolutions are based on maxims such as lex posterior, lex superior or other 
type of doctrine for source of law.35 
Principles, such as the principle that no-one should profit from one’s wrongs, 
are norms that officials have to take into account in their decision making. They 
have a dimension that rules do not, a “dimension of weight or importance” and 
they may pull to different directions.36 If principles intersect, their relative weight 
must be taken into consideration in the decision making.37 
Weighing different principles cannot be exact.38 Here, thoughts of Dworkin have 
often been compared to those of Robert Alexy. Alexy sees principles as “optimization 
commands”. This means that principles set an obligation to optimize applicability of 
both of the intersecting principles. His idea is that conflicting principles supplement 
each other and are applied as widely as possible, although an order of priority is 
formed between them.39 
As it pertains to the relationship between rules and principles, Dworkin does not 
consider rules and principles as being in conflict. For him, rules reflect principles 
and rules represent “a kind of compromise amongst competing principles”. In 
situations when the relationship between rules and principles should be evaluated 
(often referred to as “hard cases”), courts weigh the principles maintaining a certain 
rule to a set of principles, which call to overruling the rule at hand. Dworkin also 
separates policies from principles. Where principles establish individual rights, a 
policy sets a collective goal to be reached, e.g. an improvement in some economic, 
political, or social feature of the community.40 
32 This follows Rondald Dworkins well known analysis from his book Taking Right Seriously. See Rondald Dworkin, Taking 
Rights Seriously, Harvard University Press 1977, 1978 (hereafter Dworkin), p.22 ff. It should be noted that Dwrokin’s 
theory openly resembles liberal political theories, which base on classical liberty rights. Hannu Tolonen sees Dworkin’s 
theory as a form of liberal political theory, which has its core at classical liberty rights. See H. Tolonen, Säännöt, periaatteet 
ja tavoitteet: Oikeuden, moraalin ja politiikan suhteesta. Oikeustiede – Jurisprudentia XXII 1989 (hereafter Tolonen), p. 
354 ff. 
33 See e.g. Juha Pöyhönen, Sopimusoikeuden järjestelmä ja sopimusten sovittelu, a doctoral dissertation. Vammala 1988 
(hereafter Pöyhönen), p. 13 – 78. Rober Alexy, Oikeusjärjestelmä, oikeusperiaate ja käytännöllinen järki. Lakimies 1989 
(hereafter Alexy), p. 620 – 621 and Scheinin, p. 29 ff. See also, Tarmo Miettinen, Tieteen vapaus. Jyväskylä 2001 (hereafter 
Miettinen), p. 67 ff and Pekka Länsineva, Perusoikeudet ja varallisuussuhteet, a doctoral dissertation. Jyväskylä 2002 
(hereafter Länsineva), p. 92.
34 Dworkin, p. 24. See also Scheinin, p. 30.
35 See e.g. Pöyhönen, p. 24 and Scheinin, p. 31. 
36 Dworkin, p. 26 – 28.
37 Dworkin, p. 26 – 28. It should be mentioned that rules do not have dimension of weigh or importance as they either apply 
or not.
38 Dworkin, p. 26 and 77 – 78. It is also said that principles are confirmed in individual cases only when a “hard case” is 
solved by applying a principle (or several principles). Pöyhönen, p. 31. 
39 Alexy, p. 627. See also Scheinin, p. 29 ff.
40 Dworkin, p. 90. Principles, which establish an individual right, have primacy over policies, which establish a collective 
goal. Dworkin, p. 22.
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Consequently, when evaluating the scope of fundamental rights, it is understood 
that all human and constitutional rights have their strongly protected core areas.41 
Further from the core area are principles, which are still protected as human and/
or constitutional rights. Policies are not protected by human or constitutional rights, 
but they may be recognized in normal laws.42 If rules conflict, only one of them may 
be applicable. If principles conflict, one should evaluate their weight and importance 
in the case at hand. If a rule and a principle are in conflict, one should evaluate the 
principles behind the rule and the principles drawing to another direction and then 
optimize their applicability in order to decide which principles apples apply (i.e. 
whether the principles(s) behind the rule is/are overridden by other principles). In 
the end, it is a question of diverse objectives and values protected as fundamental 
rights.43 The method is commonly used in fundamental rights analysis and it 
should also be taken into consideration when evaluating the possible limitations 
of fundamental rights.44 It also enables evaluating the case -by -case relationship 
between fundamental rights.45
At this point it should be mentioned that this book does not apply 
maxims such as lex posterior or lex superior in order to solve possible 
conflicts between copyright and other rights. The reason for this is that 
no specific paragraphs or laws have been enacted as it pertains to the 
right to science and culture. In other words, so far the right to science 
and culture is merely maintained in the Article 27(1) of the UDHR and 
Article 15 of the ICESCR. Thus, it is not possible to use maxims such as 
lex posterior or lex superior to compare concrete norms constituting the 
right to science and culture e.g. to specific paragraphs in copyright laws. 
For this reason, the right to science and culture is compared to author’s 
rights through basic fundamental rights doctrine. 
41 See also Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights. Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998), p. 215: 
“The common theme emerging from a huge family of [modern human rights] theories is that a minimum absolute or core 
postulate of any just and universal system of rights must include some recognition of the value of individual freedom of 
autonomy.”
42 It is in the end philosophical question how distinctions between rules and principles are or should be made. See in 
more detail, Pöyhönen, p. 20 – 29. See similarly as here Riku Neuvonen, Sananvapaus, joukkoviestintä ja sääntely, 
tutkimus sananvapauden toteutumisesta joukkoviestinnän sääntelyssä ja joukkoviestinnän oikeudellisen sääntelyn suhteesta 
joukkoviestinnän sääntelyyn, licentiate’s degree. Helsinki 2005, p. 16. 
43 See similarly also Tuomas Mylly, Intellectual Property and Fundamental Rights: Do They Interoperate in Bruun, Niklas 
(ed.): Intellectual Property Beyond Rights, WSOY, 2005, p 187.
44 For example, General Comments of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights separate protected core areas 
of different fundamental rights. Available at: http://www2.ohchr.org/english/bodies/cescr/comments.htm. The method is 
also commonly used e.g. by the Constitutional Committee of Finland.
45 It could be mentioned that also theory of Karhu emphasises role of fundamental rights and situational sensitivity in decision 
making in order to avoid problems related of formal/casuistic reading of law. Juha Pöyhönen (nowadays Karhu), Uusi 
Varallisuusoikeus, Helsinki 2000 (hereafter Pöyhönen 2000), p. 191 – 193.
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Finally, it should be mentioned that the book also evaluates the relationship of 
copyright to communicational/information sciences and the Internet.46 This is done 
because copyright has been often connected to communication and applying the 
concept of reproduction to the Internet has faced certain challenges. Consequently, 
chapter 4 compares authors’ economic rights to basics of communicational sciences 
as explained by Wiio and C.E. Shannon. In this respect, one could say that it belongs 
under “communication law”.47 
46 In more detail see Hirvonen, p. 28 ff.
47 In Finland copyright has also been connected to field of “communication law” e.g. Kulla (et al), Viestintäoikeus 
[“Communication law in English, if literally translated”], Vantaa 2002. See also Päivi Tiilikka, Jukka Siro (eds), Kirjoituksia 
viestintäoikeudesta, Helsinki 2010 and Marika Siiki’s article, Tekijänoikeuksiin ja verkkoviestintään liittyvät rikokset 
Helsingin hovioikeuden viimeaikaisessa oikeuskäytännössä, p. 95 ff.
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2   APPLIED BASIC CONCEPTIONS RELATED TO 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS ANALYSIS
2.1. RECIPROCAL NATURE OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
As explained, the right to science and culture and rights of authors have historically 
been presented as opposing rights. This conflict of rights is congruent with the idea 
that rights, and especially fundamental rights, are in a reciprocal relationship with 
each other. Often, the principle of reciprocity is derived from Immanuel Kant’s 
idea of legal rights and obligations: when a person calls upon his/her rights against 
another, for reasons of consistency, s/he has to recognize that the other is like s/
he is. Thus, thorough this recognition a person has to also accept that the other 
person may have similar rights that should be honored. By recognizing another’s 
rights, corresponding obligations against those rights appear always when a person 
invokes his/her own rights.48
Mylly has described this interdependent nature of rights in a similar 
way: ”Rights should not be conceived as atomistic, but intersubjective 
in their character. As elements of the legal order, they are based on 
mutual recognition and emerge co-originally with the law positively 
creating them. The intersubjectivity of rights connotes that it is possible 
to construct all private relations, and hence all private law relations, 
from the perspective of fundamental rights. Taking one right as far 
as it can go brings it likely into conflict with other rights and restricts 
the dialogue between rights, necessary in pluralistic societies. Hence, 
individuals must accept that the perception of their own rights requires 
that they honour the rights of others.”49 
As it pertains to the right to science and culture and right protecting essential 
economic interests of authors, the reciprocal nature may be read from paragraph 
47 of the General Comment 21 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
48 Pöyhönen 2000, p. 72. See also Raimo Siltala, Perusoikeusjärjestelmän sisäisestä logiikasta. Lakimies 4/2001, p. 737.
49  See Mylly, p. 181. See similarly also Christophe Geiger, The Constitutional Dimension of Intellectual Property, published 
in Intellectual Property and Human Rights: Enhanced Edition of Copyright and Human Rights, Paul L. C. Torremans (eds) 
(hereafter Geiger). p. 104 – 107. Regarding possible fundamental rights collisions and consequent limitations in Finland 
see e.g. Veli-Pekka Viljanen, Perusoikeuksien rajoittaminen, published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (et al), Helsinki 2011, 
p. 139.
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Rights. It states that “Given the interrelationship between the rights set out in 
article 15 of the Covenant [ICESCR]…, the full realization of the right of everyone 
to take part in cultural life also requires the adoption of steps necessary for the 
conservation, development and dissemination of science and culture, as well as 
steps to ensure respect for the freedom indispensable to scientific research and 
creative activity, in accordance with paragraphs 2 and 3 respectively, of article 15.”50 
Similarly General Comment 17 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights states that the right to material interests resulting from creative works as 
provided by Article 15 1 (c) of the ICESCR [i.e. author’s rights] is “intrinsically 
linked” and “mutually reinforcing and reciprocally limitative” to right to culture 
and science as provided in Article 15 1(a)(b) (and paragraph 15.3 of the ICESCR, 
which obligates states to “respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research 
and creative activity”).51 Also property right as a fundamental right is connected 
to other fundamental rights and should not be evaluated in isolation.52 Keeping in 
mind the reciprocal relationship of rights subjects and aim of fundamental rights 
may be evaluated.
2.2.  AIM AND SUBJECTS OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
PROTECTION 
It is often said that only particularly important rights are protected as fundamental. 
The aim of these fundamental rights is to set a certain minimum standard for 
protection. This means in the words of the high commissioner for human rights:
“on the basis of the extensive experience gained by the Committee, as 
well as by the body that preceded it, over a period of more than a decade 
of examining States parties’ reports the Committee is of the view that a 
minimum core obligation to ensure the satisfaction of, at the very least, 
minimum essential levels of each of the rights is incumbent upon every 
State party. Thus, for example, a State party in which any significant 
number of individuals is deprived of essential foodstuffs, of essential 
primary health care, of basic shelter and housing, or of the most basic 
50 See United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Forty-third session, 2 – 20 November 2009, 
General Comment No. 21, Right of everyone to take part in cultural life (art. 15, para. 1 (a), of the International Covenant 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (hereafter General Comment 21), paragraph 47 and e.g. paragraphs 2 and 9, 
which also acknowledge the relationship between rights of authors and users. 
51 See United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Thirty-fifth 
session 7-25 November 2005, General Comment No. 17: The Right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the 
moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author, 
paragraph (hereafter General Comment 17), paragraph 4.
52 Pekka Länsineva, Omaisuuden suoja (PL 15 §), published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (et al), Helsinki 2011 (hereafter 
Länsineva 2011), p. 555 – 556.
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forms of education is, prima facie failing to discharge its obligations 
under the Covenant.”53 
Therefore, although fundamental rights ought to equally protect everybody, it 
is understood in this book that only the essential rights (“essential foodstuff, of 
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing ...”) are to be protected 
by human and similar constitutional rights. It is difficult to see why this should 
not apply also to the right to science and culture and rights of authors.54 However, 
it should be mentioned that one does not need to see the standard covered by 
fundamental rights as a definitive. For example, according to Ojanen ECHR sets 
minimum standards for the protection of human rights and consequently human 
rights could be seen both more stringent and more extensive as afforded in the 
ECHR.55 
As it pertains to subjects of fundamental rights protection, governments are 
obligated to secure a certain minimum standard of protection for natural persons. 
The approach is clear from a historical viewpoint as after the Second World War 
it was generally accepted that all humans have certain minimum universal rights56 
as has been confirmed in the preambles of the UDHR and ICESCR and e.g. in the 
Finnish Constitutional doctrine. For example, the preamble of the UDHR starts 
by stating that “Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and 
inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, 
justice and peace in the world.”57 Consequently, it is not surprising both the General 
Comment 17 analyzing basic material interests for authors and General Comment 
21 defining the right to science and culture also acknowledge natural persons as 
53 Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, The Nature of States parties obligations (Art. 2, par.1):.12/14/1990, 
fifth session, CESCR General Comment 3, paragraph 10 (emphasis original, hereafter General Comment No. 3) and 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No.17 (2005) (hereafter General Comment No. 
17), paragraph 35. See similarly regarding the Constitution of Finland e.g. Perusoikeuskomitean mietintö, betänkande av 
kommittém för grundläggande fri- och rättigheter 1002:3 (Committee Report 1992:3), p. 49. See also Pekka Hallberg, 
Perusoikeusjärjestelmä, published in Hallberg (et al), Perusoikeudet, Helsinki 2011, p. 29 and Heikki Karapuu, 
Perusoikeuksien tausta ja yleinen sisältö, published in Hallberg (et al), Perusoikeudet, Helsinki 2011, p. 63. 
54 This interpretation is also supported by the General Comment of the Economic and Social Council stating that: “The 
protection of material interests of authors in article 15, paragraph 1 (c), reflects the close linkage of this provision with 
the right to own property, as recognized in article 17 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in regional human 
rights instruments, as well as with the right of any worker to adequate remuneration (art. 7 (a)). Unlike other human rights, 
the material interests of authors are not directly linked to the personality of the creator, but contribute to the enjoyment 
of the right to an adequate standard of living (art. 11, para. 1).” See General Comment No. 17, paragraph 15, emphasis 
added. 
55 See in more detail Ojanen, p. 108 – 109. 
56 See e.g. Christopher Harding, Uta Kohl and Naomi Salmon, Human Rights in the Market Place, The Exploitation of Rights 
Protection by Economic Actors, Ashgate Publihsing Limited 2008 (hereafter Harding, Kohl & Salmon), p. 32 – 33.
57 See also Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Substantive issues arising in the implementation of the 
international covenant on economic, social and cultural rights, Follow-up to the day of general discussion on article 15.1 
(c), Monday, 26 November 2001, Human rights and intellectual property (14 December 2001), chapter 5. Regarding the 
Finnish doctrines see e.g. Perusoikeuskomitean mietintö 1992: 3 (Committee Report 1992:3), p. 49 and 60, Government Bill 
309/1993, p. 23 – 24, Mikael Hidén, Perusoikeuksien yleisiä kysymyksiä, published in Liisa Nieminen (eds.) Perusoikeudet 
Suomessa (hereafter Hidén), p. 10 ff, Pekka Hallberg, Perusoikeusjärjestelmä, published in Perusoikeudet (eds. Hallberg 
et al), Helsinki 2011, p.41 and Länsineva, p. 106 ff. See also Peter Drahos, Intellectual Property and Human Rights, I.P.Q. 
1999, 3, 349-371 (hereafter Drahos), p. 7. 
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the subjects of fundamental rights protection. Challenges related to extending 
fundamental rights protection to legal persons shall be evaluated later in chapter 7.
2.3.  STATES OBLIGATIONS AND APPLICABILITY OF 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Rights are often classified to “individual and group rights”. Individual rights, 
often referred to as civil and political rights (such as right to freedom of speech 
or property right), are often considered “first generation rights” as provided e.g. 
by United Nations Convention on Civil and Political Rights. They serve to protect 
individuals against interventions of the government. As their intention is to prevent 
governments from threatening individuals, they are often called negative rights. 
Group or collective rights, which are also called as “second generation rights”, are 
social, economic and cultural in their nature (such as a right to be employed, right 
to housing and right to health care). They are generally constitutional assignments 
obligating governments to act in a certain (positive) way and aim to ensure equal 
treatment for citizens. Regarding the relationship of individual and collective rights 
the general rule is that if in conflict, individual rights override collective rights.58 
Consequently the above mentioned means that States are obligated to guarantee 
that rights protected in Article 27 of the UDHR and Article 15 of the ICESCR are 
respected. One could also describe that as it pertains to the right to science and 
culture and protection for basic material interests resulting from creative works, 
States are obligated to respect, protect and fulfill them.59 In more detail the right 
58 In general regarding he classification between individual and collective rights in more detail see Mylly, p. 163 ff, Heikki 
Karapuu, Perusoikeuksien tausta ja yleinen sisältö, published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (eds.) Helsinki 2011, p 72 - 73 
and Kaarlo Tuori, Tuomarivaltio – uhka vai myytti, Lakimies 6/2003, p. 935. See also Committee Report 1992:3, p. 50 
ff., Matti Pellonpää, Europeiska Människorätts konventionen. Helsinki 2007 (hereafter Pellonpää I). p. 25 ff and Kaarlo 
Tuori, Toomas Kootkas, Sosiaalioikeus. 4th renewed edition. Juva 2008. p. 179 ff and Tarmo Miettinen, Tieteen vapaus. 
Jyväskylä 2001 (hereafter Miettinen), p. 30 and 43 ff. So called “third generation rights”, as a right to healthy environment 
and a right to natural resources, are often referred to as “soft law”. Significance of the third generation rights is somewhat 
unclear and often the two first generations are mentioned as more significant ones. For this reason they shall not be 
discussed in the article in more detail. See e.g. Committee Report 1992:3, p. 50.
59 See General Comment 17, paragraph 28 and General Comment 21 paragraph 48. The obligations have also been stated 
e.g. in United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Thirty-ninth 
session 5-23 November 2007, General Comment No. 19: The Right to Social Security, paragraph 43, United Nations, 
Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Thirty-fifth session 7-25 November 
2005, General Comment No. 18: The Right to Work, paragraph 22, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Thirty-fifth session 7-25 November 2005, General Comment No. 
17: The Right of everyone to benefit from the protection of the moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, 
literary or artistic production of which he or she is the author, paragraph 28, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, 
Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Thirty-fourth session,  Geneva, 25 April - 13 May 2005, General 
Comment No. 16: The equal right of men and women to the enjoyment of all economic, social and cultural rights, paragraph 
17, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Twenty-ninth 
session,  Geneva, 11-29 November 2002, General Comment No. 15: The Right to water, paragraph 20 and United Nations, 
Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Twenty-second session,  Geneva, 
25 April - 12 May 2000, General Comment No. 14: The Right to highest attainable standard of health, paragraph 33. See 
also Shaver, p. 125 – 126 and Shaver and Sganga, p 15 – 16. 
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to respect requires the States refrain from interfering directly or indirectly with the 
enjoyment of the rights. The obligation to protect requires States to take steps to 
prevent third parties from interfering with the protected rights. Finally the obligation 
to fulfill requires States parties to take appropriate legislative, administrative, 
judicial, budgetary, promotional and other measures aimed at the full realization 
of the rights.60 
As fundamental rights pose negative or positive obligations to governments, 
private individuals have not traditionally been directly obligated by their effect.61 
However, it has been acknowledged that fundamental rights may also have 
horizontal effects obligating individuals in their mutual relations (individual – 
individual or individual – other private legal entity). This effect is often referred 
to as Drittwirkung, a term based on German legal discourse.62 Regarding ECHR 
references especially to articles 8 (right to privacy), 9 (freedom of thought, conscience 
and religion), 10 (freedom of expression), 11 (freedom of assembly) and article 2 of 
Protocol 4 (freedom of movement) have been made. However, under the case law of 
the European Court of Human Rights the scope has been broadened even further.63 
In practice horizontal effects mean that weigh should be given to the principle 
of equality. In other words private parties in an equal position barely form a 
constitutional threat to each other. Instead economic power concentrations threat 
more easily constitutional rights of those associating with these concentrations. 
Obligation to protect the weaker party is emphasized the more disproportionate 
the relationship of the parties is.64
Despite the above mentioned, it has been uncommon in practice to give relevance 
to horizontal effects of fundamental rights.65 However, considering how power 
60 Regarding the right to science see similarly e.g. Miettinen, p. 264 ff.
61 Mylly, p. 180 and Ojanen, p. 117.
62 See e.g. Committee Report 1992: 3, p. 129 – 132 and Government Bill 309/93 vp., p. 29. In general about horizontal 
effects, see e.g. Länsineva, p. 103 – 105, Hidén, p. 21 – 22 and Anders von Koskull, Personuppgiftslagens tillämplighet 
på manuell behandling vid rekrytering till jobb. En fråga om grundläggande rättigheter. JFT 6/2002 (hereafter Koskull), p. 
624 ff, Veli-Pekka Viljanen, Perusoikeuksien soveltamisala, published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (eds.) Helsinki 2011, p. 
134 ff and Heikki Karapuu, Perusoikeuksien tausta ja yleinen sisältö, published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (eds.) Helsinki 
2011, p 86.
63  See Mylly, p. 183. See also Ojanen, p. 117. Significant cases have been Walrave, Bosman and Defrenne. In the case 
Walrave, Case C-36/74 Walrave and Koch v Association Union Cycliste Internationale [1974] ECR 1405, the European 
Court of Justice ruled that prohibition against discrimination and freedom of movement of workers applied to a private 
association as rules of the association collectively aimed regulating gainful employment and services. In Bosman, Case 
C-415/93 Union Royale Belge des Sociétés de Football Association ASBL v Jean-Marc Bosman [1995] ECR  I-4921, the 
European Court of Justice followed similar reasoning as in Walrave and stated that “Article 48 of the EEC Treaty precludes 
the application of rules laid down by sporting associations, under which a professional footballer who is a national of one 
Member State may not, on the expiry of his contract with a club, be employed by a club of another Member State unless 
the latter club has paid to the former club a transfer, training or development fee.“ In Defrenne, Case C-43/75 Defrenne 
v Sabena [1976] ECR 455, the European Court of Justice ruled that the prohibition on discrimination between men and 
women “applies not only to the action of public authorities, but also extends to all agreements which are intended to 
regulate paid labour collectively, as well as to contracts between individuals.” 
64  See e.g. Kaarlo Tuori and Juha Lavapuro, Perusoikeuksien ja ihmisoikeuksien turvaamisvelvollisuus (PL 22§), published 
in Hallberg (eds.), Perusoikeudet, Helsinki 2011, p. 814, Koskull, p. 626 – 627 and Pekka Länsineva, Konstitutionalismi, 
perusoikeudet ja yksityinen valta. Lakimies 7-8/2006, p. 1177 – 1190, especially, p. 1184 and Länsineva, p. 103 – 105.
65 See Mylly p. 187 and The Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in C-275/06, Productores de Música de España (Promusicae) 
v Telefonica de España SAU [2008] ECR I-271 (at para 114).
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balances between transnational corporations and states have changed as corporations 
have become sufficiently powerful to even pose threat to governments66, increasing 
amounts of claims have been made that protection afforded by fundamental rights 
should also extend to private parties and especially to the power of large corporations. 
In the words of Mylly: 
“An increasing number of legal scholars see restricting the effects of 
fundamental to the relationship between the state and the individual as 
increasingly inadequate. Globally operating corporations, in particular, 
should according to many be responsible for fundamental rights 
violations under international law in some circumstances. They are 
increasingly powerful actors that some states lack the resources and 
some states the will to control, thus making the sole reliance on state 
duties inadequate. Such corporations may exercise major power over 
individuals and directly control their well being.”67 
From the viewpoint of this book it is relevant to note that also General Comment 
21 regarding the right to science and culture as provided in Article 15(a) of the 
ICESCR explicitly states that a violation of the right to science and culture “can 
occur through the direct action of a State party or of other entities or institutions 
that are insufficiently regulated by the State party, including, in particular, those 
in the private sector. Many violations of the right to take part in cultural life occur 
when States parties prevent access to cultural life, practices, goods and services 
by individuals or communities.”68 In particular the General Comment has posited 
the States parties an obligation to pay attention “to the adverse consequences of 
globalization, undue privatization of goods and services, and deregulation on the 
right to participate in cultural life.”69 The Constitutional Law Committee in Finland 
has also emphasized the idea that courts applying and interpreting copyright 
legislation should also take balance between copyright and other possibly conflicting 
rights – i.e. horizontal effects – into consideration.70 
66 See e.g. Joel Bakan, The Corporation, the Pathological Pursuit for Profit and Power, New York 2004 (hereafter Bakan), p. 
25: “Corporations have become sufficiently powerful to pose a threat to governments … and that is particularly the case with 
respect to multinational corporations, who will have much less dependence upon the positions of particular governments 
… corporations and their leaders have displaced politics and politicians as … the new high priests and reigning oligarchs 
of our system.” See also Harding, Kohl and Salmon, p. 24, footnote 3 with references to literature documenting literature 
regarding corporations as human rights abusers.
67 See Mylly, p. 181-182 (emphasis original). See also Mylly, p. 191 ff, explaining possible limits for horizontal effects. See 
also Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 50.
68  See General Comment 21, paragraph 62 (emphasis added). 
69 See General Comment 21, paragraph 50(b).
70 Committee Report 7/2005, p. 2. Section 106 of the CF explicitly sets on obligation for courts not to apply a regular 
law, which contradicts with the Constitution. It could be mentioned that also paragraph 31 of the General Comment 17 
posits states parties obligation to prevent third parties from infringing the material interests of authors resulting from 
their productions. However, this protectionism shall be evaluated in more detail in its own chapter discussing copyright 
protection. 
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Finally it should be noted that regardless of whether one accepts direct horizontal 
effects of fundamental rights states have in any case a positive obligation to take 
actions to restrict breaches of human rights conducted by private actors. In other 
words it is a violation for the state to actively restrict enjoyment of a right, as well 
as to fail preventing other private parties from restricting enjoyment of a right.71 For 
this reason in the end “human rights enter the picture because the state permitted 
the breach of a right to occur.”72 
2.4.  REGARDING POSSIBILITIES TO LIMIT FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHTS
In an ideal democracy and constitutional State there should not be restrictions 
between fundamental rights and democracy. In fact fundamental rights are seen 
as prerequisites for democracy and must be protected also from possible violations 
of the legislator. According to Tuori one could talk of necessary self-restraints, 
which restrain activities of the legislator by controlling that fundamental rights 
are protected.73 Thus fundamental rights and especially their protected core areas 
trump other rights and objectives (such as economics, if needed) in society. Certain 
fundamental rights have also been regarded as absolute. For example, under ECHR 
no derogation is permitted from right to life (except deaths resulting from lawful acts 
of war). Respectively fundamental rights protect from torture, inhuman, degrading 
treatment or punishment, slavery and retroactive criminal offences.74 Melander 
considers also legality principle with its sub-principles as an absolute principle.75
Nevertheless, as fundamental rights may also overlap, strengthen or limit each 
other’s scope they are also relative and may consequently be subject to restrictions.76 
In this respect the European Court of Justice has presented a proportionality 
test aiming to balance or weigh approach to fundamental rights. It characterizes 
methods used in all of the European countries and also the European Court of 
71 Shaver, p. 167 and especially footnote 184. 
72 Mylly, p. 182 (emphasis original).
73 See Kaarlo Tuori, Kriittinen oikeuspositivismi (translated into English as Critical legal positivism), Juva 2000, p 234 ff. See 
also Kaarlo Tuori Tuomarivaltio – uhka vai myytti, Lakimies 6/2003, p. 916 and Sakari Melander, Kriminalisointiteoria 
– rangaistavaksi säätämisen oikeudelliset rajoitukset, Suomalaisen lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja, A-Sarja N:o 288, a 
doctoral dissertation. Vammala 2008 (hereafter Melander), p.71 ff. Also Wahlroos as as economist seems to accept this 
startingpoint. See, Björn Wahlroos, Markinat ja Demokratia, loppu enemmistön tyrannialle, Keuruu 2012, p. 182.
74 See articles 2, 3 and 4 of the ECHR. See also Ojanen, p. 121. In Finland also sub principles of the principle of legality 
are regarded as absolute. Melander, p. 75. Such principles are a requirement for accuracy regarding provisions to set 
criminalisations. Also the principle prohibiting to institute legal actions twice for the same cause of action (ne bis in idem) 
may be considered as a sub principle of principle of legality.  
75 See Melander, p. 75.
76 See Mylly, p. 163. Mylly (footnote 57) refers to Rawls and points out that rights are self-limiting as well: “based on the 
fact that the basic liberties are to be the same for everyone and we can accordingly obtain greater liberty for ourselves 
if the same greater liberty is granted to everyone. This in turn could lead to unworkable and socially divisive extensions 
reducing the effective scope of the freedom in question.”
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Human rights.77 The proportionality test is comprised of three parts. The first asks 
whether the limitation of a right by an act of the Community institutions has a 
legitimate or justified aim or purpose from the standpoint of the objectives of the 
Treaty on European Union. The second part evaluates whether the act limiting a 
fundamental right is indispensable for the achievement of its goal. It is inquired 
from the viewpoint of human rights if more lenient means would be available for 
reaching the desired goal. Finally in the third stage it is examined if the restrictions 
are proportionate and tolerable interference to the human rights in relation to 
the pursued aim. At this stage a balance between the pursued goal and restricted 
human rights is evaluated.78 It could be mentioned that ECJ has also regarded such 
general principles as legitimate expectations, non-discrimination and transparency 
relevant in its case law.79 Moreover, the Courts of the European Community have 
recognized that there may be collective goods justifying a restriction of an individual’s 
fundamental rights.80 This requires weighing between the collective and individual 
right in relation to the possible restriction to the fundamental rights in question.
Finally it should be emphasized that possibilities to limit fundamental rights 
should be taken into consideration also because they are connected to possibilities 
to criminalize activities in a society. As a criminalization means a possibility to use 
public (coercive) power, it is clear that standards for criminalizing activities are 
high. For example, according to the Finnish Constitution, law cannot forbid actions 
the constitution specifically entitles. The Constitutional Law Committee has also 
stated that pecuniary penalty means interfering to the property of the convicted and 
imprisonment means interfering to a person’s right to liberty.81 Therefore, thorough 
77 In general Article 4 of the ICESCR states about possibilities to set limitations. Regarding the right to science and culture 
and the right to material interests resulting from creative works the principle the principle of proportionality has been 
stated in General Comment 21, paragraph 19 and General Comment 17, paragraph 23.  See also Mylly, p. 165, Ojanen, 
p. 130.
78 Paul Craig, Grainne de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, second edition, Oxford University Press 1998, 
p. 349 ff. See also Ojanen, p. 98 – 99 and p. 129, footnote 114. See also Craig, P. and de Búrca, G.: EC Law. Text, 
Cases, & Materials. Clarendon Press. Oxford 1995 (hereafter Craig and de Burca), p. 340 – 349 and de Búrca, G: The 
Language of Rights and European Integration. In Shaw, J. And More, G. (eds.), New Legal Dynamics of European Union. 
Clarendon Press, Oxford 1995 (hereafter Búrca 1995), p. 52.  The conditions set by the proportionality test may also be 
read from a Memorandum of the Constitutional Law Committee of Finland regarding general conditions for restricting 
constitutional rights in the CF. See Memorandum of the Constitutional Law Committee 25/1994 vp, p. 5. See also Sakari 
Melander, Kriminalisointiteoria – rangaistavaksi säätämisen oikeudelliset rajoitukset. A Doctoral Dissertation. Vammala 
2008 (hereafter Melander), p. 118. It is also possible to restrict the constitutional rights by way of exception i.e. when a 
limiting a constitutional right with a normal law is not possible. These types of restrictions are in principle forbidden and 
possible only thorough emergency laws, which necessitates same legislative procedure as enacting a constitutional right 
would necessitate. However, such legislative cannot affect the constitutional system as a whole. See Veli-Pekka Viljanen, 
Perusoikeuksien rajoittaminen, published in Hallberg (et al), Perusoikeudet, Helsinki 2011, p. 144 – 164. 
79  Principle of legitimate expectations is connected to legal certainty and applies especially against retroactive measures. 
The principle of non-discrimination postulates that similarly placed persons should not be discriminated.  Paul Craig, 
Grainne de Búrca, EU Law, Text, Cases and Materials, second edition, Oxford University Press 1998, p. 349 ff. See also 
Ojanen, p. 98 – 99.
80 See Mylly, p. 168 where he refers to Familiapress-case, Case C-368/95, Vereinigte Familiapress Zeitungsverlags- und 
vertriebs GmbH v Heinrich Bauer Verlag [1997] ECR, I-3689. In the case it was regarded that importance of press diversity 
may weigh more than a restriction to pose quantitative or equivalent measures that restrict imports. The case also showed 
how collective right related to freedom of speech may trump individual element of the same right.  
81  See Memorandum of the Constitutional Law Committee 23/1997 vp, p. 2. See also Melander, p. 118 – 119. According 
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criminal punishment, the Constitutional Law Committee of Finland has defined 
that criminal system always touches constitutional rights.82 Therefore individual 
criminalizations should always be evaluated as limitations to constitutional rights as 
enacting a penal provision requires that general and possible special requirements 
for limiting constitutional rights should be fulfilled.83 How the above analysis applies 
in relation to the right to science and culture and to the rights of authors shall be 
evaluated next.
to Melander the memorandum of the Constitutional Law Committee (23/1997) is focal since in the memorandum the 
Constitutional Law Committee developed general principles related to relationship of constitutional rights and criminal 
law.
82 Melander, p. 119. Furthermore there are also certain constitution-based absolute limits for penal provisions related to 
possibilities to criminalize and enact punitive sanctions. Such are retroactive criminal law, death penalty, prohibition to 
torture or other punishments violating human dignity. See Melander, p. 75 and Ojanen, p. 121.
83 See Memorandum of the Constitutional Law Committee 23/1997 vp, p. 2 and Melander, p. 118 – 120 and p. 302 ff. 
Regarding the relationship of criminal law to the general possibilities to restrict constitutional rights the Constitutional 
Law Committee in Finland has concluded that: 1) A restriction must be based on law. This requirement may be derived 
also principle of legality enacted in Section 8 of the Constitution of Finland. 2) A restriction must be accurate. Also this 
requirement is derived from the principle of legality. 3) A restriction must be acceptable. A criminalisation must have 
a cogent social need justification from the viewpoint of the constitutional rights. 4) The core of a constitutional right 
cannot be restricted with a regular law. Every constitutional right has a core area protecting certain activities that cannot 
be criminalized. 5) A restriction must be proportionate. This means that the criminalization must be in proportion to the 
objective it aims to protect. It should be considered whether desired objective could be achieved by other means but 
thorough criminalization. 6) A requirement for necessary legal protection refers to possibilities to make an appeal and to 
other procedural rights. 7) A requirement to follow obligations set by human rights. See also Committee Report 25/1994, 
vp., p. 5 and Veli-Pekka Viljanen, Perusoikeuksien rajoittaminen, published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (eds.) Helsinki 
2011, p. 160.
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3 THE RIGHT TO SCIENCE AND CULTURE
He who receives an idea from me, receives instruction himself without 
lessening mine; as he who lights his taper at mine, receives light without 
darkening me. 
- Thomas Jefferson, Letter to Isaac McPherson, 13 August 1813.
3.1. JUDICIAL BACKGROUND 
Article 27(1) of the UDHR states “Everyone has the right freely to participate in the 
cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific advancement 
and its benefits.” A corresponding right has been provided in Article 15 1(a)(b) and 
3 of the ICESCR. Although there has been little literature analyzing the “right to 
science and culture”, from a historical perspective at least the following justifications 
for its existence have been given.84 
One aim of the right was to prevent misuse of science and technology as especially 
done during the Hitler’s regime.85 It was also believed that the right could reject 
“Communism’s embrace of statism in favor of social democratic principles.”86 
UNESCO on the other hand believed that the right to science and culture promotes 
collaboration among the nations through education, science and culture, which 
also contributes to peace and security.87 Finally, UDHR has also been connected to 
the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man, which was completed 
about six months earlier containing rights similar to Article 27 of the UDHR.88 
84 In words of Chapman: “… this right is so obscure and its interpretation so neglected that the overwhelming majority 
of human rights advocates, governments, and international human rights bodies appear to be oblivious to its existence.” 
See Audrey R. Chapman, Towards on Understanding of the Right to Enjoy the Benefits of Scientific Progress and Its 
Applications, Journal of Human Rights, 8:1-36, 2009 (hereafter Chapman), p. 1. See also Shaver, p. 126 with footnotes 
and p. 151-153.
85 Chapman, p. 5 and Shaver, p. 135.
86 Shaver, p. 135.
87 Shaver, 141 – 142, Shaver, Lea Bishop and Sganga, Caterina, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: On Copyright and 
Human Rights (July 21, 2009). Wisconsin International Law Journal, Vol. 27, p. 637, 2009 (hereafter Shaver and Sganga, 
emphasis added). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1437319 and Chapman, p. 5. UNESCO was founded in 
1945 “to contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the nations through education, science and 
culture.” See Article 1(1), of the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation, 
adopted in London on 16 November 1945 (hereafter UNESCO Constitution). 
88 Subsection 1 of the Article 13 of the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man provides that “Every person 
has the right to take part in the cultural life of the community, to enjoy the arts, and to participate in the benefits that 
result from intellectual progress, especially scientific discoveries.” Subsection 2 continues that “He likewise has the right 
to the protection of his moral and material interests as regards his inventions or any literary, scientific or artistic works of 
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Following the American Declaration of the Rights and Duties of Man framers of 
Article 27 of the UDHR were “concerned with ensuring universal access to the 
fruits of science and technology, as well as to the realm of cultural and artistic life, 
broadly understood.”89 Thus history of the article 27(1) of the UDHR explains only 
in rather general terms assumed benefits related to the right science and culture.
Despite this and although the right has been without closer attention for longer 
time several international instruments has kept referring “to the right to equal 
participation in cultural activities;90 the right to participate in all aspects of social 
and cultural life;91 the right to participate fully in cultural and artistic life;92 the right 
of access to and participation in cultural life;93 and the right to take part on an equal 
basis with others in cultural life.94 Instruments on civil and political rights,95 on the 
rights of persons belonging to minorities to enjoy their own culture, to profess and 
practise their own religion, and to use their own language, in private and in public,96 
and to participate effectively in cultural life,97 on the rights of indigenous peoples 
to their cultural institutions, ancestral lands, natural resources and traditional 
knowledge,98 and on the right to development.”99 Interest towards the right to science 
and culture as provided in Article 27(1) has also increased. In addition to legal 
literature100 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights 
has published in 2009  General Comment No. 21 discussing the rights protected 
under Article 15 1 (a) of the ICESCR. 
Therefore, it may be argued that the right to science and culture exists and should 
correspondingly be given relevance.101 Consequently in general terms it could already 
at this point be stated that the right to science and culture is similar to other human 
rights in that it is a universal, indivisible and interdependent right.102 It is a freedom 
which he is the author. 
89 See Shaver, p. 134. Shaver also refers to Johannes Morsink who argues that the final document also rejects Communism’s 
embrace of statism in favour of social democratic principles. Shaver, p. 135, where she refers to Johannes Morsink’s book, 
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: Origins, Drafting and Intent 1 (1999).
90 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, art. 5 (e) (vi).
91 Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women, art. 13 (c).
92 Convention on the Rights of the Child, art. 31, para. 2.
93  International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families, art. 43, 
para. 1 (g).
94 Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities, art. 30, para. 1.
95 In particular the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, arts. 17, 18, 19, 21 and 22.
96 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, art. 27.
97 Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities, art. 2, paras. 
1 and 2. See also Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities (Council of Europe, ETS No. 157), 
art. 15.
98 United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, in particular arts. 5, 8, and 10–13 ff. See also ILO 
Convention No. 169 concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in Independent Countries, in particular arts. 2, 5, 7, 8, 
and 13–15 ff. 
99 Declaration on the Right to Development (General Assembly resolution 41/128), art. 1. In its general comment No. 4, 
paragraph 9, the Committee considers that rights cannot be viewed in isolation from other human rights contained in the 
two international Covenants and other applicable international instruments. See General Comment 21, paragraph 3. 
100 See Shaver (passim) and Shaver and Sganga (passim).
101 See also Shaver, p. 155.
102 General Comment 21, paragraph 1. 
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obligating States both abstention/non-interference with the exercise of the right and 
positive action to secure the right, which means ensuring preconditions to realize 
the right.103 How this could take place in more concrete shall be evaluated next.
3.1.1. A RIGHT FOR “EVERYONE”
Article 27(1) of the UDHR and Article 15 1(a)(b) of the ICESCR provide protection 
for “everyone”. In more detail paragraph 9 of the General Comment 21 defines 
that” “In its general comment No.17 on the right to benefit from the protection 
of moral and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic 
production of which one is the author, the Committee recognizes that the term 
“everyone” in the first line of article 15 may denote the individual or the collective; 
in other words, cultural rights may be exercised by a person (a) as an individual, 
(b) in association with others, or (c) within a community or group, as such.”104 
Following the starting point of fundamental rights, protection provided by the right 
to science and culture is in principle granted to natural persons. It covers also the 
“common man” i.e. not merely limited for professionals.105 This is noteworthy as 
due to societal development as anyone can be a content producer and a user i.e. 
a prosumer. It should be noted that also freedom of science extends outside the 
academia, even to plain users of science.106 
However, as explained, the right to science and culture covers also individuals 
“in association with others, or within a community or group”. Similarly freedom 
of science as protected in Article 15 (3) of the ICESCR and Section 16(3) of the CF 
provides protection for everyone although the protection is especially intended for 
researchers and scientific communities.107 Just as freedom of expression is fulfilled 
103 General Comment 21, paragraphs 6 and 44.
104 General Comment 21, paragraph 9.
105 See Shaver, p. 143 and 154, Shaver and Sganga, p. 9 – 12 and Chapman, p. 5 – 6. The general comment also makes 
specific references persons requiring special protection, which are women (para. 25), children (paras. 26 and 27), older 
persons (paras. 28 and 29), persons with disabilities (paras. 30 and 31), minorities (paras. 32 and 33), migrants (paras. 34 
and 35), indigenous peoples (paras. 36 and 37) and persons living in poverty (paras. 38 and 39). However, one should not 
understand that protection provided to persons requiring special protection would somehow be stronger than protection 
provided to a “common man”. Instead governments have a special positive obligation to ensure that also persons requiring 
special protection are able to take part in cultural life in a similar manner as a common man.  
106 This is because a definition for what is science is wide as any content which attempts to find truth with conviction, plan 
and sufficient form may be regarded as science. Albert Einstein’s theory of relativity may be given as a practical example 
of a scientific work conducted outside the academia. The theory was created in 1905, but Einstein got his first academic 
post only in 1909. See in more detail Kari Enqvist, Albert Einstein – mies ja tekoset, teoksessa Suhteellista?, Einsteinin 
suhteellisuusteorian jalanjäljillä, Jan Rydman (toim.), Tieteen päivät 2005, Yliopistopaino Kustannus ja Tieteellisen seurain 
valtuuskunta, p. 16–19. See also Pentti Arajärvi, Oikeus sivistykseen. Sivistykselliset persuoikeudet, oppivelvollisuus ja 
oikeuksien toteutumisen takeet. Helsinki 1994, p. 110. Thus also low quality science conducted by hobbyists is protected 
although it cannot escape scientific criticism. Miettinen, p. 269 – 270. 
107 See Miettinen, p.270 and Pirjo Kontkanen, Tekijänoikeudet yliopistotutkimuksessa -ja opetuksessa. IPR University Center 
2006 (hereafter Kontkanen 2006), p. 42. It could be mentioned that one may separate freedom of research (i.e. a right to 
de research by choosing a research method and topic), freedom of teaching and studying (i.e. a right to make decisions 
regarding teaching and a right to study topics one is interested in) and freedom of science (i.e. protectionism against 
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in a social context or the right to privacy protects families108, the right to science 
and culture protects scientific and cultural communities and groups from public 
authorities or other external influence. As these communities and groups need not 
to be perceived as legal persons it may be asked how the protection of individuals 
in a community or a group is being arranged? 
As it pertains to scientific communities it has been argued e.g. in Finland that 
the protection is derived from the autonomy of universities, which is protected in 
Section 123 (1) of the CF. This institutional protection for scientific communities 
would protect decision making related to evaluation and orientation of scientific 
research as a right to self-criticism is an important institutional right for the scientific 
community.109 According to Miettinen the right would also protect procedural forms 
of autonomy and the right to self criticism regardless of how the autonomy has 
been organized in practice. However, as there is no specific subject for protection, 
Miettinen understands that scientific communities would be protected indirectly 
through individuals involved.110 Therefore a right for scientific communities would 
mean that universities (and to some extent other educational institutions) are 
entitled to self-organize teaching, manage their property, nominate teachers and 
officials, make suggestions regarding legislation on universities, decide on teaching 
and research, make financial decisions, make decisions regarding their internal 
governance and administration and provide standards as Universities Act and 
University Decree enable.111 As a possibility to decide on research and teaching 
belongs also to the centre of university autonomy, scientific and educational 
communities should also have a possibility to decide on the relevant content used 
for research and teaching without external obstacles.112
The analysis does not yet answer to the question of what groups or communities 
the right to science and culture could protect. For example, in the above analysis 
for protectionism of scientific communities is derived from a specific constitutional 
norm (Section 123 of the CF providing autonomy of universities). No such specific 
norms exist for the right to science and culture in the constitution of Finland.113 In this 
respect, it seems somewhat unclear on what grounds other groups or communities 
external interfering) from each other. Miettinen, p. 256. See also Government Bill 309/1993, p. 64. 
108 See e.g. Miettinen, p. 272.
109 Kaarlo Tuori, Sivistykselliset perusoikeudet (CF 16 and 123), published in Hallberg, Pekka (et al): Perusoikeudet. Oikeuden 
perusteokset, Helsinki 2011 (hereafter Tuori), p. 625 – 628.
110 Miettinen, p. 271 – 275 and p. 292. 
111 Government Bill 250/1990, p. 5, Committe Report 9/1997, p. 3, Government Bill 263/1996 vp., p. 12 and Miettinen, p. 
271 – 279, 292, 293 and especially 408 ff and Tuori, p. 528 ff.
112  It should be remembered that protection for scientific communities may also extend outside the academia. Miettinen, p. 
271 and Tuori, p. 530 – 531. According to Tuori this would provide e.g. justifications for having members of scientific 
communities in institutions deciding on funding for research. He also states that freedom of art may extend e.g. to theatres 
maintained by public authorities and would provide theatres freedom to make decisions regarding their artistic solutions. 
Tuori, p. 531. 
113  It could be mentioned that a similar norm exists for Sami people of Finland. Section 17.3 of the Constitution of Finland 
provides that “The Sami, as an indigenous people, as well as the Roma and other groups, have the right to maintain and 
develop their own language and culture. Provisions on the right of the Sami to use the Sami language before the authorities 
are laid down by an Act
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could be protected.114 Nevertheless, as the norm exists in the UDHR and ICESCR 
it cannot be neglected. Thus, one could contemplate whether the right to science 
and culture could extend its protection at least indirectly through individuals e.g. 
to Wikipedia and other similar online communities. However, as there is only little 
analysis regarding the right to science and culture it is somewhat challenging to give 
more specific definitions when it could extend its effect to groups and communities.
3.1.2. CULTURAL LIFE 
As it pertains to defining culture, General Comment 21 states that “Various 
definitions of ‘culture’ have been postulated in the past and others may arise in 
the future. All of them, however, refer to the multifaceted content implicit in the 
concept of culture. In the Committee’s view, culture is a broad, inclusive concept 
encompassing all manifestations of human existence. The expression ‘cultural 
life’ is an explicit reference to culture as a living process, historical, dynamic and 
evolving, with a past, a present and a future”.115 In more concretely a definition of 
culture “encompasses, inter alia, ways of life, language, oral and written literature, 
music and song, non-verbal communication, religion or belief systems, rites and 
ceremonies, sport and games, methods of production or technology, natural and 
man-made environments, food, clothing and shelter and the arts, customs and 
traditions through which individuals, groups of individuals and communities 
express their humanity and the meaning they give to their existence, and build 
their world view representing their encounter with the external forces affecting 
their lives. Culture mirrors the values of well-being and the economic, social and 
political life of individuals, groups of individuals and communities”.116 In legal 
literature it has also been specified that cultural life includes among other things 
e.g. folklore, scientific journals, how-to books, and Wikipedia; storytelling, Haiku, 
detective novels, blogs, folk songs, the Beatles, mp3s, Ndebele house paintings, 
Pablo Picasso, scrap-booking, digital photography, performance, kabuki theatre, 
Bollywood, YouTube and all new media and genres that may arise in the future.117 
Thus concept of culture also covers new forms of culture, such as e.g. digital culture.118 
Consequently, we may see that a definition of “cultural life” should be understood 
to be broadly referring to both science and arts. 
Due to the wide formulations we may see that also scientific expressions belong 
under the concept of cultural life. This may be read e.g. from the wording of the Article 
114 Similarly also Miettinen, p. 274.
115 General Comment 21, paragraphs 10 and 11.
116 General Comment 21, paragraphs 13. See also Shaver and Sganga, p. 642 – 645.
117 Shaver and Sganga, p. 644 – 645.
118 Shaver and Sganga, p. 664. See also Shaver, p. 156.
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27(1) of the UDHR and from the Constitution of the United Nations Educational, 
Scientific and Cultural Organization.119 Also paragraph 49 of the General Comment 
21120 and Constitutional Law Committee of Finland has connected scientific research 
to cultural rights.121 Therefore, as freedom of science overlaps with the right to science 
and culture, obtaining new knowledge, sharing of information, scientific teaching 
and publishing, freedom of teaching and freedom to conduct research may also be 
regarded to be part of the right to science and culture.122 
3.1.3. THE RIGHT TO “PARTICIPATE/TAKE PART IN”
“The right to take part in” forms an essential right related to the right to science and 
culture as it specifies the obligations for states to secure.123 According to General 
Comment 21 the right “to participate/take part in” consists of three interrelated 
components, which are (a) participation, (b) access to, and (c) contribution to 
cultural life.124 
Participation covers “the right of everyone – alone, or in association with others 
or as a community – to act freely, to choose his or her own identity, to identify or 
not with one or several communities or the change that choice, to take part in the 
political life of society, to engage in one’s own cultural practices and to express 
oneself in the language of one’s choice. Everyone also has the right to seek and 
develop cultural knowledge and expressions and to share them with others, as well 
as to act creatively and take part in creative activity.”125 
119 As explained, Article 27(1) of the UDHR protects grantes everyone a right “to enjoy the arts and to share in scientific 
advancement. Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Article 1(1) and 1(2c) 
on the other hand aims to contribute to “education, science and culture” (Art 1.1) and to “maintain, increase and diffuse 
knowledge by assuring the conservation and protection of the world’s inheritance of books, works of art and monuments 
of history and science…” See Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Article 
1(1) and 1(2c). See also the Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Co-operation, Records of the General 
Conference, Fourteenth Session, Paris 1966, Articles 3 – 4. In more detail see also Shaver, p. 142 – 143.
120 It provides that to the “obligation to respect includes the adoption of specific measures aimed at achieving respect for the 
right of everyone … (c) To enjoy the freedom to create … which implies that States parties must abolish censorship of 
cultural activities in the arts and other forms of expression, if any; This obligation is closely related to the duty of States 
parties, under article 15, paragraph 3, ‘to respect the freedom indispensable for scientific research and creative activity.’” 
See General Comment 21, paragraph 49 and 49(c). 
121 Committee Report 1992:3 (a memorandum of the Fundamental Rights Committee), p. 370 – 371 where the Constitutional 
Committee states that “Freedom of science, art and higher education create conditions for development of culture. See 
also Miettinen, p. 262.
122 Miettinen, p. 256285 – 286 and p. 480 ff. As explained, one may also separate freedom of research (i.e. a right to de 
research by choosing a research method and topic), freedom of teaching and studying (i.e. a teachers right to make decisions 
regarding teaching and a student’s right to study topics one is interested in) and freedom of science (i.e. protectionism 
against external interfering). See also Kontkanen, p. 98 – 99.
123  See also the Preamble of The UNESCO Constitution, which in general provides a similar right by stating that ”The 
Governments of the States Parties to this Constitution on behalf of their peoples declare … That the wide diffusion of 
culture, and the education of humanity for justice and liberty and peace are indispensable to the dignity of man and 
constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfill in a spirit of mutual assistance and concern.” 
124 General Comment 21, paragraph, 14 and 15. In general see also Shaver and Sganga, p. 645 – 646 and Shaver, p. 169 ff.
125 General Comment 21, paragraph 15(a)
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Access is an important part of the right. It “covers in particular the right of 
everyone – alone, or in association with others or as a community – to know 
and understand his or her own culture and that of others through education and 
information, and to receive quality education and training with due regard for 
cultural identity. Everyone has also the right to learn about forms of expression and 
dissemination through any technical medium of information or communication, 
to follow a way of life associated with the use of cultural goods and resources such 
as and resources such as land, water, biodiversity, language or specific institutions, 
and to benefit from the cultural heritage and the creation of other individuals and 
communities.”126 
“Contribution to cultural life refers to the right of everyone to be involved 
in creating the spiritual, material, intellectual, and emotional expressions of the 
community. This is supported by the right to take part in the development of 
the community to which a person belongs, and in the definition, elaboration and 
implementation of policies and decisions that have an impact on the exercise of a 
person’s cultural rights.”127
In addition the General Comment 21 specifies that there are necessary conditions 
for the full realization of the right of everyone to take part in cultural life on the basis 
of equality and non-discrimination. In this respect it lists availability, accessibility, 
acceptability, adoptability and appropriateness.128 Availability refers to presence 
of cultural goods and services, which are open for everyone to enjoy and benefit 
from through different sources and in various different forms. Availability refers 
to cultural life as something that is being created and enjoyed in communities 
and in public.129 “Accessibility consists of effective and concrete opportunities for 
126 General Comment 21, paragraph 15(b) (emphasis original). See also United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights, Twenty-second session, 25 April – 12 May 2000, General Comment No. 14, The Right to the highest 
attainable standard of health, article 12 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, paragraph 
12 (hereafter General Comment 14) related to the right to science: “Information accessibility: accessibility includes the 
right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas concerning health issues.”
127 General Comment 21, paragraph 15(c) (emphasis original).
128 See similarly Shaver, p. 170 – 171 and United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights, Twenty-first session 15 November- 3 December 1999, General Comment No. 13: The Right to 
Education (hereafter General Comment No 13, United Nations, Economic and Social Council, Committee on Economic, 
Social and Cultural Rights, Twenty-second session, Geneva 25 April - 12 May 2000, General Comment No. 14: The 
Right to the Highest Attainable Standard of Health (hereafter General Comment No 14), United Nations, Economic and 
Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Twentieth session, Geneva 26 April - 14 May 1999, 
General Comment No. 12: Right to Adequate food (hereafter General Comment No 12) and United Nations, Economic 
and Social Council, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Twenty-ninth session, Geneva 11 - 29 November 
2002, General Comment No. 15: The Right to Food (hereafter General Comment No 15). 
129 Article 27(1) of the UDHR explicitly states that “everyone has the right freely to participate in the cultural life of the 
community…” General Comment 21 paragraph 16(a) more specifically describes accessibility as a “presence of cultural 
goods and services that are open for everyone to enjoy and benefit from, including libraries, museums, theatres, cinemas 
and sports stadiums; literature, including folklore, and the arts in all forms; the shared open spaces essential to cultural 
interaction, such as parks, squares, avenues and streets; nature’s gifts, such as seas, lakes, rivers, mountains, forests and 
nature reserves, including the flora and fauna found there, which give nations their character and biodiversity; intangible 
cultural goods, such as languages, customs, traditions, beliefs, knowledge and history, as well as values, which make up 
identity and contribute to the cultural diversity of individuals and communities. Of all the cultural goods, one of special 
value is the productive intercultural kinship that arises where diverse groups, minorities and communities can freely share 
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individuals and communities to enjoy culture fully, within physical and financial 
reach for all in both urban and rural areas, without discrimination. It is essential, 
in this regard, that access for older persons and persons with disabilities, as well as 
for those who live in poverty, is provided and facilitated. Accessibility also includes 
the right of everyone to seek, receive and share information on all manifestations 
of culture in the language of the person’s choice, and the access of communities to 
means of expressions and dissemination.”130 Acceptability on the other hand entails 
that the laws, policies, strategies, programs and measures adopted by the State 
party for the enjoyment of cultural rights should be formulated and implemented 
in such way as to be acceptable to the individuals and communities involved. 
Adaptability on the other hand refers to the flexibility and relevance of strategies, 
policies, programs and measures adopted by the State in any area of cultural life, 
which must be respectful of the cultural diversity of individuals and communities. 
Finally, appropriateness refers to the realization of a specific human rights in a 
way that is pertinent and suitable to a given cultural modality or context, that is, 
respectful of the indigenous people. In this respect one should take into account 
cultural values attached to, inter alia, food and food consumption, the use of water, 
the way health and education services are provided and the way housing designed 
and constructed.131 Therefore, the right to participate consists of several elements that 
States should secure for their citizens. States should especially focus on protecting 
core areas of the right to science and culture.
3.1.4. THE PROTECTED CORE AREAS OF THE RIGHT TO SCIENCE AND CULTURE
When evaluating reciprocal relationship of the right to science and culture and the 
right to material interests resulting from creative works, it is important to define 
their protected core areas. The protected core area of the right to science and culture 
may be read from paragraphs 22 and 55 of the General Comment 21. 
Paragraph 22 stipulates special topics for broad application of the right and states 
that “no shall be excluded from access to cultural practices, goods and services.”132 
Moreover, paragraph 55 of the General Comment stipulating specifically on the core 
obligations of States parties’ states that “the Covenant [ICESCR] entails at least the 
obligation to create and promote an environment within which a person individually, 
or in association with others, or within a community or group, can participate in the 
the same territory.” It could also be mentioned that paragraph 12 of the General Comment 21 postulates that the “concept 
of culture must be seen not as a series of isolated manifestations or hermeneutic compartments, but as an interactive 
process whereby individuals and communities, while preserving their specificities and purposes, give expression to the 
culture of humanity.” 
130 General Comment 21 paragraph 16(a). 
131 General Comment 21 paragraphs 16(c) (d) and (e).
132 See paragraph 22 of the General Comment 21.
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culture of their choice, which includes the following core obligations applicable with 
immediate effect: (a) To take legislative and any other necessary steps to guarantee 
non-discrimination and gender equality in the enjoyment of the right of everyone 
to take part in cultural life; (b) To respect the right of everyone to identify or not 
identify themselves with one or more communities, and the right to change their 
choice; (c) To respect the right of everyone to engage in their own cultural practices, 
while respecting human rights which entails, in particular, respecting freedom of 
thought, belief and religion; freedom of opinion and expression; a person’s right to 
use the language of his or her choice; freedom of association and peaceful assembly; 
and freedom to choose and set up educational establishments; (d) To eliminate any 
barriers or obstacles that inhibit or restrict a persons’ access to the persons own 
culture or to other cultures, without discrimination and without consideration 
for frontiers of any kind; (e) To allow and encourage the participation of persons 
belonging to minority groups, indigenous peoples or to other communities in the 
design and implementation of laws and policies that affect them. In particular, States 
parties should obtain their free and informed prior consent when the preservation 
of their cultural resources, especially those associated with their way of life and 
cultural expression, are at risk.”133 
From the viewpoint of this book, it must be emphasized that that fulfilling the 
element of access belongs to the State parties’ core obligations. Access, on the other 
hand, means, according to paragraph 15(b) of the General Comment that everyone 
has “the right to learn about forms of expression and dissemination through any 
technical medium of information or communication, to follow a way of life associated 
with the use of cultural goods and resources such as and resources such as land, 
water, biodiversity, language or specific institutions, and to benefit from the cultural 
heritage and the creation of other individuals and communities.”134 Moreover, 
accessibility consisted “of effective and concrete opportunities for individuals and 
communities to enjoy culture fully, within physical and financial reach for all in 
both urban and rural areas, without discrimination. It is essential, in this regard, 
that access for older persons and persons with disabilities, as well as for those who 
live in poverty, is provided and facilitated. It also included the right of everyone to 
seek, receive and share information on all manifestations of culture in the language 
of the person’s choice, and the access of communities to means of expressions and 
dissemination.”135 
This important feature of the element of access has also been acknowledged in 
the legal literature. For example, according to Shaver and Sganga the “right ‘to take 
part in’ culture consists in the ability to consume and create, individually and with 
133 General Comment 21 paragraph 55 (emphasis added).
134 General Comment 21, paragraph 15(b) (emphasis original).
135 General Comment 21 paragraph 16(a). 
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others. Culture exists to be shared and to inhabit a culture is to contribute to it.”136 
Therefore, when comparing to the right to science and culture to the protection 
granted to authors it may be seen that the element of access – in terms of copyright 
use of the content – belongs to the protected core area of the right to science and 
culture. In practice, this means that States should immediately “take those steps 
intended to guarantee access by everyone, without discrimination, to cultural life.”137
3.1.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Since the right to science and culture as provided by Article 27(1) of the UDHR 
and Article 15 1(a) of the ICESCR is opposing right in relation to rights of authors 
it is not surprising that a right to access – containing a right to receive and share 
information on all manifestations – belongs to the protected core area of the right 
to science and culture. Consequently it is understood in this book that the right 
to science and culture grants, inter alia, everyone access and possibility to share 
scientific and cultural products. In economical terms “Article 27 conceives of science, 
culture, and the arts – in short, the myriad expressions of human knowledge – as 
global public goods.”138 In economic terms, knowledge may be understood as a non-
rivalrous good, which in comparison to rival goods such as housing or food, is not 
diminished by consumption.139 On the contrary, sharing knowledge or expressions 
as non-rivalrous goods increases their amounts. In other words, the more people 
share (in terms of copyright “copy” and make content available) content the more 
content exist. This would mean that the right to science and culture as provided 
by the article 27(1) of the UDHR and 15.1(a) of the ICESCR provide in terms of 
copyright natural persons and communities and groups a right to use content. 
This does not need to mean that there would be an unlimited right to receive and 
share manifestations of cultural and scientific expressions. For example, it may be 
asked if the core area of the right to science and culture should cover using only a 
limited amount of content at a time. This is because it is difficult to find justifications 
136 They also continue that ”The right to take part in cultural life implies the ability to access, enjoy, engage with and extend 
the cultural inheritance; to enact, wear, perform, produce, apply, interpret, read, modify, extend and remix; to manifest, 
interact, share, repeat, reinterpret, translate, critique, combine and transform.” See Shaver and Sganga, p. 646. Later Shaver 
has also elaborated that “The touchstone concept of the right to science and culture, however, must be access. This concept 
is inherent in the earliest formulation of the right, which spoke simply of the right of all peoples to take part in cultural 
life, to enjoy the arts, and to share in the benefits of scientific progress. …  [The right to access] should be understood to 
include the ability to actively participate and share with others, not merely to play passive role of consumer.” Shaver, p. 
169 and 172. 
137 General Comment 21, paragraph 66.
138 Shaver, p. 155, 156 and 172 – 173. Relevance of markets in relation to fulfilment of the referred rights is acknowledged 
also in Continental countries. See e.g. Haarmann, p. 11.
139 See in more detail e.g. Mikko Välimäki, The Rise of Open Source Licensing, A challenge to the use of Intellectual Property 
in the Software Industry, a doctoral dissertation, Turre publishing 2005 (hereafter Välimäki), p. 53 ff. See also e.g. Peter 
Suber, Knowledge as a public good, SPARC Open Access Newsletter, issue 139, 2009, available at: http://www.earlham.
edu/~peters/fos/newsletter/11-02-09.htm. 
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to argue that everyone needed a right to freely share unlimited amounts of content. 
On the other hand, nothing seems to narrow applicability of the right to science 
and culture to closed or small groups. As nowadays means exist to easily receive 
and share content it is difficult to understand why using those means should be 
prevented, if rights of others are also taken into consideration. This means that the 
right to science and culture should also cover the open networks of the information 
society to the same extent as author’s rights do. In other words, if rights of authors 
apply to on the Internet / open networks, as a counter balance also the right to 
science and culture should be applied there to the same extent. In practice this 
indicates that the balance between the right to science and culture and rights of 
authors should be accomplished in a similar manner as they were perceived in the 
industrial society. 
It could also be mentioned that as fundamental rights protect natural persons 
and their groups and communities, it is questionable if legal persons could enjoy 
protection as provided by Article 27 (1) of the UDHR and 15 1(a) of the ICESCR at all. 
As later shall be explained in more detail, it is questionable whether/to what extent 
legal persons may enjoy fundamental and especially human rights protection at all. 
On the other hand, if legal persons owning copyrighted content may be protected 
by human or other fundamental rights, then, as a counter balance, legal persons 
using copyrighted content should be protected as well. 
Finally, it should also be noted that the right to science and culture may be 
limited. For example, it has been explicitly stated in paragraph 18 of the General 
Comment 21 that “no one may invoke cultural diversity to infringe upon human 
rights guaranteed by international law, nor limit their scope.” Similarly paragraph 
20 of the General Comment states that Article 15(a) of the ICESCR “may not be 
interpreted as implying for any State, group or person any right to engage in any 
activity or perform any act aimed at the destruction of any of the rights and freedoms 
recognized in the Covenant or at their limitation to a greater extent than is provided 
therein.”140 Thus similarly as e.g. Article 10(2) of the ECHR stipulates limitations 
to freedom of expression regarding “national security, territorial integrity or public 
safety”, the right to science and culture may be limited.141 For example, human 
dignity and protection for privacy may restrict possibilities to obtain and share 
scientific information.142 
140 See General Comment 21, paragraphs 18 and 20.
141 Article 10(2) of the ECHR states that freedom of expression may be limited “… in the interests of national security, 
territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the 
protection of the reputation or the rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or 
for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.” See also Sami Manninen, Sananvapaus ja julkisuus (PL 
12 §), published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (et al), Helsinki 2011, p. 477 – 478. 
142 See e.g. General Comment 14, paragraph 12: “Information accessibility: accessibility includes the right to seek, receive 
and impart information and ideas concerning health issues. However, accessibility of information should not impair the 
right to have personal health data treated with confidentiality.” See also e.g. Personal Data Act of Finland (523/1999) 
securing especially right to privacy, Medical Research Act of Finland (488/1999) applying “…to medical research carried 
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As the right to science and culture contains “the right of everyone to seek, receive 
and share information on all manifestations of culture in the language of the person’s 
choice”143 we may see that it is also clearly in conflict with rights of authors especially 
if they are protected through exclusive rights necessitating permission before use.144 
Consequently, before evaluating relationship between the right to science and culture 
in more detail it needs to be evaluated whether there exist any theories supporting 
the right to science and culture.145
3.2.  THEORETICAL SUPPORT FOR THE RIGHT TO SCIENCE 
AND CULTURE
3.2.1. OPEN ACCESS
So called open access postulates that information is a public good and that free 
flow information is beneficial for the society.146 In fact, it has been even argued 
that conducting science is prevented unless researchers are able to receive scientific 
information.147 In this respect especially Stevan Harnad has envisaged the evolvement 
of a ‘Fourth Cognitive Revolution’ as a result of electronic journals instigated by 
researchers. Harnad has postulated that the Fourth Cognitive Revolution would 
be enabled by easy e-mail communication, open peer-review of research results 
before official approval for publication and the possibility of direct links from the 
text to the sources. 148 At the core of Open Access is the feature characteristic to 
out on persons, human embryos and human foetuses…“ and an Act on the Openness of Government Activities of Finland 
(621/1999) establishing that in specified cases a researcher is not entitled to gain access to secret documents for scientific 
purposes unless an authority grants permission. See also Miettinen, p. 159 and Tuori, p. 526. Liisa Nieminen, Lapset 
tutkimuskohteena: Kuka päättää lapsen osallistumisesta tutkimukseen? Lakimies 2/2009, p. 226 ff.  See also Chapman, 
p. 2.
143 General Comment 21 paragraph 16(b). See also in general about the right to access in paragraph 15(b) of the General 
Comment 21.
144 Already from the historical perspective ”the purpose of the right to science and culture was quite different and very much 
in conflict with modern intellectual property law.” Shaver, p. 136. 
145 Also Shaver has listed several economic theories recognising relevance of knowledge as a public good. Shaver, p. 156 ff. 
146 In general about open access see e.g. Peter Suber, Open Access Overview, available at:  http://www.earlham.edu/~peters/
fos/overview.htm.
147 Miettinen, p. 307 and p. 231 where he refers to a memorandum of Pentti Arajärvi (Pentti Arajärven memorandum to 
parliament 18.9.1990, p. 27 – 28 and 32 – 33. See also Marjut Salokannel, Tieteessä tapahtuu 2003:1, p. 27 ff. Available 
at: http://www.tieteessatapahtuu.fi/031/Salokannel.pdf. 
148 According to Harnad the first Cognitive Revolution was the emergence of language, the second the advent of writing 
and the third the invention of the printing press. See Recommendations for the promotion of open access in scientific 
publishing in Finland, Memorandum by the Openn Access working group. Reports of the Ministry of Education, 2005:16, 
p. 10 and Stevan Harnad, Post-Gutenberg Galaxy: the Fourth Revolution in the Means of Production of Knowledge. 
Public-Access Computer Systems Review 2 (1): 39 - 53 (also reprinted in PACS Annual Review Volume 2 1992; and in 
R. D. Mason (ed.) Computer Conferencing: The Last Word. Beach Holme Publishers, 1992; and in: M. Strangelove & 
D. Kovacs: Directory of Electronic Journals, Newsletters, and Academic Discussion Lists (A. Okerson, ed), 2nd edition. 
Washington, DC, Association of Research Libraries, Office of Scientific & Academic Publishing, 1992); and in Hungarian 
translation in REPLIKA 1994; and in Japanese in “Research and Development of Scholarly Information Dissemination 
Systems 1994-1995. 
46
all knowledge: you can give knowledge a way and still keep it.149 Consequently the 
ideal state of open access can be listed as follows:
The research is readily available to anybody
- on the Internet with a www browser at no charge and without restriction
-  in full-text format
- immediately and perpetually from the time of publication
- without constraint on use or distribution
- good scientific conduct, however, demands that content may not be falsified
  and the author and source must be properly acknowledged 
Therefore, the aim of open access is completely free and unrestricted possibilities 
to read, print, and distribute content without payments or barriers. Usually, open 
access is connected education and scientific use, but when understood widely it is 
not limited to scientists, scholars, teachers and students, but extends also to “other 
curious minds”150 and covers both public and private information.151 Open Access 
sees the Internet as the most important channel for the unhindered dissemination 
of content. 
3.2.2. EXCHANGE AS INNATE CHARACTER FOR HOMINIDS
According to Matt Ridley “the special feature of human intelligence is that it is 
collective, not individual – thanks to the invention of exchange and specialization.”152 
An argument that specialization and exchange of goods are beneficial for the society 
is not new, but Ridley’s reasoning goes further in comparison to previous writers as 
he sees that exchange is an innate character humans have had in relation to other 
hominids, which caused prosperity of humans. In Ridley’s words it was humans who 
“started, for the very first time, to exchange things between unrelated, unmarried 
individuals; to share, swap, barter and trade”.153 According to him this explains 
how rare objects could have been moved far away from the source materials that 
were needed for their production. “The effect of this was to cause specialization, 
149 Recommendations for the promotion of open access in scientific publishing in Finland, Memorandum by the Openn 
Access working group. Reports of the Ministry of Education, 2005:16, p. 9. Available at (in English): http://www.minedu.
fi/export/sites/default/OPM/Julkaisut/2005/liitteet/opm_250_tr16.pdf?lang=fi. 
150 See e.g. Budapest Open Access Initiative, available at: http://www.soros.org/openaccess/read. 
151 See FinnOA’s web-pages: http://www.finnoa.fi/?page_id=14. FinnOA “is constituted by a group of professionals interested 
in promoting open access to scientific information. These people come mainly from the academia, libraries and data 
management.” See FinnOa in English at: http://www.finnoa.fi/?page_id=10. 
152 See Matt Ridley, The Rational Optimist: How Prosperity Evolves. HarperCollins Publishers 2010 (hereafter Ridley), p. 
361. Ridley completed a Doctor of Philosophy in 1983 and has written several popular books. In more detail see e.g. 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Matthew_White_Ridley,_5th_Viscount_Ridley and http://www.mattridley.co.uk/biography. 
153 Ridley, p. 56.
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which in turn encouraged more specialization, which led to more exchange – and 
‘progress’ was born, by which I mean technology and habits changing faster than 
anatomy.”154 Consequently, Ridley does not accept that modern economy would 
owe its existence “to science (which is its beneficiary more than its benefactor); nor 
to money (which is not always a limiting factor); nor to patents (which often get in 
the way); nor to government (which is bad at innovation).”155 
Instead Ridley believes that development is based on the characteristic feature of 
knowledge that you can give it away and still keep it. In Ridley’s words, innovators 
are “in the business of sharing. It follows that spillover – the fact that others pinch 
your ideas – is not an accidental and tiresome drawback for the inventor. It is the 
whole point of the exercise. By spilling over, an innovation meets other innovations 
and mates with them. The history of modern world is a history of ideas meeting, 
mixing, mating and mutating. And the reason that economic growth has accelerated 
so in the past two centuries is down to the fact that ideas have been mixing more 
than ever before.”156 
Moreover, Ridley also sees that innovation process is a bottom-up instead of a 
top-down process. Consequently, he emphasizes role of natural persons and new 
companies, but is skeptical regarding efficiency of big companies to innovate.157 
Therefore, it is not surprising that Ridley sees the role of intellectual property 
important primarily when the innovation is happening, but “it does very little to 
explain why some times and places are more innovative than others.”158 Regarding 
the role of prosumers he states that “Today the open-source software industry, 
with products such as Linux and Apache, is booming on the back of massive wave 
of selflessness – programmers who share their improvements with each other 
freely. Even Microsoft is being forced to embrace open-source systems and ‘cloud 
computing’ – shared on the net – blurring the line between free and proprietary 
computing.”159 
However, it could be mentioned that Gates, co-founder and chairman of 
Microsoft, has both praised and criticized Ridley’s views. Gates accepts Ridley’s 
argument related to importance of exchange of goods is a key element related 
to all innovation. However, he disagrees with Ridley’s view is that innovation is 
not a “top-down” process and refers to Intel as an example, which according to 
154 Ridely, p. 56. 
155 Ridley, p. 269.
156 Ridley, p. 270 – 272.
157 “Though [companies] may start out full of entrepreneurial zeal, once firms or bureaucracies grow large, they become 
risk-averse to the point of Luddism. The pioneer venture capitalist Georges Doriot said that the most dangerous moment 
in the life of a company was when it had succeeded, for then it stopped innovating.” Ridley, p. 260 – 261 and 322 ff.
158 Ridley, p. 267.
159 Ridley, p. 270 – 272 and p. 356. See also, Matt Ridley: When ideas have sex at TED (Technology, Entertainment, Design, 
is a nonprofit devoted to Ideas Worth Spreading, founded in 1984) http://www.ted.com/talks/matt_ridley_when_ideas_
have_sex.html. 
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Gates has “developed over 99% of its breakthroughs after its first success.”160 These 
remarks made by Gates are noteworthy from two perspectives of this book. The 
first noteworthy point is related to the role of corporations in innovation. Firstly, as 
later shall be explained in more detail, the individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright 
theory assumes that individual authors – not corporations – are at the core of 
creativity. In other words individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory postulates 
that innovation is “a bottom up process”. This is relevant to keep in mind when 
we evaluate the reciprocal relationship of the right to science and culture and the 
protectionism granted authors on a fundamental right level. Secondly, it should 
be noted that both Ridley and Gates accept that exchange plays a crucial role 
regarding innovation and wealth creation. As explained, exchangin innovation and 
creations is today easier than ever before. Exchange is also the aim of exclusive 
based copyright system, as it should encourage using expressions through individual 
transactions between right holders and users. For this reason, it is important to 
evaluate possibilities of exchange as it pertains to use of content. 
3.2.3. ECONOMICS OF NETWORKS 
Although the main focus of the book is to evaluate prosumers acting for non-profit 
purposes in comparison to right holders and especially authors as private natural 
persons, theories based on network economics shall be evaluated. As corporations 
owning large quantities of copyrighted content for commercial purposes exist, it 
is reasonable to evaluate also economic theories providing support to claims that 
using content as postulated by the right to science and culture may be economically 
justified too. 
Theories evaluating network economics imply that it may be beneficial if free 
dissemination of information is allowed.161 It may be generalized that they see 
sharing, instead of withholding (as is case regarding copyright), information and 
160 See Bill Gates, Africa Needs Aid, Not Flawed Theories. The Wall Street Journal, November 26, 2010, available at: http://
online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704243904575630761699028330.html. In the article Gates also criticized that 
Ridley “never explains what will replace all the companies that figure out how to make microchips or fertilizer or engines or 
drugs. Of course, many companies will come and go – that is a key element of capitalism – but corporations will continue 
to drive most innovation. It is a dangerous and widespread problem to underestimate the ongoing innovation that takes 
place within mature corporations.” In his response Ridley stated that “I know that these radical ideas are not to everybody’s 
taste, and he [Gates] is right that most innovation takes place within existing companies. But it is very striking that some 
of the most far-reaching innovations over the past several decades have come from driven, visionary outsiders like Mr. 
Gates, Mark Zuckerberg and Sergey Brin rather than from corporate research and development departments. What is more, 
these innovations have been achieved with much less capital investment up front than in the days of Andrew Carnegie 
and Henry Ford.” See, Matt Ridley, Africa Needs Growth, Not Pity and Big Plans, The Wall Street Journal, November 
27, 2010, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704648604575621122887824544.html. 
161 In general also Castells’s networked society locates its central characteristic to networks as social and organizational models 
instead of groups and hierarchies. He sees networks, also Internet, as an enabler of looser and more flexible arrangements of 
human affairs, influencing widely different areas of society, including globalisation and industrialisation. See e.g. Castells, 
p. 176 and 180 where he states: “Networks are the fundamental stuff of which new organizations are and will be made” 
(emphasis original). See also Yochai Benkler, The Wealth of Networks: How Social Production Transforms Markets and 
Freedom, Yale University Press 2006 (hereafter Benkler), p 3 and 18.
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knowledge as the basis of knowledge and wealth creation. For example, according to 
a seminal article of Nahapiet and Ghoshal social capital may be defined as interactive 
resources embedded in the networks of social relations.162 According to them, social 
capital also facilitates development of intellectual capital, consisting of personal and 
team relationships, trust, norm-based control values and network ties. This means 
that knowledge is always created in the social context; who you know directly affects 
what you know. Thus, intellectual capital is the ability of an organization to use 
its social capital and networks, and the density, connectivity (strength of ties) and 
hierarchy of the network links define the nature of the intellectual capital.163 Value 
creation, in turn, is part of the processes and exchanges in the relations between 
people and organizations, and within different organizational systems without 
necessary immediate material or monetary involvement.164 However, as a result of 
these exchanges the material and monetary value are also created.165 
Moreover, Harhoff, Henkel and von Hippel have analyzed in their game 
theoretical model effects of “freely revealing” details of innovations to other 
manufacturers. By “free revealing” they “mean that all existing and potential 
intellectual property rights to that information are voluntarily given up by that 
innovator and all interested parties are given access to it – the information becomes 
a public good.”166 Despite the fact that free revealing contradicts the classical tenant 
of economic theory of innovation, Harhoff, Henkel and von Hippel conclude that 
because of high transactions costs related to licensing, informational asymmetries 
and incompleteness of contracts “under very plausible parameter constellations it 
does indeed pay users to freely reveal their innovations to other users – even to 
direct rivals.”167 Thus, the same challenges related to concluding transactions as 
shall be referred later in this book had an impact to the results of Harhoffs, Henkels 
and von Hippels article. Freer sharing of knowledge and content enable also others 
freer possibilities to build on the pre-existing knowledge/content.168 Although open 
162 See e.g. Janine Nahapiet & Sumantra Ghoshal, Social Capital, Intellectual Capital, and the Organizational Advantage. 
Academy of Management Review 1998 (hereafter Nahapiet and Ghoshal). Vol 23. No. 2, 242-266 (passim) and especially 
p. 243 where they state: “The central proposition of social capital theory is that networks of relationships constitute 
a valuable resource for the conduct of social affairs, providing their members with “the collectivity-owned capital, a 
‘credential’ which entitles them to credit, in the various senses of the word.”
163 According to Nahapiet and Ghoshal “social capital facilitates the conditions necessary for exchange and combination, 
which are necessary for creation of intellectual capital. See Nahapiet and Ghoshal, p. 246 ff.
164 Allee, V., The Future of Knowledge, Butterworth-Heinemann 2002, Burlington MA.
165 Consequently it is not surprising that networks have also emerged as an important new area of inquiry within the field of 
entrepreneurship. Johanisson, B., In search of a methodolgy for entrepreneurial research, Class paper, Växjö and Lund 
Universities. Sweden 1995. Networks are viewed as the media through which actors gain access to a variety of resources 
held by other actors. A key benefit of networks for the entrepreneurial process is the access they provide to knowledge 
and advice. Relationships can also have a reputation related or signalling meaning. Networks can either be seen as means 
to reduce the uncertainty in the environment, or in the positive perception, firms network linkages may lead to subsequent 
beneficial resource exchange, or even to knowledge creation. Hoang, H. and Antonic, B., Network-based research in 
entrepreneurship: A critical review, Journal of Business Venturing, 18(2), p. 165 – 187.
166 Dietmar Harhoff, Joachim Henkel, Eric von Hippel, Profiting from voluntary information spillovers: how users benefit 
by freely revealing their innovations. Research Policy 32 (2003) (hereafter Harahoff, Henkel and von Hippel), p. 1753.
167 Harahoff, Henkel and von Hippel, p. 1754 and 1767.
168 For example, in words of Hippel: “It is our contention that completely fully-functional innovation networks can be 
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source/content projects are typical examples of this type of development, consumers 
as users – or prosumers as depicted in this article – may have a significant role of 
as innovators also on other fields but intangible property.169 
It should be noted that there is no specific theory explaining why users/prosumers 
innovate. Despite this several individual reasons may be given. For example, users 
tend to innovate if information is “sticky” i.e. is costly to acquire, transfer, and 
use in a new location.170 Users may also have unique capabilities enabling them 
to create low-cost innovative solutions or unique needs in relation to the product 
produced by the producer. They may also expect to benefit from their innovation by 
themselves or simply enjoy the creation process or find that their creations might 
leverage job opportunities.171 Also related innovations and innovations revealed by 
others may incite to innovate.172 Users may also become “’user-entrepreneurs’ or 
otherwise give rise to a new market niche or industry.” If innovation takes place 
in a distributed way, it also entails that other users share their innovations with 
other users and producers.173 
Finally, freer sharing of content may also create benefits e.g. in the form of 
network effects: the more others consume a certain piece of content the more others 
do so as well.174 In this respect Internet provides a unique platform for starting 
authors to share their content in order to obtain recognition. This recognition may 
end up to value creation in different ways. 
Hietanen has described a distribution process of a movie that created 
with help of fan-culture and was posted freely downloadable for all: 
“While the movie [Star Wreck: In the Pirkinning] was distributed 
freely online using a [Creative Commons]-license, it managed at the 
same time to sell over 17.000 copies on DVD. In December 2005 the 
Finnish national TV-network YLE bought the broadcast license, devoted 
built up horizontally – with actors consisting only of innovation users (more precisely, “user/self-manufacturers”). Users 
participating in the network design and build innovative products for their own use – and also freely reveal their designs to 
others. Those others then replicate and improve the innovation that has been revealed and freely reveal their improvements 
in turn – or they may simply replicate the product that has been revealed and adopt it for their own, in-house use.” Eric 
von Hippel, Open source software projects as user innovation networks, MIT Sloan School of Management, June 2002 
(hereafter Hippel), p 3.
169 See e.g. Marcel Bogers, Allan Afuah and Bettina Bastian, Users as Innovators: A Review, Critique, and Future Research 
Directions. Journal of Management, Vol. 36 No. 4, July 2010 (hereafter Bogers, Afuah and Bastian), p.859–860, where 
they list outdoor sports, mountain biking, kite surfing, rodeo kayaking, sailing, juvenile products, stereo components, 
automobiles and retail banking as examples of areas where consumer users (prosumers) have invented. 
170 See Hippel, p. 9–10. 
171 See Bogers, Afuah and Bastian, p. 860–863.
172 Hippel, p. 18. Välimäki has listed the following possible reasons regarding open source development: monetary and other 
material reward, fun and “scratch of the itch”, fame and merit, service to the society or mankind and instinct workmanship 
and ethical and altruistic reasons. See Välimäki, p. 58–59.
173 Bogers, Afuah and Bastian, p.859–860.
174 In more detail, see Stan Liebowitz, Rethinking the Newtorked Economy: The True Forces Driving the Digital Market 
Place, 2002, p. 151 ff. Available at: http://wwwpub.utdallas.edu/~liebowit/knowledge_goods/book.pdf.  See also Mikko 
Välimäki, Ajatuksia tekijänoikeuslainsäädännön uudistamiseksi, Lakimies 2/2004, p. 262.
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one February night to Star Wreck on the digital culture channel and 
broadcasted the film on the national TV channel. The movie was later 
broadcasted on several European and Japanese TV channels. The TV 
broadcast licenses alone covered the production costs of the movie. A 
year after the initial release Universal Pictures bought the distribution 
rights to the special edition version of the DVD, even though the original 
version remains available as a free download.”175 
3.3.  CONCLUDING REMARKS REGARDING THE RIGHT TO 
SCIENCE AND CULTURE
The right to science and culture may be described as an opposing interest or as a 
counter balance to rights of authors protected in Articles 27(2) of the UDHR and 
15(c) of the ICESCR. We may also see that theories justifying freer use of content 
may found. Consequently giving relevance to the right to science and culture may 
be found justified. In fact, it may be even argued that it is as important to use 
content as it is to create it. Economic rights of authors would also be insignificant 
if no content were used. In short a society where no content was used would be a 
dead society. This again explains how the right to science and culture and rights 
of authors interdependent on each other. In order to evaluate the right to science 
and culture with the right protecting essential economic interests of authors, rights 
of authors needs to be evaluated next.
175 See Herkko Hietanen, The Pursuit of Efficient Copyright Licensing, How Some Rights Reserved Attempts to Solve the 
Problems of All Rights Reserved, a doctoral dissertation, Lappeenranta 2008, p. 179. Album ’Ghosts’ from Nine Inch 
Nails may also be used as an example in this respect. It was best selling album on Amazon MP3 although it was released 
for free distribution also. See in more detail e.g. Wikipedia for Ghosts I-IV. Available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/
Ghosts_I%E2%80%93IV. For similar examples see also, Ahto Apajalahti – Kaj Sotala, Jokapiraatinoikeus, Vantaa 2010, 
p. 48 ff. 
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4 PROTECTION PROVIDED BY COPYRIGHT
“Everyone attempts to fend for oneself, but most amusing is life of the 
one who deludes himself the best possible way. Hahahaha!”
- Svidrigailov in Fyodor Dostoyevsky’s Crime and Punishment
The first privilege for printing books was granted in 1469 in Venice.176 Despite this, 
the roots of copyright are often ascribed to England where a royal charter was given 
in 1557 to The Company of Stationers of London in order to protect publishing.177 
Although stationer’s rights protected private interests of stationers, regulations that 
are regarded as predecessors of copyright were also used as means for censorship.178 
There were also considerations whether copyright should be considered as a common 
law right (i.e. not statute based). Enacting the Statute of Queen Anne in 1709 did 
not stop these considerations and it was not until Donaldson v. Becket in 1774, 
when it was decided that there is no common law copyright, but copyright is based 
on a statute (and its term is limited).179 The concept of an author neither appeared 
until the Statute of Queen Anne.180 Therefore we may see that during the first two 
hundred years role of authors was petty as it came to copyright. As Välimäki puts 
it“… instead of creating incentives to new authors or innovators, the first privileges 
predating modern copyright laws started from the idea that the interests of those 
who invested in the copying machines [i.e. printing presses] and the supportive 
institutional structures should be protected.”181
176 See T.M. Kivimäki, Tekijänoikeus,, Helsinki 1948 (hereafter Kivimäki), p. 42 and Kemppinen, p. 42 – 43.
177 According to Patterson members of the book trade had developed some form of copyright prior to receiving their charter 
of incorporation in 1557. However, the royal charter added “dignity and powers”, which the company used in giving 
definite form to its “stationer’s copyright.” The term “copy” was not used until 1701. See Lyman Ray Patterson, Copyright 
in Historical Perspective. Vanderbilt University Press 1968, p. 6-7, 21 and 28 – 29 (hereafter Patterson). 
178 See, Patterson, p. 4. See also e.g. Komiteamietintö 1953:5, Ehdotus laiksi tekijänoikeudesta kirjallisiin ja taiteellisiin 
teoksiin (Committee Report 1953:5), p. 36 and Haarmann, p. 3 and 13.
179 Donaldson v. Becket (4 Burr 2408, 98 ER 257; 2 Bro PC 129, 1 ER 837 (1774)). In Donaldson v. Becket the House of 
Lords decided that copyright is limited in term. See Mark Rose, Authors and Owners, The Invention of Copyright. Harvard 
University Press, third printing 2002 (hereafter Rose),, p. 5. 
180 Patterson, p. 5. Even when the concept of author’s right emerged it was used in a legal struggle between publishers. See 
Rose, p. 4 – 5. 
181 Mikko Välimäki, The Rise of Open Source Licensing. A Challenge to the Use of Intellectual Property in the Software 
Industry. A doctoral dissertation, Turre Publishing 2005 (emphasis orignal), p. 59. 
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4.1.  INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS AT THE CORE OF FUNDAMENTAL 
RIGHT PROTECTION
However, since the Statute of Queen Anne and the French revolution, a concept 
of an author as the initial right holder gained foothold in Europe. After the second 
World War, interests of authors were acknowledged in Article 27 (2) of the UDHR 
and later in Article 15 1 (c) of the ICESCR as subjects of protection. The central 
role of authors may be clearly read from both as they provide protection for “moral 
and material interests resulting from any scientific, literary or artistic production 
of which he is the author.”182 
Also today contemporary European individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright 
theory posits authors as natural persons at the core of copyright.183 So-called moral 
rights belonging to the core of copyright also emphasize the close connection 
between an author and his/her works in the Continental droit d’ auteur system.184 
In other words, unlike in Anglo-American copyright thinking, droit d’ auteur theory 
postulates that original author is always a human, not a legal person whose rights are 
always derivative from a natural person.185 This is also consistent with fundamental 
rights, which in principle protect natural persons. 
However, human rights conventions do not grant exclusive rights to authors. 
Instead several national legislations and international conventions since the Berne 
Convention (1886)  do.186 Due to exclusive rights granted to authors copyright is 
182 It could be mentioned that despite the rights of authors have longer “official” history in comparison to the right to science 
and culture, it was not self evident if they should be acknowledged in the human rights context. According to Shaver the 
“first insight to be gained from the historical view is that this second element of the right to science and culture [i.e. the 
protection for moral and material interests of authors] provoked significant controversy among the Declaration’s framers. 
The “access” element of Article 27 was included in the earliest draft, and virtually no objections to its inclusion were ever 
raised during the extended process of international debate and ratification. The notion of protection for creators’ interests, 
however, was introduced into the draft bill of rights later, initially rejected as inappropriate for inclusion in human rights 
document and subject to protracted debate.” Shaver, p. 144.  
183 See Articles 27(2) of the UDHR and 15(c) of the ICESCR referring to authors and e.g. United Nations, Committee on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Thirty-fifth-session session, 7 – 25 November 2005, General Comment No. 17 
(2005), paragraph 7 under headline “Author” referring to authors as natural persons. Respectively the starting point is same 
in Finland as paragraph 1 of the FCA states that the one who has created a work shall have copyright thereto. See paragraph 
1 of the Finnish Copyright Act (8.7.1961/404). Paragraph 2 grants exclusivity and defines the contents economical rights. 
See also e.g. Government Bill 235/1987, p.7 and Committee Report 1980:12 explicitly stating that “copyright is built on 
individualism.” Committee Report 1980:12, p. 120-121. See also, Kivimäki, p. 23, 43 - 46 and 237 and Haarmann, p. 4 
– 7. 
184 See Haarmann, p. 5 – 6 and Kivimäki, p. 239 ff. Regarding moral rights as core rights see e.g. General Comment 17, 
paragraph 39 (b). 
185 See e.g. Government Bill 235/1985, p. 7, Haarmann, p. 5 and 100 ff and Kivimäki, p. 23, 45, 61 and 237. It should be noted 
that as it pertains to computer programs and databases paragraph 40b of the Finnish Copyright Act states that computer 
programs and databases, which have been produced under employment, belong to the to the employer. However, also 
regarding computer programs the original author is a natural person although rights to computer programs and databases 
created in an employment relationship are automatically by law transferred to the employer. Anglo-American copyright 
laws have specific works made for hire –doctrine providing direct protection legal persons. See e.g. 17 U.S.C § 201 (b).
186 The Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, of September 9, 1886. The Berne Convention 
was completed at Paris on May 4, 1896, revised at Berlin on November 13, 1908, completed at Berne on March 20, 1914, 
revised at Rome on June 2, 1928, at Brussels on June 26, 1948, at Stockholm on July 14, 1967, and at Paris on July 24, 
1971 and amended on September 28, 1979. 
54
often perceived as a property right.187 Despite this, intellectual property should 
not be considered to be a human right. In the words of the Economic and Social 
Council: “Human rights are fundamental as they are inherent to the human person 
as such, whereas intellectual property rights are first and foremost means by which 
States seek to provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the 
dissemination of creative and innovative productions, as well as the development 
of cultural identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific, literary and artistic 
productions for the benefit of society as a whole.”188 Thus a distinction has been 
made between human rights and property rights.
It is understood here that the intent behind this separation is to emphasize the 
role of human rights in comparison to property right and not vice versa. It would be 
difficult to see that property right protection could somehow be “better” or “stronger” 
in comparison to protections provided by human rights. As explained, the aim of 
fundamental rights is to protect “essential foodstuffs”, “essential primary health 
care”, “basic shelter and housing”, “the most basic forms of education” etc.189 In 
Finland it has also been stated that property does not have any specific position in 
relation to other fundamental rights and that it aims to secure essential property 
of individuals, not property masses of property as such.190 Property in this respect 
may be seen as one instrument to achieve the named human rights objectives. This 
would mean protecting property when it enables securing the mentioned “basic/
essential” human rights objectives. In other words, it is difficult to tie any societal 
value to property as such as this would mean that in a conflict situation weighing 
property to other fundamental rights as an equal right would always mean pricing 
the competing right in economic terms, which would be a rather unrewarding task 
187 About copyright as a property right see e.g. Kivimäki, p. 43 – 44 where he refers to John Locke’s ideas of property. 
See also Rainer Oesch, Tekijänoikeudet ja perusoikeusnäkökulma, Lakimies 3/2005 (passim) and e.g. Statement of the 
Constitutional Law Committee 7/2005. Regarding John Locke’s concept on property see Two Treatise of Government 
(first publication in 1689), Second Treatise (sec. 27).
188 General Comment No. 17, paragraph 1. Furthermore, neither e.g. wordings of Article 27(2) of the UDHR nor Article 
15 1(c) ICESCR necessitates that rights of authors should be protected thorough exclusive property rights. This means 
in words of Mylly: “Establishing an embracive exclusive property right regime is certainly not the only possible way to 
accomplish this task [protecting moral and material interests of authors and inventors]. For example, moral and material 
interests (i.e. protectionism for essential foodstuffs, essential primary health care, basic shelter and housing etc.) could be 
protected thorough a regime based on a liability rule or direct reward for the author or innovator.” See Mylly, p. 202. 
189 This link between property right as securer of basic material interests of authors is also supported by the General Comment 
of the Economic and Social Council. It states that: “The protection of material interests of authors in article 15, paragraph 
1 (c), reflects the close linkage of this provision with the right to own property, as recognized in article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and in regional human rights instruments, as well as with the right of any worker to adequate 
remuneration (art. 7 (a)). Unlike other human rights, the material interests of authors are not directly linked to the personality 
of the creator, but contribute to the enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living (art. 11, para. 1).” See General 
Comment No. 17, paragraph 15, emphasis added.  See also General Comment 17, paragraphs 35 and 39. Regarding the 
Constitution of Finland as a securer of basic rights see Perusoikeuskomitean mietintö 1992:3, Betänkande av kommittén 
för grundläggande fri och rättigheter (Committee Report 1992:3), p. 49, Pekka Halberg, Perusoikeusjärjestelmä, published 
in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (et al) Helsinki 2011, p. 29.
190 Länsineva 2011, p. 551. See also Mikael Koillinen ja Juha Lavapuro, Tekijänoikeudet tietoyhteiskunnassa 
perusoikeudnäkökulmasta, published in Viestintäoikeus (eds Kulla et al), Helsinki 2002, p. 338. The property right norm 
of the Constitution of Finland should also be interpreted as a norm aiming to distribute wealth evenly in a society instead 
of concentrating wealth to the hands of few.  Länsineva 2011, p. 564. 
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as we should start giving price to rights such as the right to privacy or to the right 
to life, liberty and security of person. This does not mean that property is not 
protected, but instead it is understood here that property as a fundamental right 
is protected to the extend it protects referred “essential/basic” interests. In other 
words property right as a fundamental right is limited, too.
An economist could also attempt to claim that as authors had petty 
role in the early history of copyright and because influence of industry 
may again be seen as more significant, value of a work should purely be 
considered to be at the core of copyright. However, if property right is 
excluded, no such fundamental rights exist. Moreover, this approach 
would not solve the problem we would have when one attempted to 
weigh property right as a competing right to other fundamental rights. 
Thus the imaginary economist would own us an answer to a question 
what is the economic value e.g. of life, liberty and security of person, 
or the right to privacy or the right to science and culture? S/he should 
also explain us on what basis such property right is limited? Thus 
fundamental rights posit boundaries to economics especially through 
their protected core areas, not vice versa.191 One could also argue that 
an author’s possibility to assign his/her rights, i.e. freedom of contract, 
is at the core of copyright as it has been accepted that copyright as 
a property right may be assigned.192 However, although copyright 
acknowledges freedom of contract, it is difficult to find any evidence 
from fundamental rights conventions that freedom of contract had 
been intended as a replacement for exclusive rights as a core right. 
Moreover, when freedom of contract is evaluated from the viewpoint of 
fundamental rights, effect of fundamental rights is intended to balance 
the relationship between the contracting parties (fix a disturbance 
of the contractual equilibrium).193 Thus fundamental rights suggest 
that one should take into consideration the balance between different 
parties and public interests instead of favouring the strongest.194 
191 In more detail see e.g. chapter 2.4.
192 See also e.g. recital 30 of the Infosoc Directive stating that: “The rights referred to in this Directive may be transferred, 
assigned or subject to the granting of contractual licences, without prejudice to the relevant national legislation on copyright 
and related rights.” See also General Comment 17, paragraph 2 (emphasis added) stating: “In contrast to human rights, 
intellectual property rights are generally of a temporary nature, and can be revoked, licensed or assigned to someone 
else.” 
193 Chantal, Mak: Fundamental Rights in European Contract Law. A comparison of the impact of fundamental rights on 
contractual relationships in Germany, the Netherlands, Italy and England (PhD thesis University of Amsterdam), Alphen 
aan den Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2008 (hereafter Mak), p. 7. See also Pekka Länsineva, Omaisuuden suoja (PL 
15 §), published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (et al), Helsinki 2011, p. 573.
194 See e.g. Pekka Länsineva, Omaisuuden suoja (PL 15 §), published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (et al), Helsinki 2011, p. 
572. See also see e.g. Mylly, p. 208 ff and Committee report 1992:3, p. 221 and Pekka Halberg, Perusoikeusjärjestelmä, 
published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (et al), Helsinki 2011, p. 50 – 51. 
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Consequently transferring rights does not mean that e.g. a transnational 
corporation would be in any need of fundamental rights protection 
protecting certain essential economic interests.195 Finally, it should 
also be remembered that although freedom of contract in principle 
means that parties are free to enter into a contract of their choice and 
on the terms they prefer, it also includes the freedom not to enter a 
contract.196 Thus, if freedom of contract would be seen as the core right 
of right holders, they should also accept that prosumers (or other users) 
could use content of right holders by simply declining from concluding 
a contract with a right holder. This would be the result because an 
author’s exclusive right would not be at the core of copyright anymore 
as freedom of contract had replaced it. Consequently, it is not surprising 
that e.g. the Finnish doctrine for freedom of contract as a fundamental 
right focuses on protecting against retroactive influence of government 
to contractual relationships. This means that one should be able to trust 
stability of contractual relationships although even this starting point is 
not unconditional. 
Consequently, as no explicit statements or open political debate to the opposite 
direction has taken place, it is postulated in this book following the individualistic 
droit d’ auteur copyright theory that as a fundamental right the protected core 
area of copyright aims to secure essential economic interests of individual authors 
as natural persons. Therefore, in relation to copyright as a fundamental right it is 
understood here that property right system is merely one way of securing basic/
essential material interests of authors.197 How a copyright system based on exclusive 
rights attempts to do this in more detail shall be evaluated next.
195 It should be remembered that it is only rational to demad evaluating case by case whether interests of individual authors 
have been endangered or not. The copyright law has been traditionally interpreted so that we rigorously examine whether 
a certain expression – perhaps a singular word – exceeds required threshold for copyright protection or whether a digital 
copy has been produced on a certain platform. 
196 Mak, p. 32.
197 This link between property right as securer of basic material interests of authors is also supported by the General Comment 
of the Economic and Social Council. It states that: “The protection of material interests of authors in article 15, paragraph 
1 (c), reflects the close linkage of this provision with the right to own property, as recognized in article 17 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and in regional human rights instruments, as well as with the right of any worker to adequate 
remuneration (art. 7 (a)). Unlike other human rights, the material interests of authors are not directly linked to the personality 
of the creator, but contribute to the enjoyment of the right to an adequate standard of living (art. 11, para. 1).” See General 
Comment No. 17, paragraph 15, emphasis added.  See also General Comment 17, paragraphs 35 and 39. Regarding the 
Constitution of Finland as a securer of basic rights see Perusoikeuskomitean mietintö 1992:3, Betänkande av kommittén 
för grundläggande fri och rättigheter (Committee Report 1992:3), p. 49, Pekka Halberg, Perusoikeusjärjestelmä, published 
in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (et al) Helsinki 2011, p. 29.
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4.2 CREATION OF EXPRESSIONS AS THE AIM OF COPYRIGHT
4.2.1. IN GENERAL
Copyright theories postulate that scientific and cultural creativity is promoted 
thorough different types of expressions/content types created by authors. In this 
respect, idea/expression dichotomy is a traditional way to evaluate starting point 
of copyright protection. Regarding the dichotomy, a common norm as stated in 
the article 9, subsection 2 of the TRIPS Agreement is that “Copyright protection 
shall extend to expressions and not to ideas, procedures, methods of operation or 
mathematical concepts as such.”198 It postulates that information and ideas as such 
fall outside the scope of copyright and neighboring right protection. Despite this, 
copyright covers wide range of different phenomena such as web pages or merely a 
speech or an improvised song as oral presentations may obtain copyright protection.
As it pertains to the protected expressions, paragraph 1 of the Finnish Copyright 
Act (and similarly e.g. article 2 of the Berne Convention) provides that expressions 
protected by copyright are, among others, literary and artistic works, oral 
presentations, musical and dramatic works, cinematographic works, photographic 
works, works of visual arts, architecture, artistic handicrafts and industrial art. In 
addition so-called neighboring rights protect e.g. performing artists, phonogram 
producers, photographs, visual recordings, radio- and television broadcasts, 
databases and newspaper bulletins. Therefore, although information and ideas fall 
outside the scope of copyright and neighboring right protection, it may be seen that 
copyright covers a wide range of different phenomena.199 
However, in order for an expression to obtain copyright protection it should 
exceed a certain threshold.200 Although no specific thresholds for protection have 
been set, case law provides guidelines for defining one. For example, in Infopaq-
case, given 16 July 2009, the European Court of Justice held that: “An act occurring 
during a data capture process, which consists of storing an extract of a protected 
work comprising 11 words and printing out that extract, is such as to come within the 
concept of reproduction in part within the meaning of Article 2 of [Infosoc-] Directive 
198 See also Article 1 subsection 2 of the Software Copyright Directive (Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the legal 
protection of computer programs): “Ideas and principles which underlie any element of a computer program, including 
those which underlie its interfaces, are not protected by copyright under this Directive.
199 See e.g. Tekijänoikeustoimikunnan mietintö, Tekijänoikeudet tietoyhteiskunnassa, ehdotukset tietoyhteiskuntadirektiivin 
edellyttämiksi lainsäädännön muutoksiksi. Muut tekijänoikeuslain muutosehdotukset 2002:5 (hereafter Committee Report 
2002:5), p.  21. 
200 About the threshold in general see: Tuomas Mylly, Intellectual Property and European Economic Constitutional Law, The 
Trouble with Private Informational Power. Vaajakoski 2009 (hereafter Mylly), p. 342 ff and p. 363 ff and Haarmann, p. 
256 ff. 
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...”201 In other words, according to the European Court of Justice, expressions a mere 
eleven words long may be deemed to exceed the required level to be protected by 
copyright, and hence, requiring permission from relevant right holders for each 
individual copy. Following the Infopaq-case the High Court Chancery Division 
regarded in 2011 that headlines and/or extracts of newspaper articles may exceed 
required level for copyright protection.202 Similarly in a case of the Finnish Copyright 
Council (2010:2) it was deemed that a sentence of eight words obtained copyright 
protection.203 In fact, the same case may be interpreted so that the Copyright Council 
regards possible that in exceptional circumstances even one word might exceed 
threshold for copyright protection.204 
Thus it is clear that expressions such as movies, music, literature, pictures, 
photographs easily exceed the required threshold for protection. However, it is 
challenging to determine where the threshold for protection specifically goes as 
there is no theory of art or science stipulating when the threshold for protection is 
exceeded and because ethical or moral evaluations are irrelevant when conducting 
the evaluation.205 Additional challenges also appear when we attempt to apply a 
concept of an expression to a digital environment.
4.2.2.  A CHALLENGE RELATED TO USE OF EXPRESSIONS IN DIGITAL 
ENVIRONMENT 
As explained, copyright theory postulates that in order to be protected, content 
must be an original and independent expression of its author.206 Moral and ethical 
evaluations are irrelevant when evaluating whether certain content is protected or 
not. However, problems may occur if a certain piece of content resembles another. 
Traditionally, the method for evaluating whether content C1 created by X is a copy 
of content C2 created by Z has been quite straight forward. A so called similarity 
assessment between C1 and C2 has been conducted. In the assessment experts from 
that particular area of art or science evaluate whether C1 is a copy of C2 or a new 
201 See Case C-%/08, Infopaq International A/S v Danske Dagblades Forening, Judgement of the Court (Fourth Chamber) 
of 16 July 2009. The court left it for the national courts to decide “if the elements thus reproduced are the expression of 
the intellectual creation of their author.” 
202 The Newspaper Licensing Agency Ltd & Ors v Meltwater Holding BV & Ors [2011] EWCA Civ 890 (27 July 2011, 
available at: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/890.html. 
203 See Copyright Council case 2010:2. Copyright Council gives opinions regarding copyright, which do not bind courts 
and it is regulated in a Decree. See Copyright Decree 574/1995. See also www-pages of the Ministry of Education and 
Culture at :http://www.minedu.fi/OPM/Tekijaenoikeus/tekijaenoikeusneuvosto/?lang=en. 
204 Similarly in legal literature e.g. Pirkko-Liisa Haarmann has argued that a slogan or e.g. name of a book may exceptionally 
obtain copyright protection. Haarmann, p. 70. 
205 It should be mentioned that the low threshold applies also to neighbouring rights. The threshold for obtaining neighbouring 
right protection is often actually minimal, as it may be sufficient to merely fulfil a certain act stated in a particular paragraph 
as e.g. to broadcast a TV-signal, produce a phonogram or take a photograph.
206 See e.g. Ehdotus laiksi tekijänoikeudesta kirjallisiin ja taiteellisiin teoksiin (Committee Report) 1953:5, p. 44 and 
Tekijänoikeuskomitean V mietintö, äänitteiden ja audiovisuaalisten teosten kopiointi ja levitys (Committee Report 1990:32), 
p. 25.
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independently protected content.207 It may be regarded clear that when a similarity 
assessment is conducted, the work must be in a form perceptible to senses.
However, it is questionable what form “expression in a digital form” has when it 
is communicated on the Internet. In the end content in the form of information is 
always converted into binary digits 1 and 0.208 This means that we may in theory ask 
whether e.g. music communicated on the Internet is in the correct form as postulated 
by copyright theory, or in the form of light or 1s and 0s? A radio program called 
Silikoni, which broadcasted computer software in Finland thorough radio waves 
in the mid 1980s may be used as a more concrete example. To human ears the 
broadcast of the code sounded as buzzing and chirping sounds.209 Information may 
also be encrypted i.e. transformed into a form which is unreadable to anyone else 
but for those who have a key to open the encryption.210 If there is no encryption key 
and decrypting the information is not otherwise possible, conducting any similarity 
test is impossible. 
On the other hand, digital information may also be presented in various forms. 
For example, various net art projects have addressed even “computer viruses as 
a curious aesthetic and media cultural phenomenon. One such example was the 
Biennale.py net art virus from 2001, which was distributed on T-shirts and sold on 
CD-ROMs ($1,500 each).”211 Similarly computer software designed to circumvent a 
digital rights management protection (DRM) have been presented in different forms 
of art such as singing.212 Dave Touretzky’s Gallery of CSS Descramblers contains 
illustrative examples of such expressions.213
207 See e.g. Markku Helin, Immateriaalioikeuksien kohteesta, Suomalaisen lakimiesyhdistyksen aikakauskirja, 1978 (hereafter 
Helin), p. 652 – 653.
208  Regarding binary code see e.g. Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Binary_code. See also Techterms.com for “digital”: 
http://www.techterms.com/definition/digital. 
209  See e.g. Yle, elävä arkisto, from a program: “Se päivä muutti Suomen: Commodore 64” and Marko Pulkkinen, Commodore 
64 kelpasi Bittiputaan mummollekin 23.11.2011, available at:  http://yle.fi/elavaarkisto/artikkelit/commodore_64_kelpasi_
bittiputaan_mummollekin_76616.html#media=76643. See also Jukka Lindfors, 24.5.2010, Silikoni lähetti radiossa surisevia 
ja piipittäviä tietokoneohjelmia, available at: http://yle.fi/elavaarkisto/artikkelit/silikoni_47372.html#media=47394. 
210  According to Wikipedia: “In cryptography, encryption is the process of transforming information (referred to as plaintext) 
using an algorithm (called a cipher) to make it unreadable to anyone except those possessing special knowledge, usually 
referred to as a key (emphasis original).” In more detail Wikipedia on Encryption at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Encryption. 
211 Jussi Parikka, Digital Contagions, A Media Archeology of Computer Viruses, Peter Lang Publishing, Inc., New York 2007, 
p. 286. See also Biennale.py project of Eva and Franco Mattes at http://www.0100101110101101.org/home/biennale_py/
index.html, digitalcraft’s ”I love you – computer_viruses_hacker_culture” exhibition:  http://www.digitalcraft.org/index.
php?artikel_id=244 and Mark Hachman, What Does a Computer Virus Look Like? at pcmag.com, http://www.pcmag.
com/article2/0,2817,2280416,00.asp. 
212 For example, listen to Joe Wecker’s song DVDdescramble.c (with lyrics) from Youtube: http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=GekuuNqAiQg. See also Jon Ippolito’s and Joline Blaise’s presentation Art From Illegal Computer Code, available 
at (Fora TV): http://www.dailymotion.com/video/xgl88j_art-from-illegal-computer-code_news. 
213 See Dave Touretzky’s Gallery of CSS Descramblers at: http://www.cs.cmu.edu/~dst/DeCSS/Gallery/. Another thing is that 
a possibility to transform information into various artistic forms (such as tools to circumvent DRM systems) may also 
cause tension between copyright and other rights. In legal terms this means that e.g. norms providing protection for digital 
rights management systems are in conflict with basics of copyright and freedom of art and expression. As copyright and 
freedom of art and expression have a connection to constitutional rights, but norms related to DRMs protect merely business 
interests without constitutional connection, the conflict is obviously problematic from the viewpoint of constitutional rights.
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Picture 1. An Extract from Dave Touretzky’s Gallery of CSS Descramblers
Consequently, it is questionable whether and to what extent copyright theory 
is applicable evaluating “form of content” in digital environment. These types of 
challenges justify asking whether alternative solutions for securing the rights of 
authors should be applied regarding use of content on the Internet. If alternative 
means are not used we must assume or “see” that copyright applies to digital 
environment. One may also argue that the described problems are merely theoretical. 
If this is the case, the next question to be examined is to what extent it is possible 
to secure essential economic interests of authors regarding use of content on the 
Internet through property right. 
4.3 COPYRIGHT AS A PROPERTY RIGHT
In contemporary legal thinking, legal relationships have been perceived as 
relationships between persons.214 This means that norms should be addressed only 
to persons, not to objects. This distinction should be kept in mind as e.g. in the history 
214 See e.g. Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, Yeale 
Law Journal (23 Yale L.J. 16), November, 1013 (hereafter, Hohfeld). See also Simo Zitting, Omistajanvaihdoksesta, 
silmällä pitäen erityisesti lain huudatuksen vaikutuksia, Suomalaisen lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja, A-sarja, N:o 43, 
Vammala 1951 (hereafter Zitting), p. 47. Regarding copyright see e.g. Markku Helin, Immateriaalioikeuksien kohteesta, 
Suomalaisen lakimiesyhdistyksen aikakauskirja, 1978 (hereafter Helin), p. 650, Mogens Koktvedgaard and Marianne Levin, 
Lärobok i immaterialrätt, Upphovsrätt, Patenträtt, Mönsterrätt, Känneteckensrätt – i Sverige, EU och internationellt, åttonde 
upplagan, Norstedts Juridik AB 2004 (hereafter Koktvedgaard – Levin), p. 38 and Pirkko-Liisa Haarmann, Tekijänoikeus 
ja lähioikeudet, Jyväskylä 2005 (hereafter Haarmann), p. 49.
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of copyright references have also been made to “intangible/immaterial” works as 
objects of rights. However, already decades ago such references to “immaterial/
intangible” objects were discarded as inaccurate from legal thinking.215 Consequently, 
with this starting point in mind, it may be asked how essential economic interests 
of individual authors could be fulfilled through property in the information society? 
4.3.1 REGARDING PROPERTY RIGHTS IN GENERAL
As it pertains to property rights, an exclusive right protected by the government 
to freely administer one’s property may be regarded as the primary right.216 This 
primary right has a negative and a positive feature. A negative feature refers to 
the right to determine about the use of content i.e. exclude others from using 
it.217 As it pertains to copyright, this has traditionally applied especially prior to 
publication of content indicating that author’s rights are at their strongest in cases 
when expressions have not been published. 218 A positive feature on the other hand 
refers to possibilities to assign rights related to use of expressions. 
At this point, it could be reminded that as a fundamental right property right is 
not an isolated right in relation to other fundamental rights. The reciprocal nature of 
fundamental rights necessitates that also property right must be balanced in relation 
to other rights. From the viewpoint this book the tension between subsections 1 and 
2 of the Article 27 of the UDHR is relevant as the legislator is obligated to secure 
rights depicted in both subsections.219 How this balancing should be conducted from 
the viewpoint of individual authors if property right is being applied?
4.3.2 FACTUAL AND LEGAL ADMINISTRATION OF RIGHTS
As it pertains to administration of property, the exclusive to freely administer one’s 
property may be divided into factual and legal administration of rights. Factual 
administration means a right to actually determine about the use of an object 
215 See e.g. Helin (passim) and Koktvedgaard – Levin, 36 – 38.
216 About copyright as a property right see e.g. T. M. Kivimäki, Tekijänoikeus. Helsinki 1948 (hereafter Kivimäki) p. 43 – 
44 where he refers to John Locke’s ideas of property. See also Rainer Oesch, Tekijänoikeudet ja perusoikeusnäkökulma, 
Lakimies 3/2005 (passim) and e.g. Statement of the Constitutional Law Committee 7/2005.
217 See e.g. T.M. Kivimäki, Uudet tekijänoikeus ja valokuvauslait, Porvoo 1966, p. 2 – 3. See also T.M: Kivimäki – Matti 
Ylöstalo, Suomen siviilioikeuden oppikirja, yleinen osa, 1973, p. 73. 
218  For example, certain limitations to copyright apply only to published works. According to Article 3(3) of the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works “The expression “published works” means works published 
with the consent of their authors, whatever may be the means of manufacture of the copies, provided that the availability 
of such copies has been such as to satisfy the reasonable requirements of the public, having regard to the nature of the 
work. The performance of a dramatic, dramatico-musical, cinematographic or musical work, the public recitation of a 
literary work, the communication by wire or the broadcasting of literary or artistic works, the exhibition of a work of art 
and the construction of a work of architecture shall not constitute publication.” 
219 See also e.g. T.M. Kivimäki, Uudet tekijänoikeus ja valokuvauslait, Porvoo 1966, p. 2 – 3. 
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whereas legal administration refers to right to sell, donate, and pawn etc. an object. 
Thus, the legal administration does not refer to possibilities to actually use the 
object, but determining about rights related to it. This separation is done in order 
to make a distinction between actually using an object from assigning property 
rights related to the object.220 
Hohfeld has explained the separation in the following way: “The term, 
“transfer”, is a good example. If X says that he has transferred his watch 
to Y, he may conceivably mean, quite literally, that he has physically 
handed over the watch to Y; or, more likely, that he has “transferred” his 
legal interest, without any delivery of possession, -the latter, of course, 
being relatively figurative use of the term.”221
Also, in relation to copyright a right holder is to some extent factually able to 
administer the use of his/her expressions. A factual possibility to administer the 
use exists regarding unpublished expressions provided the right holder has pieces 
of the content him/herself and regarding live-performances, if the right holder 
him/her self is the performer. Thus, in practice factual possibilities to administer 
the use of copyrighted content are rather narrow.  
The problem related to right holder’s possibilities to factually 
administer the use of his/her content may be illustrated with the 
following example: how could a right holder “silence” a person 
who performs his/her protected song in a public place (sings it in a 
restaurant or merely whistles it on the street) without the right holder’s 
permission? The question becomes even more problematic, if there are 
several singers. It simply would be impossible for an individual author 
to factually “silence” them both at the same time (as they may not even 
be at the same location), even if s/he had a right to do so.222 
In other words, after the work has been posted openly available on the Internet an 
individual loses his/her factual possibility to administer the use of his/her works. 
However, despite the loss of factual possibilities to administer the use, it may be 
argued that a right holder retains a legal right to administer the use. 
220 Zitting, p.7 and Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, Some Fundamental Legal Conceptions as Applied in Judicial Reasoning, 
Yeale Law Journal (23 Yale L.J. 16), November, 1013, under headline: Legal Conceptions Contrasted with Non-legal 
Conceptions. 
221 See Hohfeld, under headline: Legal Conceptions Contrasted with Non-legal Conceptions. 
222 See also Olli Vilanka, Rough Justice or Zero Tolerance? – Reassessing the Nature of Copyright in Light of Collective 
Licensing (Part I), published in in “In Search of New IP Regimes”, a publication of IPR University Center 2010 (hereafter 
Vilanka 2010), chapter 3.1. It could be mentioned that in theory also factual administration contains a negative and positive 
feature to administer property: A right holder may factually exclude others from using his/her content by factually keeping 
it by him/herself (a negative right) or enable use of the content e.g. by deciding to perform it in a live concert (a positive 
right).
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Regarding copyright as a legal right to administer the use an exclusive right to 
produce copies and make expressions available to the public are the most significant 
rights. It is understood in this book that in order to fulfill these legal rights – as 
rights directed to persons – individual authors and interested users/prosumers 
should conclude individual transactions with each other in order to produce copies 
and make content available to the public (instead of obligating the right holder to 
somehow “factually” control who, where and when uses his/her content).223 In fact, 
if concluding transactions is not possible authors are not able to secure their basic 
material interests. This means that a minimum requirement for functionality of 
copyright theory based on exclusive economic rights is the possibility to conclude 
transactions. This is important to notice as it defines when it is justified to apply 
exclusive rights. In other words if it is not possible to conclude transactions, 
the legislator should attempt to secure basic material interests of authors in an 
alternative manner.224
It should be noted that impossibility to conclude transactions should 
not directly endanger rights of prosumers as protected in Article 27(1) 
of the UDHR. Prosumers are able to use content as the right to science 
and culture provides even if it would not be possible to conclude a 
transaction with a right holder.225 It would be difficult to consider 
justified that the right to science and culture of prosumers could be 
endangered on the basis that it is not possible to fulfill rights of authors. 
It could also be mentioned that because individual control over use of 
content is often factually impossible and permissions from right holders 
are de facto obtained against compensation, copyright seems to form a 
certain type of business model embedded to law: law postulates that the 
primary way to fund content production is to ask permission from a right 
holder in certain points defined in law. When a copy is being produced 
and content is made available to the public are today those points. 
223 This should apply also to Anglo-American copyright system. See e.g. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: a 
Structural and Economical Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, Columbia Law Review, December, 1982, 
Under B. An Overview of the Market Model: “1. The Market System. Economists in the tradition of Adam Smith defend 
our society’s primary dependence on markets by arguing that individual transactions in the marketplace serve both social 
needs and the needs of the individual persons participating.” It could be mentioned that often rights have been assigned 
to legal persons such as e.g. collective management organisations. If this is the case those legal persons conduct the 
administration. 
224 Situations when individual administration is not considered possible may vary. For example, today collective licenses and 
platform fees have been introduced in the Nordic countries when it has been deemed impossible for authors to conclude 
transactions individually. In fact these paragraphs for collective administration  are evidence that the legislator often acts 
as postulated above i.e. implements alternative means but individual transactions  between prosumers and authors in order 
to secure economic interests of authors.
225 Another thing is that in such situation authors would not be able to obtain compensations unless alternative means but 
exclusive rights had been enacted in order to secure economic rights of authors. 
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Nevertheless, considering the separation between factual and legal rights, it seems 
more rational to perceive copyright as a legal right since otherwise its functionality 
would be minimal. Therefore it shall next be examined in more detail at what 
point individual authors and prosumers should conclude individual transactions 
for producing copies and making content available to the public on the Internet as 
economic rights of authors postulate.
4.4 RIGHT OF REPRODUCTION AND INTERNET
Article 2 of the Infosoc-Directive provides an author an exclusive right of “direct or 
indirect, temporary or permanent reproduction by any means and in any form, 
in whole or in part.”226 Due to wide applicability of the right of reproduction one 
has traditionally examined in very detail whether an act of reproduction has taken 
place. This can be seen from official documents, legal literacy and case law.227
For example, according to the Commissions Explanatory memorandum for the 
proposal for the Infosoc-Directive (2001/29/EC) already a transmission of a video 
from a database in Germany to a home computer in Portugal may require at least 
100 acts of storage (copying).  Similarly e.g. Sorvari has described how “using a 
work on a computers monitor or on its stationary memory unit or on an external 
recording or from the Internet necessitates for technological reasons temporary 
reproduction of the work on the computer’s operating memory or on the monitors 
buffer storage. ... Such copies may easily turn into permanent backup copies and 
stay on the computer even after the power has been switched off.”228 Therefore, 
relevant copies necessitating permission are in theory been formed constantly when 
content is being added and communicated on computers forming the Internet.229
226 See Article 2 of the Infosoc-Directive. See also Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Paris 
Act of July 24, 1971, as amended on September 28, 1979, article 9, which states that: “Authors of literary and artistic 
works protected by this Convention shall have the exclusive right of authorizing the reproduction of these works, in any 
manner or form” (emphasis added). A corresponding wide and strict formulation can be found from the paragraph 2, 
subsection 2 of the FCA. 
227 This indicates that copyright doctrine has traditionally followed a strict literal (i.e. grammatical) reading of the law. 
Regarding theories for interpreting law see e.g. Aarnio Aulis, Mitä lainoppi on? Helsinki 1978, p. 101 and ff and similarly 
Raimo Siltala, Johdatus oikeusteoriaan, Helsingin yliopiston oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan julkaisut, Helsinki 2001, p. 
110 and ff.
228 See Katariina Sorvari, Vastuu tekijänoikeuden loukkauksesta, Erityisesti tietoverkkoympäristössä. Academic Dissertation, 
Vantaa 2005, p. 93 ff.. See also Katariina Rajala’s Licenciate: Rätten att framställa exemplar och temporär lagring i 
nätverksmiljö. NIR 1999, p. 103 ff., Sakari Aalto – Dieter Paemen, Copyright Licensing of Music on the Internet in the 
EU, Defensor Legis 2001, p. 631 (where they explain that a normal CD player creates constantly temporary copies in 
order to function as intended), Egbert Dommering, Copyright being washed away thorough the electronic sieve, Some 
thoughts on the impeding copyright crisis, 1994, p. 4 – 6 and Tuomas Mylly, Tekijänoikeuslaki uudistuu?, Helsinki 2004, 
p. 4. Wide interpretation for the concept of reproduction has in fact prevailed a long time. Regarding court cases discussing 
acts of reproduction on computers in detail see e.g. Apple Computer Inc. V. Formula International, Inc. (594 F.supp 617 
(C.D. Cal 1984) and MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer Inc. 991 E.2d511 (9th cir.1993). 
229 This indicates that copyright doctrine has traditionally followed a strict literal (i.e. grammatical) reading of the law. 
Regarding theories for interpreting law see e.g. Aarnio Aulis, Mitä lainoppi on? Helsinki 1978, p. 101 and ff and similarly 
Raimo Siltala, Johdatus oikeusteoriaan, Helsingin yliopiston oikeustieteellisen tiedekunnan julkaisut, Helsinki 2001, p. 
110 and ff.
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According to a study of IDC the amount of bits added to digital 
environment only in 2008 was 3,892,179,868,480,350,000,000 bits 
and in 2010 the amount was five times as many, and increasing.230 
In comparison the amount of printouts taken from the Internet (i.e. 
not copies taken by photocopying) by teachers in comprehensive 
schools and secondary schools in 2008 in Finland was approximately 
5.000.000, which roughly corresponds to 60,000,000,000 bits.231 Thus 
although heaps of content is being printed in educational institutions, 
the amount of information in the digital environment is significantly 
larger.232 Used information is in various different and often protected 
forms of content as e.g. in text, sound, image, photographs, software 
and often mixed together as in forms of adaptations or audiovisual 
productions. The evolving information mass may also be referred to as 
“big data”.233
Thus, we may see that it may be challenging to apply the concept of reproduction 
on the Internet. Consequently it may firstly be asked who is liable in an author 
– user/prosumer –relationship (i.e. excluding possible intermediaries from the 
evaluation) for the produced copies and secondly when s/he who is liable for the 
copies should ask necessary permissions for each emerging one. 
As it pertains to the first question and we evaluate possible liability in an author 
– prosumer-relationship, it is clear that only prosumers as users may be held liable 
230 See John Gantz and David Reinsel, A Digital Universe Decade – Are You Ready?, 2010, available at: http://www.emc.
com/collateral/demos/microsites/idc-digital-universe/iview.htm and John Gantz and David Reinsel, IDC – Multimedia 
White Paper, As the Economy Contradicts, the Digital Universe Expands, May 2009. Available at: http://www.scribd.com/
doc/15748837/IDC-Multimedia-White-Paper-As-the-Economy-Contracts-the-Digital-Universe-Expands. An illustrative 
presentation about the increase of information on Internet have also been made e.g. by Michael Wesch in “an Anthropological 
introduction to YouTube” (hereafter Wesch), available at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPAO-lZ4_hU. It should be 
mentioned that as the information is communicated further in digital environment, it is subsequently copied again. 
231 See Peruskoulujen ja lukioiden valokopiointitutkimus 30.9.2008, Jan-Otto Malmberg. A Study conducted by the Ministry 
of Education and Kopiosto, p. 8 and 17. The estimation related to the amount of bits is based on an assumption that one 
A4 sized paper in writing contains roughly 1500 bits of information. However, the estimation is rough as the amounts of 
bits per document varies based on what content is being used (e.g. text or pictures) and on how the information is stored. 
The estimation was given by Markku Wallgren, Novell Finland, technical expert, e-mail interview on 30th of March 2011. 
If we evaluate educational institutions more widely, on yearly basis hundreds of millions photocopies and prints are taken 
in elementary schools and secondary schools in Finland. For example, in 2008 the amount of copies and printouts was 
over 400.000.000. See Jan-Otto Malmberg, Peruskoulujen ja lukioiden valokopiointitutkimus 2008, p.8. In communal and 
governmental bodies the yearly number is altogether approximately 900.000.000. See, homepage of Kopiosto, available 
at (in Finnish), http://www.kopiosto.fi/kopiosto/teosten_kayttoluvat/valokopiointi/fi_FI/valokopiointi/. 
232 As additional examples it could be stated that 35 hours of video was being uploaded every minute to YouTube in 2010. 
See YouTube’s blog, available at http://youtube-global.blogspot.com/2010/11/great-scott-over-35-hours-of-video.html. In 
general about the use of Internet in workplaces see e.g. Manuel Castells, The Rise of Network Society, The Information 
Age: Economy, Society and Culture, Volume I, Second Edition, Blackwell Publishers 2000, p. 375 and 390. About the 
increase of information in social media general see e.g. Gary Hayes’s Social Media counter http://www.personalizemedia.
com/garys-social-media-count/ and about the increase of information on the Internet in more general see e.g. EMCs World 
Wide Information Growth Ticker, available at: http://www.emc.com/leadership/programs/digital-universe.htm. 
233 For example IBM has defined big data the following way: “Every day, we create 2.5 quintillion bytes of data — so much 
that 90% of the data in the world today has been created in the last two years alone. This data comes from everywhere: 
sensors used to gather climate information, posts to social media sites, digital pictures and videos, purchase transaction 
records, and cell phone GPS signals to name a few. This data is big data.” See, IBM’s definition at: http://www-01.ibm.
com/software/data/bigdata/. See also Wikipedia for “big data” at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_data. 
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for the copies that are being produced when content is being communicated on 
the Internet. This is because it is clear that one cannot hold the right holder liable 
for use of his/her own content. 
However, as it pertains to the question when a user/prosumer should be held 
liable for the copies a problem is that it is difficult to see how a user (or even author) 
could be aware of all the possibly relevant copies that are being formed on different 
computers and platforms on the Internet during transmission processes. In fact, 
considering the information mass on the Internet, it is difficult to see that anyone 
could supervise all the copies that are being produced on different platforms and 
computers during communication processes. This applies even if it was possible to 
permanently record all the transmitted information and one would later attempt 
to go through the constantly increasing information mass:234 Who could constantly 
examine in detail each piece of copy of the growing information mass? This rather 
clearly implies that an idea of an individual author rigorously administering who, 
where and when uses his/her expressions on the Internet in order to conclude 
relevant transactions is rather challenging.235 
However, it should be noted that in this respect article 5(1) of the Infosoc Directive 
(and correspondingly paragraph 11(a) of the Finnish Copyright Act) attempt to clarify 
the situation. Article 5(1) of the Infosoc directive posits a mandatory exemption 
exempting from copyright “transient or incidental” copies, which are an “integral and 
essential part of a technological process and whose sole purpose is to enable [...] a 
transmission in a network between third parties by an intermediary, or [...] a lawful 
use of a work or other subject-matter [...], and which have no independent economic 
significance”. Intention of the exemption is to enable normal communication 
processes in digital environment without risk of infringing copyright as otherwise 
use of Internet as it is being used today would not be possible. Although it is mainly 
directed to intermediaries236, it also applies to copies in general as it exempts 
copies completely from copyright.237 Thus, the exemption provided by article 5(1) 
of the Infosoc directive formally alleviates problems related to constantly forming 
reproductions on the Internet. However, it does not specifically state when use 
234 Regarding dig data and challenges of governments see e.g. Tom Kalil, Big Data is a Big Deal, White House, Office of 
Science and Technology Policy, available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2012/03/29/big-data-big-deal. Regarding the 
private sector the Pirate Bay case may be used as an example. The Pirate Bay is a file sharing service, which has been 
convicted as violating copyrights. See e.g. decision of Svea hovrätt case B 4041-09. Despite court ruling(s) stating the 
service illegal claimants (several companies) are struggling to to “administer” content used with help of this single web-
site. 
235 Alf Rehn has descrbed that focusing on copies in digital environment resembles a certain type of valorisation of business 
models. Alf Rehn at a course: Perspectives on Immateriality I: Copyright and New Business Logics, 30.11. – 2.12.2005.
236 Intermediaries are third parties who offer intermediation services between those who transmit (in terms of copyright copy 
and communicate) content. Regarding varying practices see also Gerald Spindler, Giovanni Maria Riccio and Aurélie 
Van Der Perre (under the direction of the professor Montero): Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Markt 
2006/09/E, Service Contract ETD 2006/IME2/69). Thibault Verbies, ULYS, p.7, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_
market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf. See also Taina Pihlajarinne, Lupa Linkittää – toisen aineiston 
hyödyntämisen tekijänoikeudelliset rajat, Vantaa 2012 (hereafter Pihljarinne) (passim).
237 See also P. Bernt Hugenholtz (with the assistance of Kamiel Koelman), DIPPER, Digital Intellectual Property Practice 
Economic Report, Institute for Information Law (IViR) (hereafter Hugenholtz), p. 23.
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is exempted leaving room for interpretation. Moreover, as explained, even if all 
the communicated information was permanently recorded it would most likely be 
impossible for anyone to constantly go through the constantly growing information 
mass in order to track down exempted and not-exempted copies combined to 
appropriate right holders in order that necessary transactions could be concluded. 
Consequently in this respect it seems that Article 5(1) of the Infosoc Directive merely 
provides a declaration stating “not all copies are relevant”. 
Thus it is difficult to see that Article 5(1) of the Infosoc Directive would either 
help us exactly defining when a user/prosumer would be liable for copies that are 
being produced on the Internet. The situation is in theory problematic as we do 
not exactly know when a license is needed. Nevertheless it should be noted that 
there does not seem to be much practical problems regarding applicability of Article 
5(1) of the Infosoc directive. This is most likely due to the fact that it is impossible 
to supervise each emerging copy because it is difficult for the right holders to sue 
users for copies that do not fall under the exemption provided by the Article 5(1) 
of the Infosoc directive. 
However, it may be accepted that users may be held liable for those copies they 
intentionally produce for use. For example, it may be accepted that copies a person 
wittingly produces onto his/her hard-drive belong under the right of reproduction.238 
Possibilities to ask permissions in order to produce these copies are comparable 
to possibilities to ask permissions to make content available to the public, a topic 
which shall be evaluated next.
4.5  RIGHT TO MAKE CONTENT AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC 
AND INTERNET
The author’s right to make the content available to the public has been enacted 
e.g. in article 3 of the Infosoc directive (and article 2 of the Finnish Copyright Act). 
According to the Article 3 of the Infosoc directive the right provides that “Member 
States shall provide authors with the exclusive right to authorise or prohibit any 
communication to the public of their works, by wire or wireless means, including 
the making available to the public of their works in such a way that members of the 
public may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by them.”239
238 Another thing is that a particular limitation (such as a right to produce private copies) may apply to those copies. 
239 It could be mentioned that the on-demand type of right (the last clause of the Article 3) would somehow differ from 
making content made available thorough one-way channels as in on-demand types of services content is being transmitted 
on request of the receiver. However, as it pertains to Internet, it is difficult to see when content is not communicated to 
the receiver on his/her request. For example, what is the difference between requesting a television to change to a certain 
channel from requesting a computer to obtain a certain information e.g. through search engine or a web browser? What 
if your television set has an internet connection and a web browser (as is often case today) and you use it to watch online 
TV? How come watching the online TV would not be based on an individual requests in comparison to traditional TV? 
It is difficult to find coherent answers to the questions. Lastly it could also be mentioned that the Directive EEC/89/552 
regarding broadcasting is so old that at the time commercialisation and popularity of Internet, which took place in the 
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Thus the right covers communicating content on the Internet i.e. in short 
necessitates that always when content is being posted openly available for everyone 
in digital environment, permission from a right holder should be asked. In this 
respect, the situation is clearer in comparison to the right of reproduction: always 
when a person communicates content on the Internet or otherwise posts content 
available to the public s/he needs permission from an adequate right holder. It is 
irrelevant whether any content is actually being communicated, but a possibility 
to obtain content suffices for the liability.240 Thus, even if a limitation allowed a 
prosumer to produce a copy onto his/her computer, s/he would still need permission 
for making it available to the public. To what extent it is rational to assume that 
prosumers and authors conclude individual transactions in order to make content 
available to the public on the Internet in practice shall be evaluated later in chapter 6.
Therefore, it seems that possible challenges regarding applicability of copyright 
on the Internet are related to the concept of reproduction. As copyright is often 
connected to acts of communication, the next chapters evaluate whether results 
from communicational research could provide more rational way to perceive the 
concept of reproduction on the Internet. 
4.6  COMPARING BASICS OF COMMUNICATIONAL RESEARCH 
TO RIGHT OF REPRODUCTION
4.6.1 IN GENERAL
A close connection between copyright and communication may be seen already 
from the writings of Immanuel Kant. He wrote that ”A book is a writing (it does 
not matter, here, whether it is written in hand or set in type, whether it has few or 
many pages), which represents a discourse that someone delivers to the public by 
visible linguistic signs. One who speaks to the public in his own name is called the 
author (autor). One who, through a writing, discourses publicly in another’s (the 
author’s) name is a publisher. When a publisher does this with author’s permission, 
he is the legitimate publisher; but if he does it without the author’s permission, he 
is an illegitimate publisher, that is an unauthorized publisher.”241
In more recent literature, the connection may be read from WIPO’s Intellectual 
Property Handbook. It states that copyright is virtually concerned with “all forms 
and methods of public communication, not only printed publications but also such 
1990s, had not even started. 
240 See also Hugenholtz, p. 27: “The relevant act of exploitation commences, and is completed, by providing public access to 
the protected work. Whether or not, in a given situation, copies of the work are actually downloaded, received or otherwise 
consumed, is quite irrelevant.”
241 Immanuel Kant, The Metaphysis of Morals, Introduction, translation, and notes by Mary Gregor, Cambridge University 
Press, 1991, p. 106 (emphasis original). 
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matters as sound and television broadcasting, films for public exhibition in cinemas, 
etc. and even computerized systems for the storage and retrieval of information.”242
In general all subgroups under the right to make content available (presenting, 
communicating displaying and distributing) also seem to resemble some form of 
communication. One usage form is even named as “right of communication”.243 
However, as it pertains to the right of reproduction, the situation is not as clear 
requiring more detailed examination. For this reason concept of reproduction shall 
be compared in more detail to basics of communicational research as presented by 
Osmo A. Wiio and C. E. Shannon.244
4.6.2 RIGHT OF REPRODUCTION AS AN ACT OF COMMUNICATION
According to Wiio all conceivable means for communication may be divided into 
two main categories: either matter is being modified into a certain form in order 
to be delivered to a recipient or energy is being modified in order to be transmitted 
to a recipient. The systems may converge as happens e.g. when a fax is sent. 
Respectively communication systems have also been divided to quantity and instant 
communicating. Quantity communicating takes place when a communication 
process takes time and leaves a mark. For example, transferring an object to 
another place is an act of quantity communicating. On the other hand in instant 
communicating message is being communicated quickly and disappears unless it 
is being separately recorded.245 Shannon’s mathematical theory of communication 
may be used to depict a communication system for instant communicating.246
242 WIPO Intellectual Property Handbook: Policy, Law and Use, chapter 2.162, http://www.wipo.int/about-ip/en/iprm/pdf/
ch2.pdf. According Fiske all cultures would die without communication. John Fiske, Merkkien Kieli, Johdatus viestinnän 
tutkimiseen, Gummerus Kirjapaino Oy, Jyväskylä 1993 (Oiriginal: Introduction to Communication Studies), p. 13 – 14. 
About the connection of culture and new systesm of communication in general see also e.g. Castells, p. 405. 
243 See also Article 8 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty (as adopted in Geneva on December 20 1996), which is titled as “Right 
of Communication to the Public”. 
244 It is evident that the comparison must be conducted on a rather general level as communicational research is completely 
different field of research than legal sciences. 
245 Osmo A. Wiio, Johdatus viestintään, 6.-8. painos, WSOY Kirjapainoyksikkö, Porvoo 1998 (hereafter Wiio), p.13. One could 
also translate the communication systems to slow and rapid messaging. (Quantity and instant messaging are translated 
from Finnish words “kesto- ja pikaviestintä”). 
246 See e.g. C. E. Shannon, A Mathematical Theory of Communication, a reprint with corrections from The Bell System 
Technical Journal, Vol. 27, pp. 379 – 423, 623 – 656, July, October, 1948 (hereafter Shannon), p. 2. Available at: http://
cm.bell-labs.com/cm/ms/what/shannonday/shannon1948.pdf. 
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Picture 2. Shannon’s Schematic diagram of a general communication system
When comparing the result of Shannon’s research to the concept of reproduction 
one sees that always when content is being communicated to another platform it is 
by definition also being copied. In other words a successful communication process 
is also an act of reproduction. This may also be seen directly e.g. from terminology 
used by Shannon as he states that:”The fundamental problem of communication is 
that of reproducing at one point either exactly or approximately a message selected 
at another point.”247 Correspondingly e.g. a Finnish Committee Report 1953:5 states 
that an act of reproduction takes place when a work is being transmitted to a 
device that may be used for its reproduction.248 Common to both approaches also is 
that communicating content always necessitates possessing a copy from where the 
communication process begins. Therefore focusing merely on platforms is irrelevant 
from the viewpoint of copyright: only distributing those platforms or communicating 
content the platforms contain may have relevance for the right holder.249
This may be illustrated though an example: it is irrelevant for a right 
holder from an economic perspective how many platforms containing 
content – traditionally copies – someone produces of a certain content 
as only the producer suffers the time and costs of producing them. 
There may be economical effects for the right holder only if the copies/
247 Shannon, p. 1 (emphasis added). 
248 Committee Report 1953:5 ehdotus laiksi tekijänoikeudesta kirjallisiin ja taiteellisiin teoksiin, p. 47. Thus according to the 
Committee Report 1953:5 an act of reproduction takes place if a work is being transmitted to a platform where it may be 
repeated (i.e. copied/transmitted again). 
249 However, an exception to this rule is that the very first platform on which the content exists is relevant: if a certain piece 
of content is on no platform, it is questionable whether it exists at all.
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platforms are distributed (“quantity communicated”) or content they 
contain is otherwise being (“instantly”) communicated to other persons. 
In other words, if you produce 10.000 copies of a Harry Potter book, 
no harm yet has occurred to the right holder(s) of the books. Only you 
have suffered the costs of production. Economics of the right holders 
may be affected only if you start distributing those copies or otherwise 
communicating content the platforms contain. 
Consequently, it seems that we may understand all the economic rights 
provided by copyright as rights to communicate content in some way. Moreover, 
all of the economic rights of right holders seem also to belong under the category 
of instant communicating, except distributing copies, which is a form of quantity 
communicating. For these reasons, it is difficult to see that considering copyright 
generally as a right to communicate content would limit exclusive rights of right 
holders. However, doing so would provide clearer way to comprehend essence of 
economic rights of authors as the approach would enable us to disregard random 
copies that are being produced during communication processes. It would also 
allow us to focus on the person who is the communicator i.e. user.
However, regardless of whether we accept the referred “communicational 
approach”, a prosumer still needs permission at least for making content available 
to the public. Whether there are applicable limitations relieving prosumers from 
the need to ask permissions as it pertains to use of content on the Internet shall 
be examined next.
4.7  LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHT TO MAKE CONTENT 
AVAILABLE TO THE PUBLIC
4.7.1.  IN GENERAL
All international conventions and treaties on copyright contain provisions for 
limiting economic rights of right holders.250 Consequently, this chapter evaluates 
those limitations of the Infosoc directive that might be considered plausible for 
prosumers (i.e. natural private persons not acting for commercial purposes) to 
produce copies and make content available to the public on the Internet. However, 
as Article 5.2(b) of the Infosoc directive entitles prosumers to produce private copies 
250 See e.g. Articles 9 – 10bis of the Berne Convention, Article 13 of the GATT Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of 
Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS), Article 10 of the WIPO Copyright Treaty, Article 15 of the International Convention 
for the Protection of Performers, Producers of Phonograms and Broadcasting Organizations (Rome Convention) and Article 
16 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT). In more detail see e.g. Papadopoulou, M.D., Copyright 
Limitations and Exceptions in an E-Education Environment, in European Journal of Law and Technology, Vol. 1, Issue 
2, 2010 (hereafter Papadopoulou), p. 8–19.
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against compensations for right holders251, focus of the analysis is on usage forms 
related to making content available to the public on the Internet.252 
At this point it should also be noted that in Europe Infosoc Directive contains 
an exhaustive list of limitations. This means that member states are not allowed to 
enact limitations if they have not been listed. If they are listed it is up to member 
states to decide whether they implement limitations as provided in article 5 of the 
Infosoc directive.253 However, an exhaustive list of limitations is problematic because, 
just as copyright may evolve, also society and scope of other fundamental rights 
necessitating a limitation to copyright may evolve. As explained, reciprocal nature 
of fundamental rights does not acknowledge a possibility to define or “lock-in” 
the scope of other rights from the viewpoint of one right. For example, regarding 
the right to science and culture General Comment 21, paragraph 10 specifically 
states that “Various definitions of “culture” have been postulated in the past and 
others may arise in the future.” Therefore an exhaustive list for possible limitations 
is problematic from the viewpoint of fundamental rights. Consequently validity 
of exhaustive set of limitations may be put under question from the viewpoint 
of fundamental rights analysis. In fact an exhaustive list for limitations indicates 
that only little, if any, weigh have been given fundamental rights analysis when 
the Infosoc directive was drafted. 254 Provided copyright legislations primarily 
protect business interests instead of individual authors as the situation would 
mean thattraditional content industry wants to keep the world as it was before the 
Internet/emergence of information society. Thus it is understandable also from the 
viewpoint of fundamental rights when Bernt Hugenholtz states “Why the Copyright 
Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid”.255 
4.7.2.  LIMITATIONS AVAILABLE FOR PROSUMERS FOR USE OF CONTENT ON 
THE INTERNET
Before evaluating limitations provided by the Infoc-directive it could be mentioned 
that also the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works 
251 In theory Article 5(1) of the Infosoc directive exempts also copies produced by prosumers. However, as explained, it is 
unclear to what extent prosumers may invoke it. 
252 It should also be mentioned that it may be argued that all of the limitations do not apply if the used expression is from 
an illegal source. As the relevance of the “illegal source” argument is evaluated later in chapter 11, its relevance shall not 
be examined in this chapter. 
253 As the list is exhaustive limitations outside the list are not allowed unless they already existed under national law and 
have a minor importance for analogue (i.e. not digital) uses and do not affect the free circulation of goods and services 
within the community. See also Papadopoulou, p. 16.
254 ECHR has been critical towards set inflexible limitations. See e.g. Phinikaridou v. Cyprus, no 23890/2, section 62, 
20.12.2007 and Backlund v. Finland, no 36498/05, sections 45 – 46, 6.7.2010. In both cases the ECHR has been critical 
towards strict time periods without possibilities to give weigh to other possible relevant factors. 
255 See Bernt Hugenholtz Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and Possibly Invalid, Published in [2000] EIPR 11, 
p. 501-502, available at: http://www.ivir.nl/publications/hugenholtz/opinion-EIPR.html.  
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contains articles providing limitations. However, as the Infosoc-directive provides 
an exhaustive list of limitations, only its limitations shall be evaluated here. 
When we evaluate the scope of copyright from the viewpoint of the right to science 
and culture it should first be noted that the right to make content available concerns 
activities directed to public. Thus private acts of making content available do not 
belong under the scope of the right, which means that prosumers are allowed to 
communicate content with each other privately. This is positive when we evaluate 
possibilities to fulfill the right to science and culture. Another thing is that it is difficult 
to give exact estimations how large group would be considered as non-public. It 
is often stated that in general public is present if the target audience has not been 
determined in advance and in theory anyone may participate an event where the 
expression is used.256 Thus it is clear that posting a piece of content on Internet 
openly available for everyone is making it available to the public in a manner, 
which necessitates permission from a right holder. Therefore, from the viewpoint 
of information networks a non-public sphere could only be a closed network with 
limited (pre-determined) attendance. Consequently, it should first be noted that as 
the right to science and culture is not limited to closed environments, as a counter 
balance to the righs of authors the right to science and culture is always in conflict 
with copyright in open networks unless specific limitations enabling use are found.
When evaluating limitations more concretely, a prosumers perspective a 
possibility to make citations as provided by Article 5.3(a)(d) (or in paragraphs 22 
and 25 of the Finnish Copyright Act) seem to apply for Internet use. They provide 
a technology neutral right applying to all content types.257 In general, requirements 
for citing is that cited content has been made lawfully available to the public, the 
citation is made in accordance with good manners and that there is an appropriate 
connection between the cited work and new work.258 A challenge related to citing is 
the lack of precise boundaries as almost any expression – perhaps even one word 
– may be regarded as a protectable content. It is not either always clear when the 
preconditions for their use are fulfilled. Nevertheless, applying the limitation for 
citing does not seem to cause many problems in practice. However, it would be 
a rather brave interpretation to claim that a right to take a citations would allow 
making content available to the public on a larger scale (e.g. for sharing music on 
the Internet). Consequently, in this respect the right to make citations is rather 
narrow in relation to the right to science and culture. 
Article 5.3(f) of the Infosoc directive allows use of political speeches and extracts 
of public lectures or similar expressions to the extent justified by the informatory 
256 About citing in Finland see e.g. Haarmann, p. 188 – 193 and 205 – 206 and Kristiina Harenko, Valtteri Niiranen ja Pekka 
Tarkela, Tekijänoikeus, kommentaari ja käsikirja, Helsinki 2006 (hereafter Harenko, Niiranen and Tarkela), p. 35 ff.
257 About citing in Finland see e.g. Haarmann, p. 188 – 193 and 205 – 206 and Harenko, Niiranen and Tarkela , p.172 – 181 
and 185 – 189. One could argue that in theory use of content through citing and other limitations listed below always in 
theory requires copying the expression to the extent it is used.
258  However, according to some, citations should not be allowed for the purposes of advertising. 
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purpose and provided that the source, including the author’s name, is indicated, 
except where this turns out to be impossible. As the limitation (excluding political 
speeches) is limited to “extracts” of expressions, we may see that its applicability 
is also rather narrow in relation to the right to science and culture.
Article 5.3(i) of the Infosoc directive allows incidental inclusion of a work or 
other subject-matter in other material. It may be asked whether this limitation could 
enable prosumers to use e.g. music on their home-made videos made available on 
the Internet. However, the word “incidental” implies that use of an expression should 
not be purposeful. Even if more liberal interpretation is accepted, it is difficult to 
see that Article 5.3(i) could provide a much wider possibilities to use than the right 
to take quotations.
Finally, Article 5.3(k) Infosoc directive allows use of expressions for the purpose 
of caricature, parody or pastiche. This limitation provides an extensive limitation also 
for prosumers to use content. However, the limitation does not enable prosumers 
to use content in their original form and consequently does not provide a substitute 
for a license.
Therefore, when we evaluate possibilities to use content as provided by the right 
to science and culture we may see that the Infosoc directive provides only rather 
limited ways for prosumers to use expressions in their original form on the Internet. 
Consequently it is difficult to see that exemptions and limitations to copyright could 
substitute a need for license in order to make content available on the Internet, 
especially if a prosumer or a user prefers to use content more comprehensively. 
4.8 CONCLUDING REMARKS 
According to the above analysis, at the core of individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright 
theory is protecting essential economic interests of individual authors creating 
expressions. Provided exclusive rights are granted to authors for administering their 
expressions, authors should secure their basic material interests through individual 
transactions with users/prosumers. If concluding these transactions is not possible, 
copyright system based on exclusive rights is not functional as authors are unable 
to secure their basic material interests. 
In this respect, applying the right of reproduction to Internet is challenging as it is 
problematic to pinpoint each copy on the Internet possibly necessitating permission 
from a right holder. This at least in theory questions functionality of exclusive 
based copyright system on the Internet regarding the right of reproduction.259 
259 To the extent producing private copies is allowed compensations of these copies are distributed to authors the result is 
positive from the viewpoint of the Articles 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR: prosumers are able to use and authors 
are entitled to obtain compensations. Another thing is that it is difficult to rigorously evaluate whose content is being 
copied by whom.
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Consequently, it was suggested that all exclusive rights of authors could be seen as 
rights to communicate content without limiting current copyright system.
However, the situation is problematic also from the viewpoint of the right to 
make content available to the public as offered limitations for prosumers in this 
respect are rather narrow. The right to science and culture is not narrowed to closed 
environments/groups and consequently it is difficult to see that already existing 
limitations to make content available to the public could secure the protected core 
area of the right to science and culture. In other words when we evaluate possible 
usage situations from the viewpoint of right to science and culture as provided by 
Article 27(1) of the UDHR and 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR, limitations enacted to Infosoc 
directive seem deficient. Most likely the right to science and culture has had little, 
if any, weight when copyright laws have been drafted. In fact an exhaustive list of 
limitations implies fundamental rights analysis has had very little if any role when 
the Infosoc directive has been drafted. This is problematic as fundamental rights are 
seen as prerequisites for democracy and e.g. according to the Finnish Constitution 
every constitutional right has a core area protecting certain activities that cannot 
be criminalized.260 Thus it may be asked how we should take into consideration the 
right to science and culture when compared to exclusive rights granted to individual 
authors from a fundamental right perspective?
260 In this respect see also Constitutional Law Committee 23/1997, vp, p. 2. See also See Sakari Melander, Kriminalisointiteoria 
– rangaistavaksi säätämisen oikeudelliset rajoitukset, Suomalaisen lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja, A-Sarja N:o 288, a 
doctoral dissertation. Vammala 2008 (hereafter Melander), p. 302 ff.
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5   COMPARING CORE AREAS OF RIGHTS OF 
AUTHORS TO THE RIGHT TO SCIENCE AND 
CULTURE
5.1.  A BASIC PREREQUISITE RELATED TO FUNCTIONALITY OF 
COPYRIGHT SYSTEM BASED ON EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS
If one attempts to secure the basic material interests of authors through a system 
based on exclusive rights, certain minimum requirements must be met in order 
for the system to be functional. A clear requirement for securing the basic material 
interests of individual authors through a property right is the possibility to conclude 
individual transactions regarding use of the property. If concluding transactions 
between authors and prosumers is not possible, an author cannot expect to obtain 
any compensation for the use of exclusive rights.261 This may also be seen from the 
European Convention on Human Rights, which does not extend its scope to possible 
future property262 – i.e. in terms of copyright to possible future transactions. It is 
difficult to see why this precondition should not apply also to unpublished works, 
as they are also worthless in economic terms if an author is unable to conclude 
transactions concerning their use. 
However, the inability to conclude transactions does not directly endanger the 
right to science and culture. Indeed, using content as granted by the right to science 
and culture is possible even if concluding transactions with a right holder is not. In 
other words, it is difficult to see that one could endanger (not to mention “annul” 
through criminalization) the existing right to science and culture on the grounds that 
it is not possible to fulfill rights of authors.263 In such situations, prosumers would 
have only one possible role: criminals. Therefore, if fulfilling the right to science 
and culture were denied in cases when it is not possible to conclude transactions 
261 This should apply also to Anglo-American copyright system. See e.g. Wendy J. Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: a 
Structural and Economical Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, Columbia Law Review, December, 1982, 
Under B. An Overview of the Market Model: “1. The Market System. Economists in the tradition of Adam Smith defend 
our society’s primary dependence on markets by arguing that individual transactions in the marketplace serve both social 
needs and the needs of the individual persons participating.” It could also be mentioned that if one creates content merely 
for one’s own amusement without even an intention to conclude transactions, there is no need to grant economic rights 
to authors.
262  See Pellonpää I and and Matti Pellonpää, Euroopan Ihmisoikeussopimus, Jyväskylä 2000, p.  479 ff with referred case 
law.
263 It could also be mentioned that it is difficult to maintain an idea we should have rights that are impossible to fulfill. See also 
Juha Pöyhönen (nowadays Karhu), Sopimusoikeuden järjestelmä ja sopimusten sovittelu, Suomalaisen Lakimiesyhdistyksen 
julkaisuja A-sarja N:o 179, Vammala 1988, p. 4. 
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with a right holder, the result would endanger both the rights of authors and the 
right to science and culture at the same time, thereby “maximizing misery”. 
However, as fundamental rights are interrelated – such as the tension between 
subsections 1 and 2 of the UDHR – why does the inability to conclude individual 
transactions not also endanger the right to science and culture, if concluding 
individual transactions is not possible? In theory, the question is relevant given the 
assumption that there would be fewer expressions to use if the essential economic 
interests of authors were not secured. This would obviously be the case if concluding 
transactions were not possible in a system based on exclusive rights. Fewer existing 
expressions to use would thus have indirect negative effects on the right to culture 
and science.264 
In this respect, it should be noted that the problem related to applying exclusive 
rights of authors already exists if concluding transactions is not possible. Therefore, 
the above analysis does not mean that fulfilling basic material interests of authors 
should be disrespected if concluding individual transactions is not possible. On 
the contrary, states are obligated to secure basic material interests of authors just 
as they must defend the right to science and culture. Instead, the above analysis 
merely means that in situations when it is not possible to conclude transactions, it 
is questionable whether a system based on exclusive rights for securing the basic 
material interests of authors is functional. In other words, in cases where concluding 
individual transactions is not possible, the legislature should use means other than 
exclusive rights for securing essential economic interests of authors. Whatever 
means are employed, they should not endanger the fundamental rights of others. 
For this reason, it is suggested herein that cases in which concluding transactions is 
not possible clearly justify limitations or even exemptions to copyright protection.265 
This is consistent with the history and practices of copyright law. For example, the 
exemption enacted in Article 5(1) of the Infosoc Directive exempted copies from 
copyright in cases where it is not practicable to monitor and conclude necessary 
transactions regarding their use.266 Collective licenses, which traditionally have been 
seen as limitations, have also been introduced in situations when is has been regarded 
impossible for individual authors to conclude transactions individually. It should 
also be emphasized that limiting copyright in situations when concluding individual 
transactions is not possible should not hurt authors; they cannot otherwise expect 
to obtain compensations in such cases. From a courts perspective, this approach 
would emphasize analysizing whether a users fundamental rights are endangered 
264 It should be noted that expressions to use would always exist even if no copyright laws existed.
265 This does not prevent granting exclusive rights back to authors in cases when concluding individual transactions becomes 
possible again.
266 The formal justification for the Article 5(1) is in short to enable normal communication processes on the Internet, but in 
practice the problem is caused by the fact that no-one can supervise and conclude appropriate transactions regarding each 
produced copy on the Internet i.e. enable communication processes through individual transactions. If this was possible, 
there would be no need for the exemption.
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due to impossibility to obtain licenses on a case-by-case basis. The next question to 
be examined is the reciprocal relationship between rights of authors and prosumers 
when concluding transactions is possible.
In practice the right to science and culture has been largely neglected. 
The most recent example may be read from the EU Directive (2012/28/
EU) on certain permitted uses of orphan works (Orphan Works 
Directive).267 The Orphan Works Directive attempts to alleviate using 
works whose right holders cannot be identified or located.268 It is 
clear that it is not possible to conclude transactions regarding use of 
works whose owners are unknown. However, also the Orphan works 
directive starts from the starting point of all rights reserved, completely 
neglecting the right to science and culture. It maintains exclusive 
rights beyond rationalism as it applies only published works or works 
that have been otherwise placed publicly available (e.g. by means of 
broadcasting). This means that unpublished works whose right holders 
cannot be found shall stay behind closed doors in theory for eternity. 
It is difficult to see who benefits from disallowing access to cultural 
or scientific content which may even be major scientific contributions 
or significant musical compositions. Such a result does not advance 
rights of users or the economic interests of the author.269 The analysis 
presented in this book acknowledging the right to science and culture 
suggests that copyright should be clearly limited as it pertains to orphan 
works given that concluding relevant transactions regarding their use is 
impossible. Furthermore, if an author of an orphan work reappears and 
claims rights to it, it would then be possible to conclude transactions.270 
267 See Directive 2012/28/EU of the European Parliament and of the Council of 25 October 2012, on certain permitted uses 
of orphan works (hereafter Orphan works directive).
268 Article 2 of the Orphan works directive states that “A work or a phonogram shall be considered an orphan work if none of 
the right holders in that work or phonogram is identified or, even if one or more of them is identified, none is located…”
269  If copyright exists primarily in order to benefit industries, maintaining a black and white starting point would benefit them 
as a mean to maintain an illusion through law that rights of authors must always be protected “for ideological reasons”. 
However, such an answer, of course, has directly nothing to do with protecting basic material interests of authors or the 
right to science and culture.
270 If an author would reappear and claim rights to an expression, concluding transaction regarding its use would become 
possible indicating that exclusive rights would again apply. It could also be decided that the authors is entitled to obtain 
compensations for the use during the time period s/he was missing as such a decision would benefit also his/her economical 
interests. It is of course possible that the author disapproves the use because of e.g. privacy reasons. However, such a 
justification does not aim to secure the authors basic material interests i.e. economical rights. 
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5.2.  ECONOMIC RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND THE RIGHT TO 
SCIENCE AND CULTURE
5.2.1.  PRELIMINARY REMARKS
As the right to science and culture has both theoretical and judicial support, its 
existence is accepted in this dissertation. As opposed to the rights of authors, the 
right to science and culture entitles using complete works. This may also be read 
from the General Comment 21, which states that it consists “… of effective and 
concrete opportunities for individuals and communities to enjoy culture fully…”271 
and contains “the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds 
and forms including art forms…”272 and creates a minimum core obligation for State 
Parties to “… eliminate any barriers or obstacles that inhibit or restrict a person’s 
access to the person’s own culture or to other cultures, without discrimination and 
without consideration for frontiers of any kind”273 Although we would narrow down 
the core area of the right to science and culture to limited amounts of works, this 
core area is still in direct conflict with copyright theory based on exclusive rights. 
Because property and human rights should not be equated, it may be asked 
whether it is theoretically rational to compare property rights to the right to science 
and culture as provided in the Article 27(1) of the UDHR and 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR. 
As explained, the situation should rather be the opposite.274 If this is nevertheless 
done and property is seen as a neutral “tool” having fundamental value in itself (as 
opposed to a right protecting certain essential/basic interests as the fundamental 
rights approach postulates), it would mean that one should give economic value 
to other fundamental rights when weighed with property right. Or, if property has 
always been seen as a right outweighing the competing right, it would mean that a 
prosumer is entitled to enjoy his/her right to science and culture only if an author 
gives his/her permission first even if the condition was to pay neglible compensation. 
If no permission is asked, it could be argued that acting as provided by the right 
to science and culture is a crime (“stealing”). However, this is what seems to be 
the situation in contemporary exclusive based copyright approach on the internet. 
Exclusive rights seem to have been considered “above” the right to science and 
culture. If no copyright limitation applies, this is problematic as it criminalizes 
core areas of the right to science and culture. One could attempt to argue that the 
problem is merely theoretical if reasonably priced licenses are being offered to 
271 See under “Elements of the right to take part in cultural life” in paragraph 16(b) of the General Comment 21 (emphasis 
added).
272 See under “Specific obligations” in paragraph 49(b) of the General Comment 21 (emphasis added).
273 See under “Core obligations” in paragraph 55(d) of the General Comment 21 (emphasis added).
274 See e.g. here chapter 4.1. and General Comment 17, paragraph 1: “Human rights are fundamental as they are inherent 
to the human person as such, whereas intellectual property rights are first and foremost means by which States seek to 
provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the dissemination of creative and innovative productions, 
as well as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions 
for the benefit of society as a whole.” 
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prosumers. At first this argument sounds plausible. However, it would still mean 
that we would be putting a price – even if a reasonable one – on the fundamental 
rights to science and culture and it is difficult to find justifications allowing us to value 
fundamental rights in economic terms.275 This is the main theoretical challenge when 
we start comparing the relationship between the right to science and culture with 
exclusive rights of authors. The possibility that distinguishing between published 
and unpublished expressions could provide guidelines to the dilemma shall be 
evaluated next.
If the concept of property is not evaluated as a right protecting certain essential/
basic interests as the fundamental rights approach postulates, but instead is seen as 
a neutral “tool” having fundamental value in itself there would be no lower limit for 
damages that may be considered to have violated property as a fundamental right. 
Indeed, even damages as little as 0,0001 euro would represent violation of property 
as a fundamental right. Unless other fundamental rights were given monetary 
value, this would mean that all other fundamental rights would be secondary to 
this objective and economically worthless. 
5.2.2.  ESSENTIAL ECONOMIC INTERESTS AND RELEVANCE OF PUBLISHING AN 
EXPRESSION
If concluding transactions is possible, it may be argued that unpublished works of 
individual authors are at the core of copyright. However, in an author–prosumer 
relationship, the protection is theoretically also in conflict with the right to use 
expressions as provided by the right to culture and science. Thus, it may be wondered 
which right should prevail in a conflict regarding the use of unpublished works. 
It would seem reasonable to conclude that taking an unpublished work from 
an authors’s desk drawer would clearly be in conflict with the core area of author’s 
exclusive property right; it would clearly be stealing. However, when we evaluate 
copyright as a legal right to administer use of content in comparison to traditional 
property, the interpretation may be challenged. For example, if the work is merely 
copied so that the author still has the original piece in his/her desk drawer, the 
analogy to traditional stealing becomes problematic. In fact, it may be even asked 
what the economical damage would be for the author, if s/he had no intention of 
using that particular expression to secure his/her essential material interests as 
economic rights postulate? 
The situation depicts the challenges that have been connected to 
copyright as non-rivalrous and non-excludable goods.276 In other words, 
275  From a practical viewpoint functionality of such system requires that that the parties are more or less in an equal position. 
276 For example Santos has stated the following, “the fact that intellectual property deals with non-rivalrous and non-
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when e.g. Article 1 of Protocol 1 in the ECHR entitles everyone “peaceful 
enjoyment of his possessions” the problem in relation to copyright 
is that a right holder is able to peacefully enjoy his/her possessions 
even if someone has copied his/her expression.277 This implies how 
copyright resembles a business model instead of traditional property 
objects. Thus when the legislators attempt to limit possibilities to use 
non-excludable goods by making them excludable through exclusive 
rights, the attempt creates an artificial legal barrier, which is often 
maintained by making analogies to traditional goods such as apples, 
buffets etc. These analogies are problematic because, opposite to 
traditional goods, the amount of copyrighted goods merely increases 
the more they are enjoyed (copied).278 For this reason, the Internet as 
an open environment produces a challenge for granting digital products 
economic value. After the first product has been produced, the price of 
the subsequent digital products is essentially zero. 
It is true that publishing an expression often implies that the author has less 
need for protection as publishing an expression indicates that his/her economic 
interests may have been secured through the publication itself.279 However, even 
if this occasionally might be the case, publishing an expression does not yet tell 
us whether essential economic interests of the author have been secured or not. 
Therefore, keeping in mind the aim of fundamental rights to secure certain essential 
rights (i.e. “essential foodstuffs”, “essential primary health care”, “basic shelter and 
housing”) it may be asked why publishing an expression should have much relevance 
in the decision making when this evaluation is conducted. 
Another concern is that communicating a private expression, e.g. an 
unpublished letter, may violate its author’s (and possibly receiver’s) 
privacy. If this is the case, the right to science and culture should be 
compared to the right to the right of privacy, not to economic rights 
aiming to secure author’s essential interests.280
excludable goods poses some insurmountable problems to its assimilation into a strictly Lockean philosophy. Human 
rights approaches to intellectual property that assume that the latter should be regarded as a human right qua property 
are fatally wounded because they rely on a defective analogy, confusing the tangible goods in which the intellectual 
work is embodied with the intangible goods themselves.” See Ana Eduarda Santos, Rebalancing Intellectual Property 
In The Information Society: The Human Rights Approach, Cornell Law School Inter-University Graduate, Conferences, 
Lectures, and Workshops, Student Conference Papers, 4-1-2011, p. 5. Available at: http://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/
viewcontent.cgi?article=1075&context=lps_clacp. 
277  ee also Santos: “This is language that is strange to the intellectual property field, and with good reason: the analogy 
between property stricto sensu and intangible property may be helpful to understand certain problems, but it is certainly 
not accurate. Intellectual property rights were not created to promote “peaceful enjoyment” of works or inventions…” 
Santos, p. 12.
278 According to Geiger copyright “concerns property of a special kind”. See Geiger, p. 105 (emphasis original). 
279  In this respect it is e.g. understandable that traditionally protection provided by copyright has weakened after the expression 
has been published. For example, certain limitations start applying to expressions after their publication.
280 Similarly it would be difficult to invoke copyright protection in order e.g. to prevent giving an unpublished letter to a 
police, if the letter reveals a serious crime. Although in this example other rights/values but the right to science and culture 
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If no relevance is given to the possibility of prior publication, we evaluate 
copyright purely as a right aiming to secure basic material (economic) interests 
of authors. From this point of view, it may be argued that the right to science and 
culture should prevail over copyright, if the author’s essential economic rights are 
secured. In such cases, the author is simply no longer in need of fundamental rights 
protection and would not be covered by the protected core area of author’s rights. 
On the other hand, if the author’s essential economic interests were endangered, 
rights of authors should prevail over the right to science and culture. 
Consequently, comparing the right to science and culture to rights of authors 
as a securer of certain essential economic rights would mean that the economic 
position of authors should be evaluated on a case-by-case basis when content is 
being used. The practical challenge of this approach is that a prosumer should then 
know whether the author’s basic material interests have been previously secured 
or not and whether the use will harm or benefit281 the author’s economic position. 
At first this approach may also sound like hairsplitting.282 However, considering 
the traditional formal copyright approach, it would not be revolutionary at all. As 
explained, we may already rigorously evaluate whether few – or even one – word 
expressions exceed the required threshold for copyright protection or whether an 
expression in bit form has been copied to a certain platform or not. Therefore, 
although certain practical challenges in this respect exist, evaluating whether a 
certain use endangers right holders’ essential economic interests on a case-by-case 
basis could be considered an option to solve the relationship between the right 
to culture and science and rights of authors. A simple solution could be that the 
non-commercial use of singular expressions (such as short phrases or everyday 
photographs) could be considered exempted from copyright due to the right to 
science and culture and the special nature of copyright as property especially in 
cases when it is obvious that the author has no intentions to use the expression in 
order to secure his/her economical rights. 
5.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The analysis in this chapter indicates that it is challenging to fulfill basic material 
interests of authors through exclusive rights in an author–prosumer relationship 
when the right to science and culture is taken into consideration. It is difficult to see 
that one could deny a prosumer from enjoying his/her right to science and culture 
would provide justification for using the content. 
281 For example, through net work effects.
282 Obtaining such information may be occasionally easy (e.g. if the author is an international multimillionaire rock-star), 
but often obtaining relevant information regarding the authors economic situation at the time of use would be difficult 
if not impossible. Similarly it would be difficult to pre-assess how a particular use influenced economic position of a 
particular author. 
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in cases where concluding individual transactions with authors is not practicable. 
Institutions “maximize misery” when they allow situations in which authors are 
unable to receive compensation and prosumers are unable to use content, as in such 
cases both rights of authors and prosumers are endangered at the same time. It is 
also theoretically problematic to require a prosumer to request permission to enjoy 
his/her fundamental rights to science and culture as in such situation property right 
is always posited above the prosumers right to science and culture.
Making analogous comparisons between copyright and traditional goods as 
property is also challenging. How could an author be deprived of his/her right 
“to peacefully enjoy his property” when someone makes a copy of it? S/he is still 
able to “peacefully enjoy his property”. It may also be asked whether it is plausible 
to grant fundamental rights protection to an author if his/her essential economic 
interests have already been fulfilled or if the author does not have any intentions to 
use a certain piece of work in order to secure his/her essential economical interests? 
Furthermore, it is challenging for a prosumer to predetermine whether their use of 
content hurts or promotes the economic position of the author.
These challenges indicate that if the essential economic interests of authors 
are being endangered, e.g. due to use of content by prosumers on the Internet, 
exclusive rights should not be considered when developing a solution for protecting 
the rights of authors and prosumers. However, the described concerns are obviously 
unnecessary, or at least diminished, if authors and prosumers constantly conclude 
individual transactions with each other, i.e. ,the system functions as postulated 
regardless of the aforementioned challenges. Thus, the next chapter evaluates the 
extent to which it is rational to assume that individual authors and prosumers might 
conclude individual transactions with each other. 
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6   REGARDING PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES 
TO CONCLUDE TRANSACTIONS BETWEEN 
INDIVIDUAL AUTHORS AND PROSUMERS ON 
THE INTERNET
6.1. IN GENERAL
This chapter evaluates possibilities of authors and prosumers to conclude individual 
transactions with each other in order to make content available to the public on the 
Internet. The evaluation is worthwhile to conduct when we take into consideration 
that already before Internet it has been in certain cases postulated impossible to 
administer use of rights individually. For example, for that reason platform fee/levy 
system was introduced.283 Some may think that evaluating possibilities to conclude 
direct transactions between individual authors and prosumers as an uninteresting 
theoretical analysis. However, arguing individual administration of rights is theory 
is close to arguing individualistic – especially droit d’ auteur – copyright as theory. 
Especially fundamental rights see copyright as a mean to secure essential interests 
of authors and if exclusive rights are been used to secure this aim, transactions 
should be concluded in order to accomplish the task.
Thus as exclusive rights are applied when content is used on the Internet, 
one could assume that obtaining permissions for using content on the Internet is 
easier than obtaining permissions for producing private copies. In order to evaluate 
whether these types of assumptions are rational, this chapter evaluates possibilities to 
conclude transactions from four different viewpoints. Firstly, although an exclusive 
right to communicate content to the public exists, in cases where content has been 
posted and is openly available on the Internet with the consent of the right holder, 
it may be asked if the use of this content should be considered allowed through 
an implied license. Secondly, the use of freer licenses, such as Creative Commons/
Open content licenses has increased. To a large extent the owner of a freer license 
waives his/her exclusive rights, thereby enabling the use of his/her content. Thus, 
their relevance as suitable solutions for concluding transactions shall be evaluated. 
283 See e.g. Prof. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Dr Lucie Guibault and Sjoerd van Geffen The Future of Levies in the Digital Environment, 
Institute for Information Law 2003 (hereafter Hugenholtz, Guibault and van Geffen), p. 10 and 12. See also e.g. Committee 
Report 1974:21, Pohjoismaiden tekijänoikeuden tarkistamiskomitean mietintö osa I, Valokopiointi ja nauhoitus erityisesti 
opetusoiminnan piirissä, Helsinki 1974 and Committee Report 1982:63, Tekijänoikeuskomitean II osamietintö, Korvaus 
yksityisestä ääni- ja kuvanauhoitustoiminnasta, Tekijänoikeudellinen välimiesmenettely, Tekijänoikeusneuvosto, Helsinki 
1982. 
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Thirdly, technological convergence and rules regulating transfer of rights may also 
have relevance regarding licensing possibilities given that theoretically each used 
technology requires a separate permission from a right holder. In this respect, the 
Internet forms a unique platform and for this reason applicability of rules regarding 
transfer of rights shall be compared to technological convergence. Finally, if a user 
needs a license to copy and communicate content (as is always the case provided 
no exemption or limitation applies), practical possibilities to conclude necessary 
individual transactions shall be evaluated on a general level. 
6.2. USE OF CONTENT FREELY AVAILABLE ON THE INTERNET
If content has been posted and is openly available on the Internet, as an open 
network, with the permission of a right holder, extent to which it is rationale to 
maintain exclusive rights may be called into question. Why would a right holder 
require permission to (copy and) communicate the content, if s/he already accepted 
that it is openly available for everyone? Posting content freely available for everyone 
forms a certain type of paradox related to applicability of exclusive rights in open 
environments such as Internet.284 This paradox may be illustrated when we compare 
the Internet as an “information superhighway” to traditional publicly accessible 
streets/highways: it would be incomprehensible to necessitate that a person X 
walking on a street should beforehand ask permission from person Z in order to 
receive (“copy”285) what Z is expressing on Z’s own initiative. Why would Z demand 
that X should ask permission from him, if Z voluntarily starts uttering his/her own 
expressions to X? This is dissimilar to a situation wherein Z attempts to arrange 
some type of technical barrier (e.g. a DRM-system, a log-in requirement or a fence) 
as an attempt to prevent anyone from approaching him unless otherwise agreed. 
In such a case the content would not be coming from an open but from a closed 
284 For example, EU Commissions Declaration on Net Neutrality emphasises »open and neutral character of the Internet. See 
last page of the Directive 2009/140/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 25 November 2009, amending 
Directives 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 2002/19/
EC on access to, and interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and 2002/20/EC 
on the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services. 
285 Similarly as computers, also people copy information through live-debates. For example, according to Wiio approximately 
5–9 words are being copied to your short term memory during reading process of this text. Osmo A. Wiio, Information 
and communication, a conceptual analysis, Department of Communication, Series 1C/1/1996, third and revised edition, 
p. 21. In more detail the physical reproduction process in your head may be described in words of Matt Ridley: “Right 
now, somewhere in your head, a gene is switching on, so that a series of proteins  can go to work altering the synapses 
between brain cells so that you will, perhaps, forever associate reading this paragraph with the smell of coffee seeping 
in from the kitchen...” Matt Ridley, Nature Via Nurture. Genes, experience and what makes us human. Harper Perennial 
2004, s. 181. It is clear that necessitating permission for these types of copies would be nonsensical (even if they were 
produced from an »illegal source») and overblown interpretations of copyright. However, as in copyright literature one 
has evaluated in very detail when a copy has been being formed on a computers monitor, RAM-memory and other similar 
platforms, the examples may be used in this in order to depict theoretical problems related to situations when one attempts 
literally apply exclusive rights in an open environment.
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system, contradicting the idea of the Internet as an open network or a street as an 
openly accessible area. 
In fact, this questions the rationality of applying exclusive rights to open 
environments. Thus, if content is openly available to everybody, it may be assumed 
that the right holder must have implicitly accepted that it may also be used to some 
extent. In this respect, possible notifications on the web-page or other context may 
provide information. However, if no general implied license doctrine exists (as is 
the case in Finland), one should evaluate the extent to which the right holder had 
implicitly allowed the use, leaving the situation open for case-wise interpretation. 
Thus, in this respect one may only recommend an interpretation. For example, 
it could be suggested that a right holder has consented to communicating his/
her content at least for non-commercial purposes, if the content has been posted 
openly available for everybody with the right holders consent. Any information or 
circumstantial factor indicating another direction would repeal the presumption. 
However, it should be noted that one problem related to this approach would be 
that it would apply only to content posted on the internet with the permission of 
the right holder. Often a prosumer cannot know whether a certain piece of content 
has been placed on line with right holder’s permission. Therefore, as long as no 
doctrine for implied licensing exists, it is difficult to provide clear answers regarding 
the use of openly available content. 
6.3. RELEVANCE OF FREER LICENSING
Fewer questions exist in relation to the use of content licensed under freer licenses. 
Freer licenses provide individual authors and prosumers the possibility to grant 
and obtain licenses from each other. They explicitly state the terms of use and, in 
principle, freely allow reproducing and making content available and for this reason 
are well suited to open environments.286 Despite the fact that they allow extensive 
copying and communication of content on the Internet, their use has increased 
tremendously in recent years. 
For example, the use of so-called Creative Commons licenses (shortly 
CC) has increased in the following way287: “CC introduced its first 
licenses in 2002. An increasing number of websites and content on the 
286 See e.g. MikkoVälimäki, Vapaammista kirjallisten ja taiteellisten teosten lisenssiehdoista, Defensor Legis N:o 6/2003, p. 
1067.
287 There is no required form for individual licensing, but so called »Creative Commons» (or CC) licensing seem to be most 
popular way of licensing, especially when artistic and literary documents are being communicated via Internet. See e.g. 
http://creativecommons.org and Mikko Välimäki, Vapaammista kirjallisten ja taiteellisten teosten lisennsiehdoista, Defensor 
Legis 6/2003. In general about Creative Commons licenses, see e.g. Herkko Hietanen, Ville Oksanen, Mikko Välimäki, 
Community Created Content, Law, Business and Policy. Helsinki 2007, available at: http://www.turre.com/wp-content/
uploads/webkirja_koko_optimoitu2.pdf. 
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Internet use CC licenses. In 2003 search engines indexed one million 
CC-licensed works. By May 2004, the total number of CC-licensed 
works had reached three million. In fall 2005 Yahoo indexed over 53 
million links that were pointing to CC licenses and just six months later 
Google’s queries for CC-content returned over 140 million pages. The 
licensed works range from classical music to sci-fi movies and from 
MIT courses in electronic engineering to governmental reports and 
publications.”288
The increase is most likely at least partially due to the paradoxical starting point 
of copyright, which postulates that exclusive rights should apply also to content that 
has been posted openly available to everyone. However, for prosumers (and other 
interested users) the problem related to freer licenses is that only a limited amount 
of the content is licensed with Creative Commons or similar licenses. On the other 
hand, from the viewpoint of a closed (traditional) copyright business model, the 
ability of freer licenses to secure compensations for right holders is obscure due to 
exclusive rights that have been at least partially waived.289 Therefore, freer licenses 
provide only a limited solution regarding the possibilities to use content. Whether 
rules regarding transfer of rights have an effect to licensing possibilities shall be 
evaluated next.
6.4.  RELEVANCE OF TECHNOLOGICAL CONVERGENCE AND 
RULES REGARDING TRANSFER OF RIGHTS
Concluding transactions, per se, should not be problematic as copyright law 
acknowledges freedom of contract.290 However, copyright laws often contain 
discretionary norms regulating the transfer of rights, which should be taken into 
consideration when examining licensing possibilities. It is at this point that an 
author and a prosumer may face challenges when drafting contracts, especially in 
relation to technological convergence.
288 See Herkko Hietanen’s doctoral dissertation: The Pursuit of Efficient Copyright Licensing, How Some Rights Reserved 
Attempts to Solve the Problems of All Rights Reserved. Lappeenranta University of Technology. Digipaino 2008 (hereafter 
Hietanen) (https://oa.doria.fi/handle/10024/42778), p 40. Lawrence Lessig also described the increase of CC-licenses on 
18th October 2006 in his is Commoner Letter in the following way: »Within a year, there were more than 1,000,000 
link-backs to our licenses (meaning at least a million places on the web where People were linking to our licenses, and 
presumptively licensing content under those licenses). Within two years, that number was 12,000,000. At the end of our 
last fundraising campaign, it had grown to about 45,000,000 link-backs to our licenses. That was December, 2005. In the 
first six months of 2006, that number grew by almost 100,000,000 licenses. In June, we reported about 140,000,000 link-
backs to our licenses. We have hit a stride, and more and more of the net marks itself with the freedoms that Creative 
Commons helps secure.» See Commoner Letter October 18th 2006, http://creativecommons.org/weblog/entry/6106. 
289 About criticism, see e.g. Wikipedia, http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Creative_Commons#General_criticism, and John C.Dvorak, 
Creative Commons Humbug, PCMAG.com, July 18, 2005, available at:http://www.pcmag.com/article2/0,2817,1838244,00.
asp.
290 This may be read e.g. from recital 30 of the Infosoc Directive, which states that “The rights referred to in this Directive 
may be transferred, assigned or subject to the granting of contractual licenses, without prejudice to the relevant national 
legislation on copyright and related rights.” 
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Challenges may occur due to discretionary provisions related to the transfer of 
rights, which commonly exist in the copyright laws of European countries.291 For 
simplicity, paragraph 27, subsection 1 of the Finnish Copyright Act shall be used 
here as an example. It provides that copyright (not including so-called moral rights) 
may be disposed of in whole or in part.292 Thus the extensity of transfer of rights 
may vary considerably as an assignee may obtain only a small license for a certain 
use or buy all the economic rights.293 However, questions related to the extent of the 
transfer may arise as paragraph 2 of the Finnish Copyright Act (similarly as article 
2 of the Infosoc-Directive) provides that the exclusive right of reproduction covers 
“any manner or form.”294 The norm depicts the technology neutrality in copyright 
and means that different communication technologies require in theory separate 
permissions from a right holder. 
Due to this norm, problems may occur if new emerging technologies have not 
been taken into consideration when the contract for the transfer of rights was 
originally concluded. If they have not been taken into consideration, it may be 
argued that the original transfer of rights did not contain rights regarding new 
technologies.295 The traditional answer to the problem has been that if the parties 
have been aware of a particular technology when the rights were transferred, rights 
for that technology may also have been assigned. On the other hand, if the right 
holder has been unaware of a certain technology at the time of transfer, it may be 
regarded that the assignment did not cover rights for the technology in question.296 
Consequently, it may be asked how these rules relating to the transfer of rights 
apply to technological convergence and the Internet, which form a unique platform 
in this respect.297
291 See e.g. Jan Rosén, Förlagsrätt, Rättsfrågor vid förlagsavtal av Jan Rosén. Akademisk avhandling för juris doktorsexamen 
vid Stockholms universitet 1989. Stockholm 1989 (hereafter Rosén), p. 57 ff and p. 130 ff. 
292 Other paragraphs related to transfer of rights in the Finnish Copyright Act are 28 (forbids an assignee of rights from 
transferring rights to a third party, unless otherwise agreed), 29 (for adjusting an unreasonable clause in a transfer agreement), 
30 (limiting transferring agreements for public performing), 31–38 (regulating publishing contracts) and 39–40 (regulating 
agreements on filming). 
293 It should be mentioned that unlike in some countries, in Finland one may also assign his/her economical rights in whole. 
See in more detail, Haarmann, p. 296 ff. 
294 See also article 9 subsection 1 of the Berne Convention. 
295 Also if new laws are drafted or a country implements a new international convention it may be argued that old contracts 
do not cover use as provided by the new implementations. For example, if the term of copyright is extended, let’s say, 
with an additional 20 years from the death of the author, it may be disputed that the old contracts covered the assignment 
for the additional 20 years. See e.g. Haarmann, p. 306–307 and Rosén, p. 81 ff, p. 130 ff and 143 ff. 
296 See e.g. Komiteamietintö 1953:5, Ehdotus laiksi tekijänoikeudesta kirjallisiin ja taiteellisiin teoksiin (hereafter Committee 
Report 1953:5), p. 64, Haarmann, p. 306 ff and Rosén, p. 84-85 and p. 157 ff and Mikko Huuskonen, Copyright Mass Use 
and Exclusivity, On the Industry Initiated Limitations to Copyright Exclusivity, Especially Regarding Sound Recording 
and Broadcasting. Academic dissertation, Helsinki 2006, p. 133–134. As a practical example it could be mentioned that 
in Holland hundreds of well-known researchers have claimed that publishers did not ask rights for digital use before year 
1997 and for this reason they have posted numerous articles freely available to Internet. See e.g. www.creamofscience.
org, Ecrim News (online edition) Cream of Science by Wouter Mettrop available at, http://www.ercim.eu/. 
297 In technological convergence technologies integrate with each other. An example of the convergence process is that you 
may e.g. speak via your computer but watch television or use internet via your phone. Sisättö, p. 63. See also e.g. Anette 
Alén, Tutkimusmatkoja monimutkaistuvaan mediaympäristöön, published in Oikeutta ja politiikkaa, viestintäoikeuden 
vuosikirja 2009 (passim). In general about the Technological convergence see also Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Technological_convergence. 
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Here, the main challenge is in defining a technology (or in the terms of 
copyright: relevant “form of use”). For example, according to the Oxford Dictionary 
information technology means “the study or use of systems (especially computers 
and telecommunications) for storing, retrieving, and sending information”298 
Techterms.com has specified that Information technology (IT) “refers to anything 
related to computing technology, such as networking, hardware, software, the 
Internet, or the people that work with these technologies.”299 Already, the given 
definitions depict the vagueness of the term. Moreover, even if we attempt to define 
technologies used on the Internet in more detail, their scope becomes a challenge. 
For example, according to a study of ipoque300, in 2009 there were vast amounts 
of technologies (or more specifically “protocols”) for communicating content on the 
Internet.301 Most popular protocols for communicating content on the Internet in 
2009 were the following: 
Chart 1. Ipoque’s internet study 2008/2009
298 See Oxford Dictionaries at: http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/information%2Btechnology?q=information+
technology. 
299 See Techterms.com at: http://www.techterms.com/definition/it.
300 Ipoque is a company providing solutions for Internet traffic management and analysis. According to ipoques own web 
page it is »the leading European provider of deep packet inspection (DPI) solutions for Internet traffic management and 
analysis.» See: http://www.ipoque.com/company. 
301 See ipoques Internet Study 2008/2009 by Hendrik Schulze and Klaus Mochalski (hereafter ipoque 2009), p. 1–2, available 
http://www.ipoque.com/userfiles/file/ipoque-Internet-Study-08-09.pdf. Already at this point it could be compared that e.g. 
e-mail (belonging under Protocol Class »standard») constituted approximately 0,5% of all the internet traffic in 2009. 
See ipoque 2009, p. 12. For 2007 see Hendrik Schulze and Klaus Mochalski, ipoque’s, Internet study 2007, the Impact 
of File Sharing, Voice over IP, Joost, Instant Messaging, One-click Hosting and Media Streaming such as YouTube on 
the Internet (hereafter ipoque 2007), available at: http://www.ipoque.com/userfiles/file/internet_study_2007.pdf. 
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The given Protocol Classes (on the left of the chart) encapsulate several different 
ways to communicate content. For example, BitTorrent, eDonkey and Gnutella 
belong to the Protocol Class »P2P» whereas Web pages and Web sites belong under 
the Protocol Class “Web”.302 Additionally, Internet technologies are constantly 
evolving.303 For example, by the time this book gets to press, the chart will most 
likely already be outdated. Thus, it may be asked how one should understand 
technological convergence in relation to the norms regarding the transfer of rights? 
If the Internet is seen as a singular digital platform, the situation is not 
problematic, as singular permission for Internet use would suffice. However, the 
situation becomes more challenging if separate permissions for all the different 
technologies used on the Internet are required, as it is unreasonable to expect 
(especially laymen) authors and prosumers to have detailed knowledge regarding 
all the existing technologies in order to take them into consideration in their 
transactions. 
This may also be seen when we evaluate licenses granted by professionals. 
For example, collective management organisations seem to be unaware of or 
uninterested in examining which technologies are used in detail. For example, Teosto 
(a Composers’ copyright society in Finland) has offered a license for “downloading” 
although it is questionable if »downloading» as such is a technology since multitude 
of technologies may be used for downloading.304 Tuotos (a Copyright association 
for audio-visual producers in Finland), on the other hand offers licenses to present 
and communicate domestic movies “in premises of educational institutions”. This 
indicates that, references to specific technologies are not included in the licenses 
of collective management organizations. To the extent that references are being 
made to technologies, they are general (such as references to “podcasting” or 
“streaming”).305 Furthermore, collective management organisations (at least in 
Finland) seem to lack uniform terminology regarding different technologies.306 Use 
302  The following examples may be given for the rest of the Protocol Classes: 1. Streaming refers to audio and video streaming, 
such as Flash, QuickTime and Real Media. 2. VoIP refers to Voice over IP (internet telephony) such as Skype, IAX and 
SIP. 3. Instant Messaging (IM) refers to IRC, Google Talk and Yahoo. 4. Tunnel refers to encrypted and unencrypted 
tunnelling protocols such as OpenVPN, SLL and Tor. 5. Standard refers to Legacy Internet Protocols such as Telnet, 
Usenet, SMTP and e-mail. 6. Gaming refers to most popular multiplayer and network games and 7. Unknown refers to 
non-classified traffic. See ipoque 2009, p. 1. 
303 For example, even a simple classification between “software” and “hardware” became questionable after cloud computing 
emerged as it enabled providing both services over a network. 
304 See Teosto’s homepage, available at (in English): http://www.teosto.fi/teosto/websivut.nsf/3071421733727897c2256e04
00462a07/d4ee60d1d5da4fe4c22577110043984c!OpenDocument. Furthermore, from a user’s perspective the license for 
downloading Teosto offers seems actually to be a license for uploading, instead of downloading. Regarding differences 
between uploading and downloading see e.g .Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Uploading_and_downloading. 
Referred pages visited in February 2012. 
305 For example, it may be asked whether e.g. Podcasting is a technology or whether RSS-feeds a podcaster may use should 
be instead be understood as technologies. In other words giving exact definitions for technologies may prove to be a 
difficult task.
306 For example, regarding podcasting Teosto refers to programs similar to radio, containing speech and music (emphasis 
here) but Gramex (a Finnish collective management organisation performing artists and phonogram producers) refers use 
similar both to television and radio. Regarding »podcasting» see e.g. homepages of Teosto (in Finnish: http://www.teosto.
fi/fi/podcasting.html) Gramex (in Finnish): http://www.gramex.fi/fi/musiikin_kayttajat/sahkoinen_media_ja_av-tuotanto/
aanitteet_internetissa/podcasting and in general Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Podcast. 
91
of more general terminology may be regarded as understandable, as it would no 
doubt be burdensome, if not impossible, to constantly update the list of applicable 
technologies from their individual members.307 However, this indicates that it is 
difficult to require separate licenses for separate technologies for communicating 
content on the Internet. 
Consequently, the above findings suggest that the Internet should be perceived 
as one platform for communicating content instead of evaluating in detail every 
technology used. Alternative interpretation necessitating separate permissions for 
constantly renewing technologies would easily endanger possibilities to conclude 
individual transactions and hence the objective set in article 27 of the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights. In this respect, a new presumptive provision to rules 
regulating the transfer of rights could provide a solution.308 For example, one could 
suggest a provision postulating that when rights are assigned for use of content 
on the Internet, a right holder accepts that the transfer covers all forms of use on 
the Internet.
6.5.  ABOUT PRACTICAL POSSIBILITIES TO CONCLUDE 
INDIVIDUAL TRANSACTIONS IN GENERAL
Finally, the extent to which it is rational to expect that individual authors and 
prosumers conclude transactions with each other shall be generally evaluated. 
In this respect, it should first be mentioned that it is difficult to find studies or 
well established licensing practices between individual authors and prosumers as 
natural persons for use of content on the Internet. This is understandable for the 
following reasons: firstly, even if we disregard the problem that even singular words 
or few word phrases may exceed the required threshold for copyright protection 
and that in theory authors and prosumers should be aware of all those copies that 
are haphazardly being produced on different platforms during communication 
processes but do not fit under the exemption provided in Article 5(1) of the Infosoc 
directive, a clear hindrance to conducting individual transactions is the impossibility 
of finding all the legal right holders of the ever expanding publicly available mass 
of information. For example, there is no universal register tracking information 
on the owners of all expressions found on the internet. The difficulty of finding 
appropriate individuals can also be read from the studies conducted by the Ministry 
of Education and Kopiosto (a copyright organization for authors, publishers and 
307 Another thing is that from a potential user’s perspective it becomes problematic if collective management organisations 
were able dictate what type of use is allowed. Such a power could prevent users from using their technologies and 
consequently prevent their companies to conduct business at all.
308 This could be possible as the European Union has not harmonized rules regarding transfer of rights. See also 
Pihlajarinne, p. 238–239
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performing artists in Finland), which have attempted to evaluate content used in 
educational institutions in order to distribute compensations thorough collective 
management organizations to the proper right holders. In short, the studies are 
based on a cross sectional sampling of data used and consequently provide only very 
general information about content used in educational institutions.309 Sometimes, 
the appropriate right holders have died or are simply impossible to locate, even if 
they were once known.310
Moreover, even if the parties were able to contact each other they should speak 
the same language as concluding contracts may be challenging when the parties lack 
a common language (although it could be possible). They should also be able to draft 
proper agreements taking in to consideration all the used rights and technologies 
as the literal reading of the law postulates.311 Often, permissions are needed from 
several individuals, which multiplies the difficulties.312 For example, when it comes 
to music, a prosumer would need a license from each composer, lyricist, arranger, 
producer, performing artist and phonogram producer.313 Or the other way around, 
all individual members of a band should individually and constantly grant licenses 
309 See e.g. a study conducted by the Ministry of Education and Kopiosto called Digitaalitekniikka opetuskäytössä, Digitaalisen 
aineiston kopiointi sekä www-sivujen käyttö. Opetusministeriön ja Kopiosto ry:n tiedotus- ja selvitysprojekti (hereafter 
Digistudy), 2004. Gathered information in the study was about the used www-pages, their www-addresses, names and 
popularity in educational use. No attempt was even made to collect exact information regarding used content. The same 
applies to studies regarding use of content by printing and scanning of content in educational institutions. See Jan-
Otto Malmberg, Tulostaminen, skannaaminen ja esitysgrafiikan käyttö peruskouluissa ja lukioissa 19.1.2009 ja Jan-Otto 
Malmberg, Ammatilliset oppilaitokset – tulostaminen, skannaus, esitysgrafiikka 14.4.2008. See e.g. study Digitaalinen 
kopiointi peruskoulussa ja lukiossa 9.4.2003 (digital copying in primary schools and secondary high), Jan-Otto Malmberg, 
Logit Oy and Jan-Otto Malmberg, Digitaalinen kopiointi korkeakouluissa 17.8.2004 (digital copying in universities) and Jan-
Otto Malmberg, Digitaalinen kopiointi ammatillisissa oppilaitoksissa ja ammattikorkeakouluissa 7.10.2003 (polytechnics), 
Logit Oy. The same generality can be seen from the photocopying studies conducted by Kopiosto and the Ministry of 
Education. See e.g. Jan-Otto Malmberg, Peruskoulujen ja lukioiden valokopiointitutkimus 30.9.2008 (primary schools 
and secondary high) and Jan-Otto Malmberg, Peruskoulujen ja lukioiden valokopiointitutkimus (primary schools and 
secondary high) 27.2.2001 and Jan-Otto Malmberg, Valokopiointitutkimus 15.2.2006 (adult educational centres). 
310 For example, considering mere family-photo albums it may be asked if it is possible pinpoint all the relevant right holders 
of the taken pictures. In fact, amounts of orphan works may be counted in hundreds of millions. See e.g. Commission Staff 
Working Paper, Impact Assessment on the Cross-border Online Access to Orphan Works, Accompanying the document, 
Proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council, on certain permitted uses of orphan works, COM 
(2011) 289 final, p. 9 and 11 ff.
311 It should also be noted that interpretations of law also vary depending on the situation and country making it easily difficult 
for individual authors and computer users to know whether a certain limitation applies or not. As it is difficult, even 
impossible, to give an exhaustive list of interpretations to all situations, it is clear that ambiguity related to possibilities 
to grant and obtain licenses is always present. 
312  Gervais talks of the same challenge as fragmentation and describes it in the following way: “The fragmentation of copyright, 
therefore, occurs on many different levels – rights contained in national laws, which recognize several economic rights 
(reproduction, communication to the public, adaptation, rental etc.); within market structures; within licensing practices; 
within a repertory of works; within different markets (language, territory); and through the interoperability (or lack 
thereof) of rights clearance systems. Fragmentation has an impact directly on all affected parties, whether they be right 
holders, users of copyright works or regulatory authorities that oversee the process.” Licenses may even be needed even 
from different countries as Internet is in practice transnational making it difficult enclose it in “virtual national walls.” 
Daniel Gervais, Collective Management of Copyright: Theory and Practice in the Digital Age, published in Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related Rights, second edition, (eds.) Daniel Gervais, Kluwer Law International BV 2010 
(hereafter Gervais 2010), p. 11. 
313 It should be mentioned that legal persons such as e.g. collective management organizations may occasionally offer licenses 
to prosumers, but they are irrelevant from the viewpoint of this article as the article evaluates possibilities to conclude 
transactions between individual authors and prosumers as droit d’ auteur copyright theory and strating point of fundamental 
rights protection postulates.
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to perhaps millions of their fans wishing to share their content on the Internet. In 
cases of audiovisual products, the amount of right holders is often even greater.314 
Due to the transnational nature of Internet, permissions are actually needed also 
to copy and communicate content from servers situated in other countries.315
This is not to imply that individual authors and prosumers as natural persons 
never conclude individual transactions with each other. For example, a court case 
addressing a failure to ask permission to post a photograph to Facebook may be 
found from Finland. In a case of the District Court of Helsinki, A argued that B had 
failed to ask permission from A to post a photograph taken by A to B’s Facebook 
profile. The case was introduced as a criminal case (docket number R10/1641), but 
was in the end settled as a civil case (L10/21045). The actual motive for the case 
might have been a break-up of the parties’ relationship.316 Nevertheless, at least for 
the present, it is difficult to find other such disputes between individual authors 
and prosumers.317
Taking the above-mentioned into consideration, it is not rational to expect that 
we would constantly conclude individual transactions with each other as individual 
authors and prosumers as it pertains to use of content on the Internet. Thus, it shall 
be concluded that even if individual authors and prosumers would occasionally grant 
and obtain licenses based on exclusive rights for use of content on the Internet, 
those licenses are bound to be rare and economically insignificant. 
6.6.  CONCLUDING REMARKS – AUTHORS RIGHTS AS A 
FACADE?
The above findings question functionality of copyright theory granting exclusive 
rights to individual authors as initial right holders for use of content in open networks 
where everyone are easily users. It is in theory problematic to subject the right to 
science and culture as provided in the Article 27(1) of the UDHR and 15(1)(a) of 
the ICESCR a property right and it is challenging for anyone to rigorously evaluate 
whether a certain usage situation endangers or in fact benefits economic rights 
314 As it pertains to audiovisual works, Gervais has explained the challenge in the following way: “A film might include rights 
to a screenplay, a book on which the screenplay was based, musical works incorporated in the film, any art or photographs 
used in the setting, as well as the end product the film itself. Each of the works in turn involve several different rights 
fragments and, consequently, multiple right holders and systems of rights clearance and possibly also guilds or unions.” 
See Gervais 2010, p. 13. 
315 For example, according to Gervais a person posting only music to Internet would need at least the following rights: 
1. Reproduction on the emission server, 2. Authorization of communication to the public in territory of emission, 3. 
Communication to the public in territory of reception, 4. Reproduction in the territory of reception. Points 1 and 4 may 
be private copies, which in theory should be examined case by case. See Gervais 2010, p. 11.
316 Information regarding the case was obtained from a district court judge Kari Lappi.
317 For example, no similar case were found from databases of Finlex and Edilex. Finlex is a database maintained by the 
Ministry of Justice and Edilex a wider database maintained by Edita Publishing.
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of authors or whether a certain use endangers the author’s fundamental rights 
(“essential foodstuff, of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing 
...”) at all. Moreover, it is somewhat paradoxical to necessitate that permission to use 
is needed, if a certain piece of content has been place openly available for everyone. 
Increased amounts of freer licenses may be seen as the result of this paradox as 
they largely waive exclusive rights. It is also difficult to see that individual authors 
and prosumers would have necessary means to take technological convergence into 
concideration when drafting appropriate licenses. Finally, to the extent concluding 
individual transactions is possible (excluding frrer licenses), only petty amounts of 
evidence (if any) indicate that individual authors and prosumers are interested in 
doing so. It simply is difficult to see that e.g. Phil Collins and all the members of 
Genesis would or could constantly conclude individual transactions with tens of 
thousands of individual prosumers interested sharing their music on the Internet.
Due to these notions it also becomes questionable whether copyright is even 
intended to directly benefit individual authors and prosumers as postulated by the 
Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR. Consequently claims that copyright 
exists in the first instance in order to benefit certain businesses become plausible. 
For example, Gervais has stated that copyright is primarily for “professionals”318 
to “organize markets for certain types of works of art or the intellect.”319 Lessig has 
more straight forwardly stated that copyright is “protectionism to protect certain 
forms of business”.320 Huuskonen on the other hand has described the situation in 
the following way: “Author’s right, therefore, seems to be a product of the publishers’ 
innovative defense in a situation where the risk of losing the present monopoly 
position seemed evident. Still, as a purely tactical instrument, it probably would 
not have succeeded throughout the centuries without other justifiable reasons that 
were emerging in society from an ideological basis (Locke). The Stationers’ Company 
was – looking back almost 300 years – able to use an idea that had already been 
discussed in philosophical circles, and which enjoyed the benevolence of the law-
makers. In this way, the change resembled modern decision-making: how can a 
politician oppose the idea of the protection of an ailing artist? The author’s right 
justification, which was later developed into a strong human rights tendency, also 
created a path-dependency in copyright legislation.”321 
This would mean copyright is primarily used to “organize markets” (and power) 
from individuals’ (by contracts) to private companies instead of protecting individual 
318 See Gervais 2010, p. 10 and 14 and Gervais 2006, p. 8. 
319 Gervais 2010, p. 15. In the citation Gervais refers especially to economical rights of a right holder. 
320 Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down Culture and Control 
Creativity, The Penguin Press, New York 2004, p.9. An exhaustive list for limitations in the Infosoc directive allowing 
only those commercial uses that existed before the 21st century also indicates the protectionism element: it does not seem 
possible for new commercial forms of use benefitting from copyright limitations regarding use of content on the Internet 
to emerge. This would be consistent with the argument of protectionism for business. 
321 Mikko Huuskonen, Copyright Mass Use and Exclusivity, On the Industry Initiated Limitations to Copyright Exclusivity, 
Especially Regarding Sound Recording and Broadcasting. Academic dissertation, Helsinki 2006, p 118.
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authors in the first instance. In other words the legal right (or business model) de 
jure granted initially for individuals would de facto seem to exist for protecting 
legal persons basing their business model on the idea of a closed system: content 
may only be used provided permission against compensation is first granted.322 
However, individualistic copyright theory appears as a facade, if power is 
primarily used for other purposes but primarily for protecting individual authors 
whose essential economic interests are being endangered.323 In other words, after 
the assignement of rights adiminisering rights takes place according to the the 
terms and objectives of the legal person. Consequently it becomes relevant to ask 
how fundamental rights analysis relates to position of legal persons. Especially, if 
power is de facto used to protect private corporate interests even with a possibility of 
criminal sanctions, it may be asked how such a use of power should be understood 
in relation to fundamental rights of others, if fundamental rights are taken seriously? 
Therefore, this book next evaluates the right to science and culture as provided by 
Article 27(1) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR and its relationship to 
corporate power. As copyright liability means also threat of criminal sanctions and 
use leading to liability may take place at home, references shall also be to the right 
to “to life, liberty and security of person” as protected by Article 3 of the UDHR or 
to “the right to privacy” as protected by Article 12 of the UDHR. 
322 It is possible that occasionally rights are assigned to legal persons whose business model is not closed. Open access 
journals may be given as an example. 
323 It could also be mentioned that one (although rather wide) definition for corruption is fulfilled if a societal system is 
being used to achieve other objectives what it formally ought to achieve. About definitions for corruption see e.g. Petri 
Koikkalainen – Esko Riepula, Näin valta ostetaan, lyhyt oppimäärä poliittisesta korruptionsta suomessa 2006 – 2009, p. 
111.
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7  THE RIGHT TO SCIENCE AND CULTURE AND 
CORPORATIONS AS RIGHT HOLDERS
7.1.  REGARDING LEGAL PERSONS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT 
PROTECTION IN GENERAL
Natural persons have traditionally been considered to be the subjects of human 
rights protection, whereas legal persons have often been explicitly excluded from 
human rights protection. As has been explained, this is a common starting point of 
fundamental rights.324 Intellectual property has not been considered to be human 
right, but has instead been connected to property rights. This has been stated in 
General Comment No. 17, chapter 7, in the following way: “Under the existing 
international treaty protection regimes, legal entities are included among the holders 
of intellectual property rights. However, as noted above, their entitlements, because 
of their different nature, are not protected at the level of human rights.”325 Despite 
this, the European Court of Human Rights has found that human rights protection 
may extend also to legal persons.326  Although these decisions do not specifically 
refer to legal persons ownng copyright protected content. Moreover, Article 1(1) of 
Protocol 1 referring to property (hereafter P1-1) of the European Convention on 
Human Rights specifically states that
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of 
his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in 
the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and 
by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provision shall not, however, in any way impair the right 
of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use 
of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the 
payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties” (emphasis added).
324 See e.g. chapter 2.2. and General Comment 17, paragraph 2 (emphasis added). See also Shaver, p 133.
325 See also Helfer, p. 84 and Mylly, p. 202.
326 See e.g. The Sunday Times v United Kingdom (Series A No 30), European Court of Human Rights (1979-80) 2 EHRR 
245 and for more examples, Harding, Kohl and Salmon, p. 25 ff. See also Mylly, p. 187 and Ojanen, p. 120.
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Although subsection 2 of the P1-1 allows states to limit property rights, subsection 
1 of the P1-1 suggests that the property of both natural and legal persons is protected 
by the ECHR.327 Furthermore, the preliminary material of the Constitution of 
Finland accepts that legal persons may in certain occasions obtain indirect (or 
derivative) fundamental rights protection.328 In Finland, this means that property 
right protection may extend to legal persons in cases where a certain proposition 
would affect legal persons in a way such that the assets of the natural persons 
behind the legal person would be affected.329 The more distant the relationship 
between a natural person and a legal person is, and the less concretely the measures 
affect the economic interests of the individuals behind the legal person, the more 
unlikely the legal person obtains fundamental/constitutional right protection.330 It 
has been said that this type of case could be at hand, for example, if a proposed act 
would affect smaller companies such as family businesses holding focal wealth of 
the individuals running the companies. Thus the intention of indirect protection 
is not to protect large corporations.331
The possibility of extending fundamental, and especially human, right protection 
to legal persons raises an interesting question since human rights should initially 
protect only individuals as natural persons, as explained above. If fundamental 
rights in general do not accept legal persons as subjects of their protection, when 
it is justified to grant legal persons human rights protection as P1-1 nevertheless 
postulates? For example, individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory specifically 
emphasises the role of authors as natural persons at the core of copyright. 
Consequently it is not surprising that in Finland the legislator has explicitly stated, 
327 See also Mylly, p. 206 – 207 and Pellonpää I, p. 600 – 601. It should also be noted that fundamental rights of the European 
Community are not, unlike other fundamental rights, universal. They apply to certain “’special’ or ‘sectoral’ rights, as rights 
claiming to be valid only for certain classes of natural or legal persons. One of the principal limitations of the applicability 
of Community fundamental rights is made by the distinction between nationals of the Member States and third country 
nationals.” Ojanen, p. 119 (emphasis original).  There are also exceptions to the rule as e.g. article 141 (formerly article 
119) of the EC Treaty secures equal pay to men and women regardless of their nationality.
328 See Perusoikeuskomitean mietintö 1992:3 (Committee Report 1992:3), p. 49, 60 and 220, Government Bill 309/1993, p. 
23 – 24, Hidén, p. 10 ff and Länsineva, p. 106 ff.
329 See chapter 7.2, the third possibility.
330 See especially Committee Report 1992:3, p. 49, 60 and 220 and Government Bill 309/199 p. 23 – 24 and Committee 
Report 45/1996. From legal literature see e.g. Hiden, p. 16, Pekka Hallberg, Perusoikeusjärjestelmä, publishded in Hallberg 
(eds.) Perusoikeudet, Helsinki 2011, p. 41 and Erkki Pystynen, Omaisuudensuoja Suomessa, Kokemuksia ja näkemyksiä 
eduskunnan perustuslakivaliokunnan puheenjohtajana, Jyväskylä 1984m p. 49 – 50. Even if the doctrine for indirect 
protection were disputed and direct constitutional protection for property of legal persons is accepted, one should in 
the end weigh the position of the parties in the case and protect the weaker party. For example, according to Länsineva 
protection granted to legal persons would not be as effective as it is for individuals. According to him in a situation when 
an individual’s rights were in a conflict with a legal person’s rights, one should weigh how close the relationship of the 
individual behind the legal person is to the constitutional right in question. If the connection is distant, an individual 
against the legal person should win the case. In order to weigh in favour of the legal person, one should find additional 
justifications to support the company’s case. If interests of two legal persons should be weighed, one should weigh the 
connection of individuals behind the legal persons to the protected right. For example, constitutional interests of an 
internationally listed company would be weaker in comparison to small family business. Länsineva, p. 108 ff and 116. 
See also Constitutional Law Committee’s Reports 45/1996 vp, 17/1997 vp.
331 See Committee Report 1992:3, p. 60, p. Government Bill 309/1993, p. 23 and especially Hiden, p. 15 - 16. It should be 
noted that only private legal persons may be indirectly protected. Government, municipalities/cities, consolidations of 
municipalities, congregations, churches and public companies cannot invoke constitutional protection.
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following the individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory, that constitutional 
protection for copyright “should be limited only to natural persons”.332 Therefore, 
the position of legal persons from the viewpoint of human rights protection shall 
be evaluated next. As subjects of fundamental right protection in the first instance 
are natural persons, the evaluation shall be critical. It shall not be argued that legal 
persons cannot have rights per se, but the focus is on the “human” rights aspect 
of legal persons, especially larger corporations.333 The reciprocal relationship of 
the right to science and culture and property owned by legal persons shall then be 
specifically evaluated in the light of individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory.
7.2. LEGAL PERSONS AND HUMAN RIGHTS IN THEORY
The general reason for excluding legal persons from human rights protection is 
that they are legal constructs and, in this respect, artificial entities.334 However, 
Christopher Harding, Uta Kohl and Naomi Salmon have evaluated in more detail 
whether one could find justifications for “human” rights protection for legal persons. 
Consequently, the structure and analysis of this chapter strongly follows the analysis 
of Harding, Kohl and Salmon combined with thoughts of Joel Bakan.335 They focus 
on human rights protection of larger corporations, which is consistent with the idea 
adopted by the Finnish constitution, that smaller legal persons may be protected 
indirectly through natural persons working in them, a topic which shall also be 
addressed in this chapter.
Harding, Kohl and Salmon evaluate whether legal persons should have human 
rights because they a) are persons with legal capacity, b) were historically created 
to protect humans c) are seen as derivate right-holders in order to benefit their 
natural protagonists (indirect protection) or d) should be regarded as human right 
holders themselves because they have the same values and attributes as humans 
do. If option-d is argued, legal persons should act as autonomous moral agents or 
have their own interests and needs.336 
332 Committee report 1992:4, p. 108 – 109.
333  It is also possible that articles of a certain company define that the legal person conducts charity work as its main task. If 
this the case the presented analysis does not apply.
334 See Stephen Bottomley, Corporations and Human Rights, at “Commercial Law and Human Rights”, Ashgate Darmouth 
Publishing 2002, p. 62. See also Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 25 – 26. According to Harding, Kohl and Salmon “the 
creation of a legal person is designed to enable a group of individuals to become collectively a player in the legal world, 
to make it a subject of legal rights and legal duties, as opposed to moral rights and duties.” Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 
29 – 30. See also, Matti Muukkonen, Yhdistymisvapaus ja yhdistysoikeuden järjestelmä, a publication of the University 
of Eastern Finland, Dissertations in Social Sciences and Business Studies, 2012, p. 101. Regarding challenges defining a 
mere concept of person see e.g. Ohlin, Jens David, Is the Concept of the Person Necessary for Human Rights? (January 
30, 2005). Columbia Law Review, Vol. 105, p. 209, 2005 (passim). Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1245942. 
335 Regarding Bakan’s analysis see Joel Bakan, The Corporation, the Pathological Pursuit for Profit and Power, New York 
2004 (passim).
336 See Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 23 – 51.
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Firstly, Harding, Kohl and Salmon consider it difficult to see that legal capacity 
could qualify as reasoning for human rights protection, as legal capacity already 
itself is recognized as human right in Article 6 of the UDHR. Thus if legal capacity 
would be “human right granted, it means that even those who do not in fact enjoy 
it, still come under the human rights umbrella. [Also] … a significant minority of 
individuals have under national systems only limited or no legal capacity at all, 
but – far from depriving them of human rights protection – this has made them 
the particular focus of the human rights movement. In the past and to a lesser 
extent today, these would have been slaves, women and other discriminated-against 
minorities.”337 Thus it is difficult to see that legal capacity could be a prerequisite 
for the granting of human rights but rather its consequence.
Secondly, legal persons were not historically designed to protect humans, as 
history itself does not support arguments to this direction. For example, the UDHR 
itself was specifically designed after the Second World War to protect individuals 
as humans. To the extent similar documents for “inalienable rights” have been 
drafted, such as e.g. the French Declaration of the Rights of Man Citizens (1789) 
or the US Declaration of Independence (1776), they have not protected everyone. 
For example, slavery, racial discrimination and limited suffrage have lasted long 
after the referred conventions were enacted. Consequently it is difficult to derive 
human rights protection to legal persons from history.338
Thirdly, an argument postulating companies as derivative rights holders also 
faces challenges to outcome. An argument making legal persons derivative right 
holders suggests that human rights protect companies in order to benefit natural 
persons owning and working in them, i.e. companies would have extrinsic benefits 
for the individual persons involved. A practical problem related to this argument 
is that individuals within legal persons are rarely equal in position, creating a 
risk that granted human rights enhance the interests of the most powerful in the 
company.339 This would be controversial considering that human and fundamental 
rights should protect certain “essential interests” such as foodstuffs, housing etc. 
In practice, companies are not treated as derivative right holders, but rather as 
337 Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 30. 
338 Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 32 – 35. See also Bakan, p. 16. However, it should be noted this has not prevented legal 
persons e.g. from invoking a right to free trial for their protection although the right was originally drafted to protect freed 
slaves. 
339  Regarding problems related to extending indirect/derivative effect of fundamental rights to legal persons a problem 
also is that occasionally there simply are not corresponding rights for natural persons and companies. For example, in 
Société Colas Est v. France (no: 37971/97, 16-04-2002) it was regarded that companies privacy, as provided in Article 8 
of the ECHR, had been violated by searching the offices of companies (by investigators from the Directorate General for 
Competition, Consumer Affairs and Repression of Fraud). However, it is difficult to perceive how such an act could violate 
privacy of the companies or even privacy of their shareholders. As Harding, Kohl & Salmon (p. 36) state: “[Investments 
of shareholders] may have suffered as a result of the search and subsequent conviction, and thus their property rights 
may indirectly have been interfered with, but not their right to privacy.” In other words it may be asked if a legal person 
may have a “privacy” that may be violated. Another thing is if a certain action to premises of a legal person violate its 
economical interests i.e. property rights. See also Harding, Kohl & Salmon, 36 – 37 and 103 ff. 
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direct right holders, making an argument that legal persons have derivative human 
rights problematic.340
Consequently, it may fourthly be asked whether legal persons should be human 
right holders themselves on the basis that they have the same values and attributes 
as humans do. In other words, if companies (or animals, trees etc) have the same 
attributes as humans, they should also obtain human rights protection. In order 
to evaluate whether this is the case, it should first be defined why humans have 
rights in the first place.341 In this respect, an answer could be that a) humans are 
thinking agents (choice of rights theory) or have b) special interests (interest theory 
of rights) that should be protected. 
The challenge is that even if humans should have rights according to the 
mentioned standards, it is difficult to expand them accordingly to companies. 
This is because companies may be regarded as either ‘artificial constructs’ or as 
‘real entities’. If companies are perceived to be ‘artificial constructs’, there is no 
person capable of having attributes similar to those which humans have.342 On the 
other hand if legal persons are perceived as ‘real entities’, which have separated 
themselves from the state and from any particular individual, other challenges arise 
for considering them to have human values and attributes. For example, when 
evaluating companies as human right holders, one could attempt to argue that 
the basis of rights is an agent capable of an autonomous will and ability to take 
into consideration other persons and make moral considerations (choice of rights 
theory).343 However, this raises the problem that company actions and rationality 
do not necessarily follow the morality and rationality of those individuals who are 
behind the company and who are irrelevant and replaceable in the end. Especially 
in bigger companies, individual morality and rationality often transforms in a group 
setting of a company in a way that may lead individuals to act in ways they would 
not otherwise do. This is enabled by the task of companies to function as efficient 
economic entities who are often legally obligated only to maximise profit.344 This 
is rational from an economic viewpoint and does not necessarily lead to immoral 
results, however, this may be (and often is) the case.
340  Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 36 – 37.
341 Bentham pondered and answered the question in the following way: “Is it the faculty of reason, or, perhaps, the faculty 
of discourse? But a full-grown horse or dog is beyond comparison a more rational, as well as a more conversable animal, 
than an infant of a day, or a week, or even a month, old. But suppose the case were otherwise, what would it avail? the 
question is not, Can they reason? nor, Can they talk? but, Can they suffer?” Jeremy Bentham, An Introduction to the 
Principles of Morals and Legislation, Chapter XVII6, note 122 (emphasis original). Available at: http://www.econlib.org/
library/Bentham/bnthPML18.html#a122. See also Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 36.
342 Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 38-39.
343 See Jerome J. Shestack, The Philosophic Foundations of Human Rights. Human Rights Quarterly 20 (1998), p. 216 referring 
to modern human rights theories (and e.g. to Kant): “The basis [for moral law] is the individual as a transcendental subject 
capable of an autonomous will.” See also Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 37.
344 Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 42, who also state: “Moral concern [companies] is permitted to the extent to which it 
increases profits – a contradiction in terms. See also Bakan (passim). Regarding Finnish legislation see e.g. Section 5 of 
the Limited Liability Companies Act – Finland (624/2006) stating: “The purpose of a company is to generate profits for 
the shareholders, unless otherwise provided in the Articles of Association.”
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Bakan has widely addressed the problem related to the amorality of 
corporations in their legally defined mandate to maximise profits. 
The following quotations depict the problem. Firstly, activities of 
corporations partially correspond to a diagnosis of a psychopath as “… 
the corporation is singularly self-interested and unable to feel genuine 
concern for others in any context. Not surprisingly, then, when we 
asked Dr. Hare to apply his diagnostic checklist of psychopathic traits 
(italicized below) to the corporation’s institutional character, he found 
there was a close match. The corporation is irresponsible, Dr. Hare said, 
because ‘in an attempt to satisfy the corporate goal, everybody else is 
put at risk.’ Corporations try to ‘manipulate everything, including public 
opinion’, and they are grandiose, always insisting ‘that we’re number 
one, we’re the best’. A lack of empathy and asocial tendencies are also 
key characteristics of the corporation, says Hare – ‘their behaviour 
indicates they don’t really concern themselves with their victims’; and 
corporations often refuse to accept responsibility for their own actions 
and are unable to feel remorse: ‘if [corporations] get caught [braking 
the law], they pay big fines and they … continue doing what they did 
before anyway’. … Finally, according to Dr. Hare, corporations relate 
to others superficially–‘their whole goal is to present themselves to 
the public in a way that is appealing to the public [but] in fact may 
not be representative of what th[e] organisation is really like.’ Human 
psychopaths are notorious for their ability to use charm as a mask to 
hide their dangerously self-obsessed personalities. For corporations, 
social responsibility may play the same role. Thorough it they can 
present themselves as compassionate and concerned about others, 
when, in fact, they lack the ability to care about anyone or anything but 
themselves.”345 
The following examples of Bakan may be used as illustrations of 
corporate amorality: “IBM – a company where ‘if your customer 
needs help, you jump,’ according to Irving Wladawsky-Berger, vice 
president, technology and strategy – jumped when Hitler sought its 
technical assistance in running the Nazi extermination and slave-
labour programs. IBM provided the Nazis with Hollerith tabulation 
machines, early ancestors of computers that used punch cards to do 
their calculations. Edwin Black, author of IBM and the Holocaust, 
says, ‘The head office in New York had a complete understanding of 
everything that was going on in the Third Reich with its machines…
345 See Bakan, p. 56–57 (emphasis original), where he refers to his interview with Dr. Robert Hare. 
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that their machines were in concentration camps generally, and they 
knew that Jews were being exterminated.’ … IBM’s motivation for 
working with the Nazis, says Black, ‘was never about Nazism…it was 
always about profit, which is consistent with the corporation’s amoral 
nature. Corporations have no capacity to value political systems, fascist 
or democratic, for reasons of principle or ideology. The only legitimate 
question for a corporation is whether a political system serves or 
impedes its self-interested purposes.’ According to Peter Drucker – who 
says he ‘discussed it more than once with old Mr. Watson,” the head of 
IBM at the time – Thomas Watson had reservations about working with 
the Nazis. ‘Not because he thought it was immoral’, says Drucker, but 
‘because Watson, with a very keen sense of public relations, thought it 
was risky’ from a business perspective. In a similar spirit, Alfred Sloan, 
Jr., chairman of General Motors in 1939, seemed morally unconcerned 
about his company’s work for the Nazis. The German subsidiaries were 
‘highly profitable,’ he noted in defence of GM’s investments in Germany, 
and Germany’s internal political affairs ‘should not be considered 
the business of the management of General Motors.’ Though the 
assistance provided to Nazis by U.S. corporations may seem shocking 
in retrospect, it should not be forgotten that many U.S. corporations 
today regularly do business with totalitarian and authoritarian regimes 
– again, because it is profitable to do so.”346
It should be noted that according to Ben Urwand content industry 
does not fare any better in this respect. He has examined relationship 
between Hollywoods film studios and Nazi regime during 1930 
and writes: “Over the course of the investigation, one word kept 
reappearing in both the German and American records: “collaboration” 
(Zusammenarbeit). And gradually it became clear that this word 
accurately described the particular arrangement between the Hollywood 
studios and the German government in the 1930s. Like other American 
companies such as IBM and General Motors, the Hollywood studios put 
profit above principle in their decision making to do business with the 
Nazis. They funnelled money into the German economy in a variety of 
disturbing ways. But, as the United States Department of Commerce 
346 See Bakan, p. 88 and endnote 7 on p. 89 for ample of evidence that IBMs actions are no exception. See also Harding, 
Kohl & Salmon, p. 42–43 for similar examples. A recent contemporary example is a case where Nokia Siemens was 
accused by Iranian Nobel Peace Prize laureate Shirin Ebadi for providing technology that according to Shirin Ebadi helped 
Tehran repress political opponents. See e.g. Gwladys Fouche, Iran Nobel winner seeks Nokia Siemens sanctions, Reuters, 
February 15, 2010, available at (in English): http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/02/15/us-iran-nokiasiemensnetworks-
interview-idUSTRE61E3SZ20100215. See also Steve Stecklow, Nokia Siemens Venture to Reduce Its Business in Iran, 
The Wall Street Journal, December 14, 2011, available at: http://online.wsj.com/article/SB100014240529702034304045
77096503401073904.html. 
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recognized, the Hollywood studios were not simply distributors of 
goods; they were purveyors of ideas and culture. They had the chance to 
show the world what was really happening in Germany. Here was where 
the term “collaboration” took on its full meaning. The studio heads, who 
were mostly immigrant Jews, went to dramatic lengths to hold on to 
their investment in Germany.”347
This does not mean that humans are necessarily any better. In words of Harding, 
Kohl & Salmon: “self-interest and the desire for personal profit are the very human 
motives which capitalism is based. The problem is that the company is a monorail: it 
enshrines and institutionally legitimises self interest and profit. … There is no moral 
understanding or reasoning; beauty, art or suffering are incomprehensible to the 
corporate amoral mind. … As such, the company is a far cry from the autonomous 
self-willing moral agent who provides the core and raison d’étre of human rights 
under the liberal tradition.”348 It therefore follows that the main task of corporations 
is to maximize profits to owners and, in doing so, other values and objectives – even 
if they are protected as fundamental rights – are secondary to them. Maximizing 
profits to owners is not an objective protected as a fundamental right. Instead, it 
is an aim that has been set in regular laws.
Finally, we may also evaluate corporations from the viewpoint of the interest 
theory of rights. It postulates that rights are interests or needs that the law should 
protect thorough imposing restrictions to others. Under this theory, rights do not 
protect liberty of individuals but are instead there to protect a moral good defined 
by a philosopher. However, the interest theory also has obstacles to outcome. For 
example, it cannot properly justify why rights are needed at all, given that interests 
may be protected thorough duties and obligations. It also necessitates that we should 
distinguish and protect the worthiest interests. In a human rights context, it would 
be ‘human nature’ and consequently we should define basic human needs. For 
example, it could be argued that our embodiment is the source of our vulnerability, 
and consequently an interest that should be protected. However, even if such an 
argument is accepted, it is clear that companies do not fulfil the corresponding 
preconditions as “corporate needs and interests bear no resemblance to basic human 
needs and interests such as life, absence of pain, food, shelter, and so on, which 
provide the common foundations of human rights.”349 Therefore, in the light of 
jurisprudence it is difficult extend human rights protection to legal persons.350
It could also be mentioned that it is challenging to find justifications 
for extending human rights protection to legal persons from a 
347 See Ben Urwand, The Collaboration, Hollywood’s Pact with Hitler, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press. 
Cambridge, Massachuttes & London, England 2013 , p. 8 – 9 and passim.  
348 Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 43.
349 Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 45.
350  It should be noted that the analysis needs not to apply to smaller legal persons.
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practical viewpoint. One may attempt to argue that corporate human 
rights benefit societies by promoting a healthy market economy and 
democracy (e.g. through freedom of speech of the press). However, 
although legal persons and market economy contains many activities 
people benefit from, it is difficult to see that it could be a justification 
for fundamental rights protection.351 As explained, fundamental rights 
should not step into picture unless essential rights (“essential foodstuff, 
of essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing etc...”) 
are endangered. Moreover, as the purpose of companies by law is to 
maximize profit, they do not need to work for the interests of democracy 
or other fundamental rights although this may occasionally (e.g. 
through freedom of expression) be the case.352 In principle, it is difficult 
to see how legal persons need human rights protection.353 Therefore, 
it is unclear what, if any, theory extends fundamental human rights 
protection to legal persons. It is also unclear how that protection should 
be balanced with other fundamental rights.
7.3. LEGAL PERSONS AS OWNERS OF COPYRIGHT AS PROPERTY
Although extending fundamental rights protection to legal persons is challenging, 
it may be argued that extending it to legal persons owning copyright is even more 
challenging. As explained, intellectual goods are not comparable to traditional goods. 
Unlike traditional goods, enjoyment of copyrighted goods does not negatively impact 
the supply of that good, indeed, the amount may even increase, in the case of 
copying. Moreover, as it pertains to legal persons, it is even more difficult to see how 
a corporation as an artificial creation could “peacefully enjoy his possessions” or how 
this “enjoyment” could be violated by a prosumer who is using content in his/her 
own home (e.g. by communicating content to the public from his/her bedroom)? 
351 See also Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 45, where they use shopping as an example of an activity that does not need to 
enjoy fundamental right protection. 
352 Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 42, who also state: “Moral concern [companies] is permitted to the extent to which it increases 
profits – a contradiction in terms. See also Bakan (passim). One could also argue that granting fundamental rights to legal 
persons would strengthen rule of law (the notion of Rechsstaat), especially procedural rights, as it would provide wider 
public good by ensuring that the State upholds the rule of law generally. Or one could argue that granting fundamental 
rights to legal persons strengthen their duties. However, neither of the arguments is convincing. For example, it would 
not be convincing to grant a right to fair trial to animals on a basis that it would strengthen compliance with the rule of 
law. The argument of positing fundamental rights to legal persons in order to increase their duties is neither convincing as 
fundamental right system posits responsibilities for States instead of their subjects. Thus it is difficult to see that granting 
legal persons fundamental right protection would add their responsibilities, but grant them rights they often do not need. 
Similarly, it would be difficult to see that granting fundamental right protection to States would strengthen their duties. 
See in more detail Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 47 ff. 
353 In words of Harding, Kohl & Salmon “[T]he era of globalisation has given rise to a growing unease about multinational 
corporations: far from requiring human rights protection, multinational corporations are a threat to them, largely because they 
can evade or trade out of governmental regulation simply through their economic power and manipulation of jurisdictions. 
Granting them human rights worsens the situation rather than alleviates it: it is like taking the sling and stone from David 
and giving it to Goliath.” Harding, Kohl & Salmon, p. 46.
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The possibility to conclude transactions regarding the use of works is also a 
prerequisite of a functional copyright system based on exclusive rights when rights 
are owned by legal persons. If concluding those transactions is not possible, it is 
not possible to secure the essential economic rights of right holders even if they 
are legal persons. Another concern is that legal persons do not always seem to be 
interested in allowing use, in practice, even in cases where concluding transactions 
is possible. An understandable reason for this is market control: if someone freely 
distributing the content of a legal person on the Internet it may damage markets 
of legal persons elsewhere by, e.g., diminishing sales of CDs. From the viewpoint of 
fundamental rights, the problem of this approach is that “market control” is not a 
protected fundamental right. Consequently, it is problematic from the viewpoint of 
the right to science and other fundamental rights if legal persons are nevertheless 
able to prevent use by, e.g., extending coercive power through criminal sanctions 
to homes of private natural persons. 
However, it is often possible to ask a legal person for permission to use content 
on the internet. For example, sending an email to a company in order to obtain a 
license may be done relatively easily. However, it can be asked whether the terms 
of the license are reasonable for a prosmer to pay. Indeed, it is possible that the 
intention of the licencing requirement is specifically to prevent use by giving a 
price a prosumer cannot pay in order to protect markets. However, if this were 
the case, the purpose of copyright to secure the rights of right holders through 
licensing would not be fulfilled. Similarly, the right to science and culture would 
be endangered if use were not allowed. In other words, right holders would not 
obtain compensation and the rights of prosumers would be endangered, i.e., we 
would be “maximizing misery,” as neither legal persons nor prosumers would enjoy 
their rights. Thus, it may be asked how a relationship between legal persons and 
natural persons should be understood from the viewpoint of fundamental rights 
when concluding transactions is possible?
In this respect, as explained in chapter 4.1., separation between human and 
other rights has also been acknowledged, as it pertains to copyright. This may be 
read e.g. from General Comment 17: “Whereas the human rights to benefit from the 
protection of the moral and material interests resulting from one’s scientific, literary 
and artistic productions safeguards the personal link between authors and their 
creations and between peoples, communities, or other groups and their collective 
cultural heritage, as well as their basic material interests which are necessary to 
enable authors to enjoy an adequate standard of living, intellectual property regimes 
primarily protect business and corporate interests and investments.”354 It is difficult 
to argue that the statement intends for property to be understood as a “better” or 
“stronger” right than human rights. On the contrary, fundamental rights doctrine 
354 General Comment 17, paragraph 2 (emphasis added). See also Shaver, p 133.
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implies that humans are at the core of fundamental rights protection. In this respect, 
it is not surprising that the Finnish legislature has explicitly stated that constitutional 
protection for copyright “should be limited only to natural persons”, which follows 
the individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory.355 Similarly, literal reading 
of the Constitution of Sweden indicates that these protections are specifically for 
natural persons: “Författare, konstnärer och fotografer äger rätt till sina verk enligt 
bestämmelser som meddelas i lag.”356 It would require a more detailed, country-
specific examination to evaluate whether this is the case in other European countries. 
Nevertheless, individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory already suggests that 
fundamental rights protection should be limited to individual authors as natural 
persons in any country having it as a starting point.
In this respect, it should be noted that the ECJ decision in the Aral 
case may be interpreted to mean that copyright protection may be 
expanded to legal persons.357 In Aral, applicants (two cartoonists and an 
editor) had designed cartoon characters for two magazines, which were 
bought by company X. Later, the company sold the magazines to an 
entrepreneur, Z, and the applicants were dismissed. Nevertheless, the 
applicants continued to use the same characters in another magazine 
and consequently were sued by Z on the grounds that the applicants 
were using the same prints Z had bought. In 1992, the Istanbul Civil 
Court decided that economic rights to artistic materials produced for 
the first company had been transferred to Z. However, at the same 
time the court decided that the applicants could use the characters in 
other magazines, but with other subjects and stories. In its decision 
the European Commission of Human Rights decided that “intellectual 
property is covered” and maintained that there is no interference with 
the right to peaceful enjoyment of possessions when, pursuant to the 
domestic law and a contract regulating the relationship between 
the parties, a judge orders one party to that contract to surrender a 
possession to another, unless it arbitrarily and unjustly deprives that 
person of property in favour of another.358 Thus, in Aral the European 
Commission of Human Rights has accepted that intellectual property 
may be protected and assigned. However, Aral does not evaluate nature 
355 Committee report 1992:4, p. 108 – 109.
356 See Kungörelse (1974:152) om beslutad ny regeringsform, Kapitel 2, paragraph 16.
357 In Anheuser-Busch (Anheuser-Busch Inc. v. Portugal (Appl. no. 73049/01), 11 January 2007, paragraphs 72 – 78) ECHR 
confirmed that intellectual property application (for a trademark) may also be protected and in Smith Kline (Smith Kline and 
French Laboratories Ltd v Netherlands, (Appl. no. 12633/87), 4 October 1990, 66 DR 78) the Human Rights Commission 
considered that a patent, as a personal property being transferable and assignable, was a possession as provided by P1-1 
of the ECHR. 
358 See Oguz Aral, Galip Tekin and Inci Aral v Turkey (Appl. no. 24563/94), 14 January 1998. See also Dima v. Romania 
(App. No. 58472/00), 2005.
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of intellectual property in any detailed manner359 and it is questionable 
whether the rights of the assignee were protected as fundamental 
rights. This is because the Commission merely stated in general terms 
that “intellectual property is covered by Article 1 of Protocol No. 1”. In 
fact, as the Commission rejected the claim of applicants, it is clear that 
it did not regard their fundamental rights as having been endangered 
(although it did not specifically analyse whether the essential rights 
of the applicant had been endangered). On the other hand, it may be 
argued that Aral allows the legal person owning copyright to enjoy 
fundamental rights protection especially because the Commission 
stated that “intellectual property is covered by Article 1 of Protocol No. 
1” and entrepreneur Z was considered the owner of content. If this is 
the case, the remaining problem is that Aral does not give us much 
guidance as it did not evaluated the position of the assignee Z in any 
detailed manner. For example, the Commission does not elaborate at all 
on whether Z’s “basic/essential interests” had actually been endangered. 
The clause “unless it arbitrarily and unjustly deprives that person of 
property in favour of another” also implies that the Commission was 
more concerned with the fundamental rights of the authors than that 
of the entrepreneur. In conclusion, it may be argued that Aral does 
not give a clear answer as to how copyright should be evaluated from 
a human rights perspective. Whichever way the European Court of 
Human Rights case law of regarding copyright evolves in the future, it 
may be recommended that it should provide more detailed reasoning 
regarding the nature of the protection it provides under the label of 
copyright, especially as an author’s right.
Due to lack of case law specifically analyzing copyright from a fundamental rights 
perspective, the situation seems somewhat open to debate. The Infosoc directive 
seems to consider copyright as property in a very formal manner as it gives little, 
if any, weight to fundamental rights. In fact, regarding the use of content on the 
Internet, a formal reading of the Infosoc directive implies that a competing societal 
aim or objective is automatically secondary to copyright, i.e., permission is always 
needed from a right holder unless an applicable limitation for a prosumer is found, 
which is problematic to find if whole works are been used on the Internet. Placing a 
prosumer’s right secondary to copyright is questionable since, if property is always 
seen as a right outweighing a competing right, the result is that a prosumer is not be 
entitled to enjoy e.g. his/her right to science and culture unless s/he first obtains a 
license. In fact, a license should already be asked if a work is posted openly available 
to the public, even if no content is actually being copied by others. In other words, 
359 See also Mylly, p. 208.
108
also in cases when no economic damage is caused to a right holder, which is the 
case if no content is ever downloaded, a formal reading of the Infosoc directive still 
suggests that copyright outweighs competing rights such as the right to science and 
culture, the right to privacy and the right to life, liberty and security of a person as it 
pertains to use of content on the Internet as an open network. This is problematic 
given that it values a certain societal objective in economic terms, provided one 
obtains a license at all. In short, if use of content without permission is always 
a crime entitling police action, the value of the right to science and culture, the 
value of the right to privacy and the value of the right to life, liberty and security 
of a person would always seem to be the price of the license, even if no actual (or 
minimal 0,0001 euro) damage occurred to the right holder.360 Consequently, the 
situation may be criticized from the fundamental rights perspective as one should 
not be able to criminalize core areas of other fundamental rights especially when we 
keep in mind that fundamental rights, including property right, are not unlimited.
It is noteworthy that a formal reading of copyright law also suggests that 
permission from a right holder is needed even if the use in question would lead to 
positive economic results from a right holders perspective e.g. through network 
effects. Thus, formal reading of the Infosoc directive enables labeling the prosumer a 
thief even in cases where a prosumers action economically benefits the right holder. 
If use benefits the economic position of the right holder, why should the prosumer 
be penalized for damaging the economic interests of the right holder? One could 
argue that it is in practice problematic, if not impossible, to analyse whether a certain 
use benefitted a right holder or not. However, rigorous analysis regarding usage 
situations would be nothing new in the light of traditional, strict, literal reading of 
copyright laws: one has traditionally needed to rigorously examine whether e.g. a 
copy has been produced or whether a certain expression exceeds the required level 
for protection or through a similarity assessment evaluate whether content A is a copy 
of a content B. Of course, as it was earlier explained, making such evaluations (e.g. 
to what extent copies of particular works are being produced on certain platforms 
on the Internet) is often impossible. For this reason, the findings in this chapter 
suggest that means other than a strict property right approach should be used to 
secure both the right to science and culture and rights of authors. Conversely, if 
strict literal reading is followed, it should also be followed in favour of the prosumer.
The aforementioned challenges may also be demonstrated through the principle 
of proportionality. As explained, enacting a criminal sanction is already an act that 
may affect the fundamental property right of a prosumer as s/he may have to pay 
360 One could attempt to argue that the problem is merely theoretical if reasonably priced licenses are being offered to 
prosumers. At first this argument sounds plausible. However, it would still mean that we would be putting a price – even 
if a reasonable one – to the fundamental rights to science and culture and, as explained, it is difficult to find justifications 
allowing us to value fundamental rights in economic terms. Fundamental rights simply should not be in the market place. 
As explained, e.g. the Finnish property right doctrine neither protects material quantities of property as such.
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fines if s/he commits a certain crime.361 Consequently, when we consider that in 
Finland a license to offer a piece of music for downloading on the Internet may cost 
only 0,07 euros,362 it may be asked whether it is proportionate to criminalize an act 
causing this type of theoretical damage with criminal sanctions/fines. For example, 
in Finland the minimum petty fine (for jaywalking) is 10 euros. Now, would it be 
proportionate to criminalize an act causing a theoretical 0,07 euro damage with 
a 10 euro sanction? In this case the fine of 10 euros would be approximately 142 
times larger than the alleged theoretical damage. Thus, the problem related to the 
reciprocal relationship between copyright and other rights may be seen from the 
fact that copyright does not acknowledge more lenient forms of penalty (compared 
with, e.g., theft and petty theft) as it pertains to use of content on the Internet.363 
The costs of fixing the door the police may have break in order to enter a prosumers 
home is also easily many times more than the theoretical damage caused to a right 
holder.364 Furthermore, demanding rigorous respect from prosumers to honour the 
property of corporations (or even authors) is also questionable when we take into 
consideration that there are always costs incurred by legal persons themselves when 
they conduct business: taxes, administrative costs, accounting, costs for recreational 
activities, charity work, etc. are constantly incurring costs for legal persons (and 
occasionally authors). From an individual author’s point of view, it would also be 
naive to believe that s/he could (with “zero tolerance”) dictate the terms of a contract 
when assigning his/her rights to a corporate right holder. Even if the economic 
damage for an author would be more than 0,07 euros, it is clear that the situation 
is problematic from the viewpoint of the principle of proportionality, taking into 
361 As explained, the Constitutional Law Committee of Finland has stated that pecuniary penalty means interfering to the 
property of the convicted and imprisonment means interfering to a person’s right to liberty.  Therefore, thorough criminal 
punishment, the Constitutional Law Committee of Finland has defined that criminal system always touches constitutional 
rights. Therefore individual criminalizations should always be evaluated as any limitations to constitutional rights as 
enacting a penal provision requires that general and possible special requirements for limiting constitutional rights should 
be fulfilled.  
362 See e.g. Teosto’s pricing-list for Internet use, availabel (in English) at:  http://www.teosto.fi/sites/default/files/files/P13_
Download%202013.pdf. Teosto is a composers collecting society in Finland. It should be mentioned that in order to 
post music performed by others one needs also permission on behalf of performing artists and phonogram producers. 
Even if it was concidered that such a license fee doubles the price it would still bee 0,14 euros per song i.e. a lot smaller 
that a possible fine for jail walking. It could also be mentioned that according to some sources a popular music service 
Spotify pays approximately 0,005 euros per download to an author. See Hans Handgraaf, Spotify royalties, available (in 
English) at: http://www.spotidj.com/spotifyroyalties.htm.  According to a Finnish author and artist Anssi Kela he received 
approximately 0,002 euro per stream from Spotify. See Mr. Kela’s blogpost Levoton tyttö ja Spotify, on 6th of November, 
available at  (in Finnish):   http://www.anssikela.com/2013/11/06/levoton-tytto-ja-spotify/. 
363 It could also be noted that e.g. the Criminal Code of Finland (39/1889) acknowledges such crimes as Unauthorised uses 
(Criminal Code of Finland, chapter 28, Sections 7 – 9, an unofficial translation available in English at:   http://www.finlex.
fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1889/en18890039.pdf. They define as crimes if traditional property of others is being used without 
permission. Maximum penalty for Unauthorised use is one year imprisonment. Penalty for Petty unauthorized use is 
fine. As a right holder may use content at the same time another uses it (the special nature of copyright), punishment for 
unauthorized use of copyright should in retrospect be smaller than unauthorized use of traditional property. It is curious 
that this is not the case. Instead the situation seems opposite as even theoretical damage to a right holder may lead to two 
year imprisonment. This is questionable from the viewpoint of principle of proportionality.
364 It may also be considered disproportionate that a teacher is considered criminal, if s/he occasionally uses content needed 
for educational purposes although s/he has not obtained a license for it. This applies even when a teacher shows a movie 
to students for recreational purposes. The situation could be interpreted otherwise if the teacher would constantly use non-
licensed content in a manner that more significantly harms economic interests of right holders.
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consideration consequent economic damages for the prosumer and the society as a 
whole: a prosumer cannot work due to his/her imprisonment, which also directly 
incurs societal costs (police, legal aid, process through the court, imprisonment itself 
etc). In fact, it seems that the property rights of prosumers and society as a whole 
is completely ignored in relation to the property of right holders. In this respect, 
it may be even asked if copyright actually aims to protect concept property at all, 
as property of some may be completely ignored, or at least seen clearly inferior to 
the property of right holders. As explained, posting a work openly available on the 
Internet is considered a crime (“theft”), even when no actual damage has occurred to 
the right holder, which is the case when no-one downloads the work. In this respect, 
it seems that copyright legislation has discarded traditional western legal principles 
such as the principle of reciprocity as presented by Immanuel Kant.365 (Curiously, 
this does not prevent right holders and their representatives who benefit from the 
situation from representing themselves as proponents of civilization and culture, 
making it rather obscure what type of civilization and culture they represent.)
One could argue that economic harm to a legal person also harms 
authors behind the legal person, and consequently property of legal 
persons should always be protected as a fundamental right. However, 
such claim would face several challenges. Firstly, fundamental rights 
are relative and urge taking into consideration reciprocal relationship 
of the parties.366 Secondly, fundamental rights protect in the first 
instance natural persons. The protection is provided against actions 
of States and powerful private interests. As some transnational 
corporations are larger than certain States is difficult to see how they 
could enjoy fundamental right protection. Even if the doctrine of 
indirect fundamental rights protection were accepted, in principle it 
would extend only to smaller legal persons (family businesses etc., 
see also chapter 7.2. and indirect/derivative protection). However, 
especially from the viewpoint of droit d’ auteur copyright theory, which 
emphasizes individual authors, even accepting indirect protection 
is problematic. As explained, the Finnish legislature has explicitly 
excluded legal persons from the scope of fundamental rights protection 
as it pertains to copyright. Thirdly, it is difficult to read fundamental 
rights conventions in a manner that prioritizes property over human 
rights. In practice, one problem of such reading would extend formal 
365 Kant’s idea of legal rights and obligations was the following: when a person calls upon his/her rights against another, for 
reasons of consistency, s/he has to recognize that the other is like s/he is. Thus thorough this recognition a person has to 
also accept that the other person may have similar rights that should be honored.
366 See Pekka Länsineva, Omaisuuden suoja (PL 15 §), published in Perusoikeudet, Hallberg (et al), Helsinki 2011, p. 573 
and Mylly p. 208 – 212.
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and inflexible property protection to legal persons in a manner that 
would legitimize arguing that even 0,01 euro damage is always a 
fundamental right problem. It is difficult to see that this is the case as 
fundamental rights protect certain essential interests. Fourthly, if States 
were obligated to protect every euro of legal persons as a fundamental 
right, one should rigorously evaluate each usage situation: did using a 
certain work on the Internet actually cause damage to the legal person? 
However, this is impossible in practice, as certain times use may also 
lead to positive results - not to mention the impossibility to monitor 
each copy forming on a certain platform on the Internet. Furthermore, 
if States were obligated to protect each euro of legal persons it would 
also seem that States were obligated to maintain certain industries 
regardless of how outdated their business models might be. Is it a 
failure of a State if a company goes bankrupt? Or how could a State 
demand legal persons to pay taxes, if each euro of a legal person is 
protected as a fundamental right? Finally, one should also consider 
the  property (and other rights) of others, as the reciprocal nature of 
fundamental rights suggest. If the property of others is ignored, it is 
questionable if we talk of property at all as “property” of right holder 
would seem to be more protected than property of others. This does not 
mean that copyright should be ignored. Instead, it means that States 
should use not use exclusive rights to protect the essential economic 
interests of authors if it endangers other rights. States may also give 
financial support to certain industries. Whatever states decide to do, 
those support mechanisms should not endanger the fundamental 
rights of others. Of course, one may argue that all the aforementioned 
challenges are irrelevant and the property of legal persons should 
always be rigorously protected as a fundamental right.367 This would 
make legislation processes generally much easier. For example, we 
would not have to determine whether e.g. certain activities of mining 
industry are bad for the environment or to private land owners as 
the result should directly favor the mining industry regardless of the 
environmental or economic damages to the land owners. However, if 
fundamental rights analysis is taken seriously, the presented challenges 
suggest that methods other than rigorous property approach should be 
used in order to secure the rights of authors and prosumers. 
Finally, disproportionateness of the situation may also be seen from the viewpoint 
of other fundamental rights. For example, it is difficult to regard using coercive 
367 In fact, as the threshold for obtaining copyright protection is easily exceeded, it may be argued that all legal (and natural) 
persons own content protected by copyright. Thus if it is accepted that legal persons owning copyrighted content should 
enjoy fundamental rights protection it could be argued that all legal persons enjoy fundamental rights protection.
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power in the form of criminal sanctions against prosumers based on theoretical 
economic damage proportionate from the viewpoint of the fundamental rights 
to life, liberty and security of person as provided by Article 3 of the UDHR. As 
explained, permission is needed when content is placed openly available on the 
Internet even in cases where no-one ever accessed the content, i.e., there would 
be no economic loss for the right holder. Why is such an act considered a crime, 
threating a prosumer’s right to life, liberty and security of a person? Moreover, if 
staling a candy bar worth 1 euro may at best (in Finland) may lead to 6 month 
imprisonment as a petty theft (in practice a small fine would be given), why should 
stealing a music track worth of 0,07 euros may lead to 2 years of imprisonment? 
The same question may be extended to the right to privacy as protected in Article 
12 of the UDHR: it is difficult to consider it proportionate for a right holder to send 
police into a person’s home based on theoretical or negligible economic damage. In 
economic terms, in relation to rights of right holders, the right to life, liberty and 
security of person and the right to privacy seem to carry no value in practice, as it 
pertains to possibilities to use content in an open environment. Even if the system 
was de facto in the first instance used to protect the essential economic interests 
of (“ailing”) authors instead of corporations, it is difficult to regard it proportionate 
that even essential interests of (“ailing”) authors should be protected through a 
formal system based on exclusive rights in a described situation. Usually, work for 
the weak/ailing is conducted through charities or such like work instead of using 
threat coercive power extending to every private natural person.368 Why should 
theoretical or minimal economic damage to an individual (“ailing”) author entitle 
breaching a prosumers privacy and lead to criminal sanctions? Such a situation 
implies that individual prosumers have no rights at all, or that their rights are 
less valued than those of the right holders. Consequently, it may be criticised as 
disproportionate to demand that prosumers should rigorously follow the will of 
right holders, especially when considering individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright 
theory. Therefore, as formal reading of the Infosoc directive does not take into 
consideration the explained challenges related to fundamental rights, the findings 
support claims regarding excessive influence of legal persons behind copyright law: 
neglecting rights of others is consistent with the activities of larger legal persons in 
their pursuit of profit and power in an amoral manner as described by Harding, 
Kohl, Salmon and especially Bakan. This leads to some additional concerns, which 
shall be addressed next. 
368 One could also contemplate why work of certain people should beging with be protected as human right in comparison to 
work of others. For example, why should producers of entertainment and science have a special kind of human/fundamental 
rights protection in comparison to producers of paper, cars or metal? Relevance of the question is emphasized in the 
information society as we all easily are author’s creating protectd expressions. Why should our human or property right 
be more strongly protected when we are authors in comparison owners of traditional property? This remark is not made 
as an argument disrespecting rights of authors, but instead as a reminder that property right is not an unlimited right.
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7.4. CONCERNS
Strict approach of the Infosoc directive implies that little if any weight has been given 
to fundamental rights analysis when the directive was drafted. As it is also difficult 
to see that copyright would exist primarily for individual authors and prosumers to 
conclude individual transactions with each other and it is difficult find reasonably 
priced licenses for prosumers to copy and make content available on the Internet, 
it becomes plausible that copyright is being used to prevent the prosumers from 
using the content in order to protect the financial interests of legal persons, especially 
large corporations. This would imply that exclusive right has been directed against 
every individual and extended to every home (due to criminal sanctions in the 
form of coercive power) in order to protect the business interests of certain legal 
persons. If this is the case, copyright is not applied as intended de jure, i.e. as a 
right protecting in the first instance the essential interests of (“ailing”) authors, as 
droit d’ auteur copyright ideology postulates. Moreover, as there would be no actual 
intentions to enable prosumers to use the content as postulated by subsection 1 
of the Article 27 of the UDHR, power aiming to prevent use is alarming both from 
the viewpoint of the right to science and culture as provided by Articles 27(1) of the 
UDHR and 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR, and from the viewpoint of fundamental rights 
to life, liberty and security of person as provided by Article 3 of the UDHR and to 
the right to privacy as protected in Article 12 of the UDHR.369 However, such use 
of power would be completely consistent with the amoral nature of corporations 
in their pursuit of profit and power as described by Harding, Kohl Salmon and 
especially Bakan. 
There are also signs that corporations are using copyright both to protect their 
interests by preventing use and also to directly benefit from situation by exploiting 
prosumers who violate copyright. The following case, which was never evaluated in 
court but received a lot of publicity in Finland, may be used as an illustration of this. 
In a Finnish case altogether 27 persons (prosumers) had been accused of sharing 
and copying certain music CDs with each other on the Internet. A record company 
had monitored the use and claimed 600 Euros from each of the prosumers collecting 
altogether approximately (600x27) 16.200 euro.370 However, according to Temonen, 
copying the CD 27 times caused approximately 270 euro damage for the record 
company (and this also only provided all of the copiers had bought the CD from 
a legal retail shop), as the retail price of the CDs were 8 – 12 euro per CD (27x10 
369 It could be mentioned that an objective of preventing use would also be problematic from the viewpoint what Ridley and 
Gates agreed as they both considered exchange i.e. enabling use as the key element of innovation. See previously chapter 
3.1.2. 
370 The reason why the case received publicity was that one alleged copyright violator refused to pay the fee of 600 euro. 
Moreover, she was allegedly a child (a nine year old girl at the time) whose father declined from paying the fee and 
signing a Confidentiality Agreement with the record company binding them not to talk about the case. As the case was 
settled before it ended up to court, no formal court decision was given regarding the actual user. 
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= 270 euro).371 Thus, in the light of this example it becomes questionable whether 
copyright is being used at all to defend the economic rights of (“ailing”) authors, 
especially because it is questionable whether authors receive anything in these types 
of processes.372 Furthermore, it is untenable to argue that it is the prosumers who 
(as “thieves/pirates”) are benefitting at the expense of right holders in situations 
such as this. On the contrary it seems to be legal persons who are economically 
benefitting at the expense of prosumers. As it is clear that 10 euro damage is in 
no proportion to 600 euro damage claim it may be asked if legal persons as right 
holders are using copyright as means for unjust enrichment. Creating more effective 
systems to contact and demand compensations from those prosumers who do not 
respect formal reading of copyright law would clearly be in the interest of legal 
persons. Due to the high level of collected compensations in proportion to lost sales 
(16.200 euro instead of 270 euro) it may become (and perhaps already is) lucrative 
for corporations to maintain a certain level of piracy, especially if effective means 
for contacting prosumers existed.373 Again, this would be completely consistent with 
amoral aim of legal persons top pursue for profit and power.
7.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
7.5.1. IN GENERAL
This book postulates that property should in principle be protected as a fundamental 
right only when it enables securing the mentioned “basic/essential” human rights 
objectives such as “essential foodstuffs”, “essential primary health care”, “basic 
shelter and housing”, “the most basic forms of education,” etc. In other words, the 
primary objective of fundamental rights, i.e., to secure certain essential interests, and 
the primary objective of corporations, i.e., to maximize profits, do not correspond 
with each other. The reason behind the separation of human rights and property 
right is to emphasise the role of human rights in comparison to property right and 
not vice versa. Consequently, it would be difficult to see how property right protection 
could be “better” or “stronger” in comparison to the protection provided by human 
371 See See Tuukka Temonen, Chisu sydän Len Blavatnik (hereafter Temonen), a Facebook –post (hereafter Temonen, available 
at (in Finnish): https://www.facebook.com/notes/tuukka-temonen/chisu-syd%C3%A4n-len-blavatnik/10151175865123732. 
Temonen has been an artist in popular Finnish band. 
372 Regarding claims that collected compensations are not distributed to authors see also (with references) Ernesto Van Der 
Sar, Music Labels Won’t Share Pirate Bay Loot With Artists, Torrentfreak, July 28, 2012, available at: http://torrentfreak.
com/pirate-bay-loot-with-artists-120728/ and Temonen. Even if all the 27 CDs had been sold legally in a normal retail 
trade, the author of the record would have received as royalties approximately 20 euro (4% - 15% royalty per CD of the 
retail price, which was 8 – 12 euro per CD). See Temonen. 
373 It could be mentioned the corporation also demanded to sign a confidentiality agreement in order to protect its “privacy” 
interests while it at the same time it the right to privacy of the prosumers in question: it was not a aproblem for the record 
company in question to send two police officers to a home of a private natural person, which completely corresponds with 
the amoral nature of corporations as described by Bakan.
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rights.374 Seeing property right as a neutral economic instrument, which always has 
a formal fundamental rights status in relation to other rights, would easily turn into 
a questionable asset especially in the hands of transnational corporations aiming to 
maximize profit for their owners. In this regard, it is questionable if right holders 
even intend to use copyright to make content available to the public on the Internet 
as postulated by Articles 27(1) of the UDHR and 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR. At the 
moment, it seems that copyright is intentionally used to prevent use rather than to 
enable it as provided by Articles 27(1) of the UDHR and 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR. This 
poses challenges from both the viewpoint of right of authors, as they cannot receive 
compensations, and from the viewpoint of the right to life, liberty and security of 
a person and the right to privacy as enshrined in Articles 3 and 12 of the UDHR.
Although the European Convention on Human Rights explicitly states that 
legal persons are also entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of their possessions, 
extending fundamental rights protection always in a formal and strict manner to 
legal persons is challenging. Although it was accepted that the property of legal 
persons was protected as a fundamental right (in this respect it should be noted 
that the European Convention on Human Rights does not specify what types of 
legal persons are protected or to what extent), it may be asked if fundamental 
rights protection may extend to larger legal persons and especially to transnational 
corporations. It is difficult to see that transnational corporations are in need of 
fundamental rights protection to protect their “essential/basic” interests. On the 
contrary, fundamental rights should protect natural persons against actions of 
corporations. Indirect protection to smaller legal persons through the essential 
interests of their protagonists is easier to understand, as the aim of fundamental 
rights protection is to protect essential interests of natural persons. However, 
provided droit d’ auteur copyright theory excludes legal persons from the scope of 
fundamental rights, extending fundamental rights protection to companies owning 
copyright would again become problematic. It could be recommended that the 
European Court of Human rights specify the conditions on which legal persons 
may earn fundamental rights protection and on the role of individualistic droit d’ 
auteur copyright theory in this respect.
7.5.2. SUGGESTIONS
The examples in this book indicate how the fundamental rights of prosumers, 
especially the right to science and culture, have been ignored when the copyright 
374 See e.g. here chapter 4.1. and General Comment 17, paragraph 1: “Human rights are fundamental as they are inherent 
to the human person as such, whereas intellectual property rights are first and foremost means by which States seek to 
provide incentives for inventiveness and creativity, encourage the dissemination of creative and innovative productions, 
as well as the development of cultural identities, and preserve the integrity of scientific, literary and artistic productions 
for the benefit of society as a whole.” 
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directive was drafted. This is problematic as traditional content holders such as 
record companies, broadcasters, publishing houses, collecting societies, etc. should 
be unable to endanger fundamental rights in a society through criminalization - 
just as e.g. the paper or mining industries are - even if they argued that they were 
protecting fundamental rights of (“ailing”) employees.375 In other words, it is difficult 
to see that States should have a strict formal obligation to protect as a fundamental 
property right the unrealized economic benefits of a legal person owning copyright. 
Property right may also be limited and States have no obligation to maintain certain 
types of industries or companies. Instead, in the first instance they are obliged to 
protect the rights of natural persons. Is should therefore be incumbent on industries 
to renew their business models (or suffer losses if unable to do so) in order to 
avoid placing the fundamental rights of others at risk (or “in the market place”).376 
Alternatively, the legislature could stop balancing different interests in the society 
and directly decide that a result of the analysis should favor the standpoint of the 
industry provided that it might even in theory suffer economical damages (as it 
now seems to be as it pertains copyright). However, as has been explained, this 
approach would be difficult to accept from a fundamental right perspective. Thus 
this book argues that the right to science and culture – including a right to make 
content available to the public in an open society – as an existing human right 
should be given relevance. How could this be done?
Regarding the reciprocal relationship between prosumers and authors, it was 
concluded that means other than exclusive rights should be applied in order to secure 
the right to science and culture and rights of authors.377 From the viewpoint of legal 
persons, the situation seems more complex. There clearly seems to be the will to 
use content often owned by larger corporations. In theory, contacting a corporation 
should not be problematic. However, from a fundamental rights perspective, one 
problem related to corporate attempts to hinder prosumers’ use of the content is that 
it should not be possible to criminalize core areas of protected fundamental rights, 
such as the right to science and culture. Consequently, if the core area of the right 
to science and culture is understood as a right to use a limited amount of content 
at a time, legal persons should not be able to prevent such use even if it takes place 
in open networks. Thus, at this point fundamental rights analysis and especially the 
right to science and culture should affect the strict and formal reading of copyright. 
This means that copyright should acknowledge more lenient or alternative ways to 
375 It could be mentioned that the approach does not prevent States from supporting industries e.g. through different types of 
support mechanisms. It instead means that fundamental rights should be taken into consideration no matter what type of 
mechanism is used.
376 Another thing is if there is need and political will to support certain industries (or more plausibly authors) with alternative 
mechanisms which are not problematic from the viewpoint of fundamental rights of others (compare: aids to shipyards). 
377 This should also apply to smaller legal persons, provided fundamental rights protection indirectly extends to them: It 
simply is difficult to see that prosumers would be able or even interested in constantly concluding individual transactions 
with individual authors or smaller legal persons. 
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evaluate such usage situations.378 In fact, given that exclusive rights of authors have 
already been limited in the interests of corporations (i.e. broadcasters, press or record 
companies) allowing the corporations to use content for commercial purposes in 
public, corresponding limitations in the interests of prosumers using content for 
non-commercial purposes in public should not be hindered.
Consequently, an alternative solution that enables use and secures compensations 
for individual authors should be suggested. In this respect, it may first be asked who 
should be relevant right holders receiving the compensations, as today all prosumers 
are authors and users. In order to respect individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright 
theory and the basic tenets of fundamental rights, focus should be placed on those 
authors whose content has been used but whose essential economic interests are 
still at risk. It is difficult to see why relevance should be given to legal persons 
as they should in principle be excluded from fundamental rights protection379, 
especially from the viewpoint of individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory. 
However, this does not mean that the system could not extend its effects to individual 
authors who have assigned their rights to legal persons. For example, if a company 
uses content but the author of the content (e.g. for contractual reasons) no longer 
receives compensation, the author may still be protected by fundamental rights. 
Thus, fundamental rights analysis suggests that the alternative system could be 
separated from corporate control, although content formally owned by corporations 
would be used. This would follow the original aim of fundamental rights as protectors 
of natural persons. The system should have negligible economic effects on legal 
persons given that the use of content by prosumers (as understood in this book) 
would allow only limited amounts of content to be used at any given time. Some 
risk should also be left for legal persons to carry. Examples of how the system could 
be organized in practice shall be evaluated in chapter 12. The book will evaluate 
next whether Internet intermediaries could provide solutions to licensing questions 
between prosumers and right holders.
It should be noted that the suggestion above does not mean that 
legal persons should always lose when the property of legal persons 
is compared to rights of prosumers. The suggestion emphasizes 
analyzing the protected core area of the right to science and culture 
and comparing it to possible economic damage to a legal person. For 
example, it would be difficult to see that prosumers rights could not 
prevail if only small amounts of content are being used and the other 
378 As explained, it is questionable if causing a 0,07 euro damage may be compared to theft. It may further be questioned if 
it should be defined as a petty theft either. As explained, already 10 euro fine for causing 0,07 euro theoretical damage is 
over 140 times bigger thand the alleged damage. Another thing is if a prosumer uses large amounts of content – i.e. is not 
anymore protected by the core area of the right to science and culture – and causes more serious damage to a corporation.
379 Excluding smaller legal persons possibly enjoying indirect fundamental right protection.
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party is a large corporation suffering only theoretical damage.380
Although this book does not focus on evaluating relationships between legal 
persons, it could be mentioned that if intellectual property is protected as a 
fundamental right of companies, the principle of equality necessitates that the 
right to science and culture should also extend its applicability as a fundamental 
right to legal persons using intellectual property. As explained, private parties in 
an equal position barely form a constitutional threat to each other. However, an 
exhaustive list for limitations in the Infosoc-Directive and formal reading of the 
Orphan works directive again indicates that the right to science and culture has 
also been ignored in this respect. For example, due to an exhaustive list of possible 
limitations in the Infosoc directive, the Orphan works directive, referring to point 
(c) of the Article 5.2 of the Infosoc-directive, allows for the use of orphan works 
but only for non-commercial purposes.381 This is not only incompatible with an 
argument that copyright creates “economic foundation for the creative industry, 
since it stimulates innovation, creation, investment and production” as recital 5 
of the Orphan work directive states, but also raises questions as to why similar 
commercial services using orphan works such as Google books should be prevented 
from emerging? It is difficult to see who would lose if commercial use of orphan 
works was allowed with a possibility for a reappearing author to claim compensation 
for the use. The reappeared author could afterwards also decide whether s/he 
would continue distributing his/her content through the service.382 As there is no 
information regarding possible numbers of reappearing authors383, it is also possible 
that the problem related to use of orphan works is theoretical.384 
380 As explained, it may also be asked if one should consider it a crime even if a prosumer uses content of an author as a 
natural person if it is clear that the author has had no intention of using that certain content in order to secure his/her 
economic interests? For example, is it proportionate if person A may threat person B with criminal sanctions if B merely 
posts a photograph taken by A to B’s Facebook profile when A has no intentions to use the photograph in order to secure 
his/her economic rights? How can A in such case even argue that s/he is using his/her copyright to protect his/her essential 
economic interests i.e. what the core area of the copyright protects? 
381 According to Article 1 of the Orphan works directive use is allowed “publicly accessible libraries, educational establishments 
and museums, as well as by archives, film or audio heritage institutions and public-service broadcasting organisations, 
established in the Member States, in order to achieve aims related to their public-interest missions.”
382 If a reappearing author would decline from licensing his/her motives should be other but economical as his/her motives 
from declining are obviously other but obtain compensations through licensing. Nevertheless, in an author – legal person 
relationship s/he the principle of equality suggests that his/her will should be respected although in theory one should 
evaluate whether his/her essential interests are endangered if the use is allowed.
383 For example, Commission Staff Working Paper, Impact Assessment on the Cross-Border Online Access to Orphan Works, 
Brussels, 24.5.2011, SEC(2011) 615 final, does not even attempt to estimate amounts of reappearing authors in practice.
384 It may be assumed that only minuscule amounts of reappearing authors wanting to opt out from the system would exist. 
For example, in Finland there are several paragraphs in law for collective licenses i.e. for those situations when individual 
licensing is deemed impossible. However, as not everyone assigns their rights to collecting societies granting collective 
licenses, Nordic collective licenses may have an extended effect covering also those right holders who have not assigned 
their rights. In order to secure position of these non-affiliate authors a separate right to opt-out from the collective license 
and a right to claim compensations for the use have been granted to non-affiliate authors. However, only minuscule 
amounts of non-affiliate authors even attempt to opt out from the license or claim compensations. As orphan authors are 
not organized in any way either, it is questionable whether the problem related to use of orphan works is actually that 
significant. Regarding the position of non-affiliates in more detail, see Olli Vilanka, Rough Justice or Zero Tolerance? – 
Reassessing the Nature of Copyright in Light of Collective Licensing (Part I), chapter 4.3, published in In Search of New 
IP Regimes, a publication of IPR University Center, Helsinki 2010. 
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8 POSITION OF INTERMEDIARIES
8.1. IN GENERAL
It may be asked whether Internet intermediaries, including firms such as Internet 
operators and search engines, should be held liable for use of content conducted by 
others, especially prosumers. It could also be asked whether the intermediaries might 
ask permissions on behalf of prosumers to make content available to the public as 
Article 27(1) and 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR postulates. Thus, it shall next be evaluated 
what an intermediary is, if it is not a user copying and making content available 
to the public as the copyright theory postulates. After this, it shall be evaluated on 
what possible liability of intermediaries could be based on, if intermediaries do not 
produce copies or make content available to the public as users do. Finally, it shall 
be evaluated whether intermediaries might ask permissions from authors on behalf 
of prosumers, if they are held liable for acts conducted by prosumers.
8.2. DEFINING INTERMEDIARIES
If intermediaries are not users, it may first be asked what they are, i.e., how should 
they be defined? In Europe a starting point for possible liability of intermediaries 
is often derived from Directive 2000/31/EC on electronic commerce (hereafter 
E-commerce Directive), which covers both natural and legal persons.385 The 
E-commerce directive also refers to the Directive 98/48/EC and its definitions of 
services.386 
The services described by the directives especially refer to services in electronic 
form. Consequently, delivery services related to goods and services not conducted by 
electronic means have been excluded from the scope of the directives.387 In addition, 
annex V of Directive 98/48/EC excludes services which are not provided “at a 
distance” although electronic services were present. In these cases the customer is 
385 See Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council, of 8 June 2000, on certain legal aspects on 
information society services, in particular electronic commerce, in the Internal Market (Directive on Electronic Commerce). 
See especially recital 50 of the directive connecting it to directive on ”harmonisation of certain aspects of copyright and 
related rights in the information society” (which later became so called Infosoc-directive. Regarding subjects of rights 
see Article 2(b) of the E-commerce directive.
386 See the reference in Article 2 a) of the E-commerce directive and in general Directive 98/48/EC of the European Parliament 
and of the Council, of 20 July 1998, amending Directive 98/34/EC laying down a procedure for the provision of information 
in the field of technical standards and regulations. 
387 See Article 2 (h) ii of the E-commerce Directive.
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physically present although electronic services were used (e.g. medical examinations 
or treatment at a doctor’s surgery using electronic equipment where the patient is 
physically present).388 Thus, in general the scopes of the directives seem to cover 
services in electronic form which are provided at a distance.
More detailed elaborations have also been given. Article 2 of the E-Commerce 
directive (referring to directive 98/34/EC as amended by Directive 98/48/E) defines 
that an “information society service covers any service normally provided for 
remuneration, at a distance, by means of electronic equipment for the processing 
(including digital compression) and storage of data, and at the individual request 
of a recipient of a service.”389 Recital 18 of the E-commerce Directive continues 
that: “Information society services span a wide range of economic activities which 
take place on-line; these activities can, in particular, consist of selling goods on-
line; … services which are not remunerated by those who receive them, such 
as those offering on-line information or commercial communications, or those 
providing tools allowing for search, access and retrieval of data; information 
society services also include services consisting of the transmission of information 
via a communication network, in providing access to a communication network 
or in hosting information provided by a recipient of the service.” Also, “services 
which are transmitted point to point, such as video-on-demand or the provision of 
commercial communications by electronic mail” are listed as information society 
services in the Recital 18 of the E-commerce directive.390 Finally, recital 28 of the 
E-commerce directive adds postal services “consisting of the physical delivery of a 
printed electronic mail message” and “voluntary accreditation systems, in particular 
for providers of electronic signature certification service” to relevant services. Thus 
we may see that a definition for a service as defined in the directives is wide and 
leave a lot of room for interpretation.391 Nevertheless, it may be summarized that the 
services provided by E-commerce directive cover services at a distance by means of 
electronic equipment for processing and storage of data although as an exception 
to the rule delivering printed electronic messages have also been included.392 
It could be mentioned that in legal literature such services as operators and 
search engines have often been considered as intermediaries.393 Spindler, Riccio and 
Van Der Perre have listed the following actors as intermediaries: “Mere conduit, 
Caching, Host providers and Auction platforms, Search Engines and Hyperlinks, 
Blogs and Forums, Content aggregators, Domain name providers and Registration 
authorities, Admin-C and online-payment providers, Gambling specific issues.”394 It 
388 In more detail see a non-exhaustive list of examples in Annex V of the Directive 98/48/EC.
389 See also Recital 17 of the E-commerce directive for specifications.
390 See recital 18 of the E-commerce directive. 
391 See also Pihlajarinne, p. 90 – 91. 
392 See recital 17 of the E-commerce directive and Article 1(2) of the Directive 98/48/EC.
393 See e.g. Pihlajarinne (passim).
394 See Gerald Spindler, Giovanni Maria Riccio and Aurélie Van Der Perre (under the direction of the professor Montero): 
Study on the Liability of Internet Intermediaries (Markt 2006/09/E, Service Contract ETD 2006/IME2/69). Thibault 
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is also difficult to see what would prevent adding to the list social media platforms 
(Facebook), P2P-software, different types of e-mail and messaging services, services 
providing platform and software for prosumers to record and watch (later) television 
broadcasts etc. Consequently, we may see that it is difficult to give an exact definition 
for a service that qualifies as an intermediary. For example, the listed services in 
legal literature do not seem to follow any technologies as such since it is difficult 
to see that “mere conduit” could be technology at all. 
Due to technological convergence it might also be difficult to make required 
definitions dependent on specific technologies. Therefore it could be contemplated, 
following a basic separation between software and hardware395, if those who 1) 
offer platforms of their own for others to use (“electronic equipment for … storage 
of data”) or 2) offer software of their own to others to use (“electronic equipment 
for processing … data”) or 3) do both 1 and 2 at the same time would qualify as 
intermediaries.396 The problem of this approach is that it is possible and even likely 
that intermediaries acting in this manner are merely offering their own property for 
others to use. One does not need to understand this only as “traditional property” 
such as a piece of a hardware, but also as intellectual property, e.g., in the form of 
software obtaining copyright protection. For example, several search engines use the 
©-sign although its use not necessary for obtaining copyright protection.397 Thus, a 
challenge is that it would be paradoxical to require intermediaries to stop using their 
own property through an argument that they are in fact using someone else’s (i.e. 
right holder’s) property.398 Such a requirement would lead to asking whether one 
attempts to change the concept of property. In other words, the problem related to 
the copyright liability of intermediaries is that it is difficult to define intermediaries 
as copiers or communicators of content if they merely provide platforms and services 
of their own for others to use. Thus, as any electronic service at a distance suitable 
for storing or processing electronic data (including delivering printed electronic 
messages seems) may fulfill the definition of an intermediary, courts seem have 
wide discretion when they decide what an intermediary is. Whether other norms 
in the E-commerce directive provide more specific definitions for basis of possible 
liability of intermediaries shall be evaluated next.
Verbies, ULYS, p.7, available at: http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/e-commerce/docs/study/liability/final_report_en.pdf. 
395 For more detailed definitions of software and hardware see e.g. Wikipedia at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Software and 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Computer_hardware. See also definition of Computer Hope at: http://www.computerhope.
com/issues/ch000039.htm. 
396 Nothing of course prevents intermediaries also from directly creating copies (or in communicational terms: initiating acts 
of communication) of expressions owned by right holders and make them (further) available to the public as postulated 
by copyright theory. However, if they do so it is clear that they do not act as intermediaries but users of content.
397 Homepage and software of the notorious Pirate Bay also easily exceeds required level for obtaining copyright protection, if 
so argued. It could also be mentioned that the Pirate Bay as such is not problematic for right holders either: it is problematic 
only because it is used by prosumers in a manner, which is not desired by right holders.
398 As explained, in Finland Pihlajarinne already talks of “concept crisis” as she evaluates possible liability of linkers as 
intermediaries. See Pihlajarinne, p. 15.
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8.3. “LIABILITY OF INTERMEDIARY SERVICE PROVIDERS”
If we have a consensus that a certain actor is an intermediary, the next question to 
examine is on what the claimed liability of intermediaries is based, if intermediaries 
themselves do not produce copies or make content available to the public as copyright 
theory postulates. In other words, if intermediaries were users, no definitional 
problems would exist as they would not be intermediaries but users. Consequently, 
if intermediaries are separated from users, it becomes relevant to define on what 
their possible liability is based on. 
In this respect, it must first be noted that the headline of this chapter, which is 
also the headline of Section 4 of the E-commerce directive, clearly indicates that 
intermediaries may be held liable. However, from the perspective of copyright, the 
E-commerce directive does not enact any new economic rights for authors. Neither 
does it specifically amend the old ones.399 Thus it needs to be evaluated on what 
possible copyright liability of intermediaries could be based on.
Although the headline of Section 4 of the E-commerce directive indicates that 
intermediaries may be held liable, none of the articles (12 – 15) under it define 
any new right or amend old rights granted for copyright holders. Instead, on the 
contrary, all articles under the headline define exemptions for intermediaries 
from possible liability. For example, Article 12 exempts under certain conditions 
services that provide access and enable communication of recipients of the service 
in networks.400 Article 13 (for ‘Caching’) exempts under certain conditions services 
making transmissions in communication networks conducted by recipients of the 
service more efficient by temporarily storing the transmitted information.401 Article 
14 on certain conditions exempts services that consist of the storage of information 
(‘Hosting’) for recipients of the service.402 It could also be mentioned that both 
Articles 13 and 14 provide that Internet Service providers are not liable if they 
expeditiously remove or disable access to information after they have obtained 
actual knowledge regarding the unlawful nature of the information. Article 15, on 
399 For example, when the Infosoc directive was implemented in Finland it was specifically stated that no new measures or 
rights were introduced under the scope of already existing exclusive rights. See Government Bill 28/2004, p. 77.
400 Service providers under Article 12 of the E-commerce directive are exempted if it a) does not initiate the transmission, 
b) does not select the receiver of the transmission; and c) does not select or modify the information contained in the 
transmission. See Article 12 of  the E-Commerce directive.
401 These service providers are exempted on condition that a) the provider does not modify the information, b) the provider 
complies with conditions on access to the information c) the provider complies with rules regarding the updating of the 
information, specified in a manner widely recognized and used by industry, d) the provider does not interfere with the 
lawful use of technology, widely recognized and used by industry, to obtain data on the use of the information; and e) the 
provider acts expeditiously to remove or disable access to the information it has stored upon obtaining actual knowledge 
of the fact that the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network, or access to 
it has been disabled, or that a court or an administrative authority has ordered such removal or disablement. See Article 
13 of the E-commerce directive.
402 Services are exempted under Article 14 of the E-Commerce directive, on condition that a) the provider does not have actual 
knowledge of illegal activity or information and; as regards claims for damages, is not aware of facts or circumstances 
from which the illegal activity or information is apparent; or b) the provider, upon obtaining such knowledge or awareness, 
acts expeditiously to remove or to disable access to the information.
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the other hand, provides that Intermediaries do not have a general obligation to 
monitor the communication processes conducted by recipients of the services. 
Thus neither the headline nor the Articles under the section 4 of E-commerce 
directive specifically define any new exclusive rights extending copyright liability 
to intermediaries. In this respect it seems that the headline of the section 4 of the 
directive furtively attempts to expand scope of copyright protection by granting 
intermediaries exemptions from liability without defining on what the liability is 
based on in the first place. 
It is clear that this type of unclear extension of rights is problematic as it is 
difficult to see that a mere sentence in the headline of Section 4 of the E-commerce 
directive stating “liability of intermediary service providers” could be clear enough 
to define when intermediaries should be held liable especially when we keep in 
mind that it is already somewhat unclear who intermediaries are to begin with. 
For example, it might be asked again what intermediaries should do regarding 
their own property, if they are held liable.403 Should they limit or stop using their 
own property through an argument that they are using someone else’s property? 
If so, does such a court ruling change the concept of property if an intermediary is 
banned from using merely his/her own property (or forced to amend his/her own 
software)? In other words, obscure expansion of possible liability to intermediaries 
causes a phenomenon, which in the words of Pihlajarinne may be described as a 
“concept crisis”.404 It is clear that the situation is problematic also from the viewpoint 
of legality principle of criminal law necessitating, inter alia, that norms stipulating 
criminal liability should be clear and ascertainable.405 To the extent “liability of 
403 As explained, several search engines use the ©-sign although it is not necessary for copyright protection. In fact, also 
homepage and software of the notorious file sharing service The Pirate Bay easily exceeds required level for copyright 
protection. In case (2010:47, “The Finnish Pirate Bay”) the Supreme Court of Finland described that the respondents 
had maintained a “web/net” instead of speculated whether the service could be considered as property in itself although 
programming and www-page of the service most likely easily exceeded required level for copyright protection. The 
Supreme Court in Finland neither accepted that the respondents could have avoided the responsibility by removing illegal 
information as provided by the E-commerce directive. This leaves it open whether services such as YouYube are legal in 
Finland or not. 
404 See Pihlajarinnne, p. 15. Also Ole-Andreas Rognstad has suggested that it might be reasonable to resign from operating 
with concepts such as reproduction and making content available to the public. See Ole-Andreas Rognstad, Opphavsrettens 
innhold i en multimedieverden – om tradisjonelle opphavsrettsbegrepers møte med digital teknologi. Nordisk Immateriellt 
Rättskydd 6/2009, p. 540–543. 
405 It could be mentioned that recital 54 of the E-commerce directive provides that “Member States are not obligated to provide 
criminal sanctions for infringement of national provisions adopted pursuant to this Directive.” This has not prevented 
member states from applying criminal sanctions. In the Swedish Pirate Bay case (see e.g. Svea hovrätt case B 4041-09 
and case no. B 13301-06T of the District Court of Stockholm) and its Finnish equivalent (Supreme Court case 2010:47) 
the courts considered that the services providers were accomplices to committed crimes. In Sweden intermediaries were 
considered to aid and bet a crime whereas in Finland they persons were considered to be directly involved with the 
crimes committed by others. Thus in both cases liability was reasoned through acts committed by others with the help 
of criminal law. Thus the problem of the rulings from the viewpoint of legality principle is that criminal law does not 
expand economic rights of authors. The challenge of the decisions may be especially seen when evaluating protected 
expressions through traditional formal/casuistic reading of copyright law: As in theory even one word may exceed required 
level for copyright protection the decisions are clearly problematic from the viewpoint of legality principle as both of 
the services easily exceed required level for copyright protection. This reveals how courts have neglected to address the 
cases from the viewpoint of the respondents as it is unclear what respondents should do with their own property after 
the convictions. Moreover, it remains unclear how the cases could be addressed e.g. in arbitral tribunals, which as a rule 
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intermediary service providers” is accepted, it seems that economic rights of authors 
are accordingly being expanded in an obscure way to intermediaries who have not 
traditionally been regarded as users. 
Services providing platform and software for prosumers to record 
and watch (later) television broadcasts over Internet may be used as a 
concrete example related to the problem of defining possible liability 
of a possible intermediary. Firstly, it is possible to consider that a 
prosumer using such service merely produces a private copy on the 
platform offered by the service provider. If the platform has not been 
defined to belong under the scope of a platform fee system, such use 
would not be relevant from the viewpoint of copyright at all. Secondly, 
if it is considered that the platform fee system extends to these 
platforms, prosumers should pay compensation for the use. Thirdly, 
if it is regarded that prosumers are not liable for using the service, it 
may be asked if the service provider is as an internet intermediary 
who should be held liable instead. If this is the case, it may be asked if 
it could exempt itself from liability as an intermediary by complying 
with a request to expeditiously remove or disable access to information 
after having obtained actual knowledge regarding unlawful nature of 
the information. Alternatively, it could be asked if the service provider 
is a normal user who needs permission from a right holder without 
possibilities to exempt itself from liability as an intermediary.406 
Traditional strict and literal reading of copyright postulates that in 
order to determine who is liable one should rigorously evaluate whether 
the copies are being produced by individual prosumers or the company 
in question. 
Finally, if we regardless of the mentioned problems consider that intermediaries 
should be held liable due to acts committed by others such as prosumers, the 
remaining question to be answered is whether they could obtain permissions from 
are unable to apply criminal law. It should also be noted that the Pirate Bay and similar services are not problematic for 
right holders as such: they are problematic only because they are used by prosumers in a manner, which is not desired by 
all right holders. It could also be noted that Article 8(3) of the Infosoc directive obligates Member States to “ensure that 
right holders are in a position to apply for an injunction against intermediaries whose services are used by a third party 
to infringe a copyright or related right.” However, it is difficult to see such injunctions as extensions of economic rights 
of authors.
406 In the last case, it easily becomes problematic for the service provider to ask adequate permissions (especially as the Infosoc 
directive prevents enacting new limitations for new forms of commercial use). This is because no company acting in a 
described manner would able to constantly ask permissions on behalf of each of its individual user wishing to record a 
certain tv-program broadcasted from a certain tv-channel. For this reason if services such as these are considered directly 
liable, copyright law does not function as postulated as it would be impossible for users to use content. This would mean 
that users were unable to operate and no right holder to obtain compensations. It would also mean that members of the 
society could neither benefit from these types of services. In such situation we would indeed be “maximizing misery”.
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right holders on behalf of prosumers who use their services. Evaluating this question 
is especially relevant when examining the possibilities to secure the rights of authors 
and the right to science and culture as provided by Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 
of the ICESCR. 
8.4.  POSSIBILITIES OF INTERMEDIARIES TO ASK PERMISSIONS 
ON BEHALF OF PROSUMERS
At first it should be remembered that if intermediaries had to ask permissions for 
themselves, they would be users rather than intermediaries. Thus, the question 
that shall be evaluated is whether use of content by prosumers in the services of 
intermediaries could be enabled through contracts between intermediaries and right 
holders. The theoretical challenge related to this type of solution is that as prosumers 
would not be directly parties to these contracts. Consequently a norm liberating a 
prosumer from copyright liability – including possible criminal sanctions – would 
not be provided by law or a fundamental right such as Article 27(1) of the UDHR. 
Instead it would come from a contract between two private entities, which often 
are large corporations. This would literally question the meaning of such rights as 
provided by e.g. Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR as private entities 
would decide whether certain acts of prosumers are legal or not. 
Nevertheless, one could consider that the problem remains theoretical if 
intermediaries and right holders could in practice conclude transactions enabling 
prosumers to use content on the services of the intermediaries. Certain intermediaries 
have also concluded contracts regarding use of content on the service of the 
intermediary. These contracts have been concluded between intermediaries and 
corporations owning rights to larger quantities of content and consequently do not 
represent individual authors directly. For example, Google/YouTube has concluded 
contracts with certain record labels and collecting management organizations 
regarding use of music videos.407 Thus, it may be asked whether these types of 
contracts could enable prosumers to use content on the services of the intermediary. 
As no researcher is able to go through all possible contracts intermediaries may 
have concluded with right holders (even if allowed), possible legal structure of such 
contracts may at best be generally estimated. Firstly, if a contract addresses merely 
relationship between an intermediary (e.g. YouTube) and a particular right holder 
(e.g. a record company) to use the right holder’s content on a platform provided by 
the intermediary, a prosumer is not a party to the contract as the contract has been 
concluded between an intermediary and a right holder. Thus the right holder itself 
407 See e.g. Wikipedia for YouTube, available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/YouTube and Vevo, available at: http://
en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vevo. 
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should be the broadcaster/user using services of the intermediary. An intermediary 
cannot be the user/broadcaster as it would make it the user instead of being an 
intermediary. Thus, in practice, in this type of solution the intermediary and the 
right holder would merely have a contract regarding the use of the platform and 
software of the intermediary. Consequently, this type of solution could not solve 
problems related to possibilities of prosumers to make content available to the 
public. Another thing is if the right holder allows prosumers to post same content 
on the platform of the intermediary. In such a situation the right holder grants an 
implied license to the prosumer who would be the user in question i.e. it would not 
be the intermediary asking permission on behalf of the prosumer.
Secondly, one may contemplate if intermediaries should ask permissions from 
right holders on behalf of prosumers. Although the idea may sound appealing it 
would face certain practical challenges to outcome. This is because, if the Internet 
is understood as an open network which may be joined anytime by anyone, it is 
questionable how any intermediary could obtain information before the prosumer 
posts a certain piece of content onto the service of the intermediary. It simply is 
difficult to see how any auction platform provider, search engine, blogger, social 
media platform or a content aggregator could know what content shall be posted 
onto its servers in the future in order to ask necessary permissions beforehand 
from adequate right holders. It could be argued that and intermediary should allow 
posting content on its service only after moderation/filtering process. However, if 
that is the case, the service is not open but closed in its nature contrary to how the 
Internet as an open network has been understood in this book. 
Moreover, even if intermediaries such as YouTube could obtain proxies from all 
individual prosumers who in future shall post content of certain rights holder onto 
their services, the next challenge would be reaching all the relevant right holders 
in order to ask permissions and distribute compensations to them accordingly.408 
Moreover, although contacting right holders owning large quantities of content 
should not be problematic, there would be major problems as it pertains to 
contacting the rest of the right holders, especially globally. Keeping in mind that 
in an information society we all are easily right holders, the problems of requiring 
individual permissions becomes evident: intermediaries should in theory constantly 
ask beforehand permissions from everyone as it is possible that everyone’s content 
may be used on the services of the intermediary in the future. Or vice versa, it 
is difficult to see how we all as right holders could constantly grant licenses to 
intermediaries in order that others could possibly post our content on the services of 
the intermediary in the future. Therefore, it is difficult to see how any intermediary 
408 In theory permissions should be constantly asked e.g. from each individual artist, lyricist, composer etc of each band 
whose music is being posted on YouTube, which obviously would be an impossible task in practice. 
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could comprehensively ask prior permissions on behalf of right holders as it pertains 
to use of content in open networks.
8.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
Due to the challenges of defining who intermediaries specifically are and when 
they should be held liable for possible copyright infringements it shall be argued 
that extending liability to intermediaries largely seems to be a political problem. 
Challenges related to the situation can in practice be seen from the variety of case law 
drawing to different directions.409 It simply is challenging to claim that a mere clause 
“Liability of Intermediary Service Providers” could sufficiently define who and when 
should be held liable. It is also difficult to see that intermediaries could ask prior 
permissions on behalf of prosumers willing to use content on their services in open 
networks as it is difficult to see how an intermediary could ask necessary permissions 
before a certain prosumers uses certain content. If masses of information are being 
used through the service of the intermediary it would also become a challenge to 
distribute adequate remunerations to adequate right holders.410 The situation is 
challenging also from the viewpoint of the legality principle in the criminal law and 
from the viewpoint of the right to privacy and freedom of expression. Whether tools 
for collective administration of content provide functional solutions for prosumers 
to obtain permissions in order use content on the Internet shall be examined next.
409 See e.g. Cédric Manara, Searching for a Coherent Copyright Regime in the Area of Search Engines, IPRinfo 5/2010, 
available at: http://www.iprinfo.com/julkaisut/iprinfo-lehti/lehtiarkisto/2010/IPRinfo_5-2010/fi_FI/Searching_for_a_
Coherent_Copyright_Regime_in_the_Area_of_Search_Engines/.Regarding various cases see also Pihlajarinne (passim). 
410 In case one does not accept the above analysis it may be suggested that a minimum requirement for possible liability of 
internet intermediaries is that they fail to comply with a request to expeditiously remove or disable access to information 
after they have obtained actual knowledge regarding unlawful nature of the information. 
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9   COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION OF CONTENT 
AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
Collective administration of content may be divided into collective licensing and 
so called platform fees. This chapter evaluates Nordic collective licenses from the 
viewpoint of fundamental rights whereas platform fees shall be evaluated in the 
light of fundamental rights in chapter 11.
9.1. COLLECTIVISTIC STANDPOINTS AND COPYRIGHT
9.1.1. IN GENERAL
When evaluating the collective administration of copyrighted content it should first 
be noted that collective administration of content is already by definition opposite 
to individual administration of content. In theory, collective administration of 
content as a complete opposite to individual administration should consist of a single 
collective body administering – “owning” – all kinds of works. If such a collective 
system was based on exclusive rights, every member of the information society 
should ask permission from the collective in order to use publicly any expression 
exceeding required threshold for protection. As there would be no individual rights, 
the collective could distribute collected compensations as it would see fit. Moreover, 
in a society where everyone is a creator and user of content (although they would 
do not own rights to their productions), a collective would also need to have the 
power to oversee everyone’s use of expressions. Otherwise an exclusive right to 
administer expressions would remain a theory. Through extensive supervision over 
used expressions – possibly even singular words – this type of society would easily 
end up resembling the society as described by Orwell in Nineteen Eighty-Four.411 
It could be mentioned that the situation would be quite similar even if there was 
several collectives administering expressions from different fields of art or science. 
The role of individuals would still remain irrelevant although there would be more 
than one collective administering use of expressions.
However, no collective copyright theories exist in the Western countries. 
However, “collectivistic standpoints” have been favored elsewhere. According to 
Kivimäki especially countries where democratic state systems were replaced by 
absolute systems favored limiting exclusive rights of authors on collective grounds.412 
411 See George Orwell, Nineteen Eighty-Four, London 1949. See also Wikipedia for Big Brother (Nineteen Eighty-Four: 
available at: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Big_Brother_%28Nineteen_Eighty-Four%29. 
412 Kivimäki was a professor of civil law, but also the prime minister of Finland from December 1932 to October 1936. In 
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For example, National Socialists in Hitler’s Germany and the old Soviet Union saw 
copyright more as a socially bound collective right.413 Välimäki has described the 
system in the former socialist countries  in the following way:
“In large scale collective compensation systems were used in the former 
socialist countries where they covered basically all kind of works. 
Although it is difficult to judge the relevance of socialist copyright to 
the recent discussion on digital copyright, it is interesting to learn how 
their system was designed. In Soviet Union authors were compensated 
according to royalties set in the government regulation. Factors 
that affected the royalty rate of e.g. books were its length, genre, 
copies printed, and the quality determined by the state. Royalty rate 
didn’t depend on the price of copies sold. The soviet system aimed 
to compensate authors as other workers based mainly on the quality 
and quantity of their output. Unfortunately, the system didn’t work 
in practice that way. Secondary issues like the number of characters 
in the work became sometimes determining factors. There was also 
clear incentive to overprinting. Nor was the system equal; in practice 
some well known and government favoured authors were exempted 
from the state set schedule and received higher royalties compared to 
others. So while the pricing system based on private royalties might not 
work optimally, it is difficult to find any historical evidence supporting 
collective compensation systems either.”414
Due to the problematic features related to collective administration in the light of 
individualistic copyright theory it is not surprising that copyright law’s preliminary 
material and legal literary in Finland has often regarded with criticism collective 
licenses, which are one form of collective administration.415 Kivimäki even stated 
1948 he wrote the first comprehensive book (“Tekijänoikeus” or “Author’s Right” if translated into English) evaluating 
copyright and theories behind it. For long time it has also been the only one describing individualistic and collective 
theories in Finland in more detail. See Kivimäki, p. 60 ff.
413 Kivimäki, p. 65–67. 
414 Mikko Välimäki, a doctoral dissertation: The Rice of Open Source Licensing. A Challenge to the Use of Intellectual 
Property in the Software Industry. Turre Publishing. Helsinki 2005. In his book Välimäki refers to Michael A. Newcity, 
Copyright Law in the Soviet Union. Praeger Publishers, New York, 1978. It could be mentioned that Kivimäki does not 
elaborate collective theories in more detail.
415 For example, Haarmann has stated that the second legal committee of the parliament barely dared to accept government’s 
proposal for a collective license in photocopying. In the report the committee among other things stated that “for now 
one has not been able to provide a better functioning system than the contractual license system”. See Pirkko – Liisa 
Haarmann, Tekijänoikeus & Lähioikeudet, 1999 and Committee Report 13/1980 (II LaVM 13/1980). See also dissenting 
opinions of Markku Tyynila and Matti Anderzén (where they required evaluating their principally problematic features of 
the contractual licensing system and criticized the law for becoming more detailed and confusing) in Committee Report 
1990:31. Finally see a letter 18.2.2003 of The Committee for Education and Culture where it specifically stated to the 
Ministry of Education that questions related to the extensity of the contractual licensing system should be reconsidered. 
See also Martin Kretschmer, The Failure of Property Rules in Collective Administration: Rethinking Copyright Societies 
as Regulatory Instruments, E.I.P.R Issue 3, Sweet & Maxwell Limited (2002), p. 132 – 135. It should be mentioned that 
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that copyright system is in crisis, if collective administration systems are being 
introduced.416 
Despite the theoretical problems related to collective compensation mechanisms, 
their use have increased in the wake of technological development. Consequently, 
it may be asked how collective administration of copyrighted content has been 
conducted in practice as opposite to individual administration and how power used 
through collective administration posits itself from the viewpoint of fundamental 
rights. 
9.1.2. BACKGROUND IN NORDIC COUNTRIES
Following the international conventions and droit d’ auteur copyright theory, a 
starting point in the Nordic countries are exclusive rights granted to individual 
authors. No theory for collective rights or administration has been introduced. 
Nonetheless, collective licenses exist in the Nordic countries. They have been 
founded due to practical reasons in cases where it has been regarded impossible 
for individual authors and users to conclude direct transactions with each other.417 
This is noteworthy as from the viewpoint of fundamental rights impossibility to 
administer use of content individually already questions foundations for granting 
exclusive rights to individuals as natural persons. In short: why should people 
honor fundamental rights protection based on exclusive rights granted to individual 
authors, if an assumption is that it is impossible for individual authors to enjoy 
those exclusive rights in order to secure their essential economic interests? In other 
words, the impossibility of individual administration as a justification for collective 
licensing creates a paradox related to collective administration, which derives power 
from rights granted to individuals.418 This leads to asking how collective licensing 
has been legally justified.
Kretschmer does not specifically examine the Nordic collective licenses, but presents his criticism in general on a more 
theoretical level.
416 Kivimäki, p, 66–67, especially footnote 4 where he described the effect of collective licenses in the following way: 
“Without intention to deny that author’s economical interest may become reasonably compensated through a compulsory 
license and royalty system, one cannot admit that after enforcement of the mentioned or comparable arrangements, the 
author whose work may be reproduced against his will, would be the master of his work, which is the idea the Berne 
Convention is based on.” Although Kivimäki refers by name only to compulsory licenses, it may be understood that he 
refers also to contractual licenses (containing an exclusive element) when mentioning “or comparable arrangements” sine 
when Kivimäki’s book was there were no paragraphs in the Nordic copyright laws regarding contractual licensing i.e. the 
term was not in use at the time (1948) when Kivimäki wrote his book. 
417 See e.g. Government Bill 23/1960, p. 3 – 4 and Government Bill 28/2004 vp., p. 62. Koskinen-Olsson, p. 284, WIPO, 
Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, Geneve, p. 3 – 4, available at: http://www.wipo.int/freepublications/
en/copyright/450/wipo_pub_l450cm.pdf, Vilanka, p. 140 – 141 and Mihály Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright 
and Related Rights, WIPO Publication No. 855 (E) (hereafter Ficsor), p. 16 and similarly Mihály Ficsor, Collective 
Management of Copyright and Related rights from the Viewpoint of International Norms and the Acquis Communauttaire, 
published in Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, second edition, (eds.) Daniel Gervais, Kluwer Law 
International BV 2010 (hereafter Ficsor II), p. 29–30. See also Gervais 2010, p. 4. 
418 Consequently it is not surprising when Martin Kretschmer (who does not specifically examine Scandinavian collective 
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The foundations of Nordic collectives licenses lay on the freedom of contract, 
which is also accepted in recital 30 of the Infosoc Directive stating that: “The 
rights referred to in this Directive may be transferred, assigned or subject to the 
granting of contractual licenses, without prejudice to the relevant national legislation 
on copyright and related rights.” In other words, the basic assumption in the 
Nordic collective licensing systems is that a right holder accepts that individual 
administration of rights is impossible and assigns his/her rights to a collective 
management organization (CMO). The paradox created by the arrangement is 
that formal reading of copyright law does not make any difference regardless of 
whether the right holder is a CMO or an individual author.419 In the assignment 
contracts, CMOs also reserve wide rights from individuals to decide about the use of 
assigned rights in order to grant licenses to users although collected compensations 
should be distributed to individuals.420 As a result, users ought to obtain necessary 
permissions and individual right holders should receive compensations. Provided 
this happens, collective licenses fulfill their task as they benefit both the individual 
right holders and the users.421 
Functional collective licensing arrangements have also existed. In this respect it 
is not surprising that also recital 18 of the Infosoc Directive refers to a possibility of 
extended collective licensing. However, it is still unclear whether freedom of contract 
enables us to grant fundamental rights protection to collective administration in 
a similar manner as individual authors are protected. Consequently the role of 
collective management organizations in relation to individual authors shall be 
examined next.
licenses but collective administration in general) states that: “the collective administration of [...] copyrights does not 
straightforwardly reflect a single underlying concept of private property – perhaps not even a notion of copyright as 
property.” See Martin Kretschmer, The Failure of Property Rules in Collective Administration: Rethinking Copyright 
Societies as Regulatory Instruments, E.I.P.R Issue 3, Sweet & Maxwell Limited 2002, p. 132 – 135. See also Kivimäki 
who stated that adopting collective licensing systems would lead to the crisis of the individualistic copyright system. See 
Kivimäki, p. 66 and especially footnote 4. 
419 However, it should be noted that other regulations such as e.g. competition law may set limitations to activites of CMOs.
420 See e.g. Kopiosto’s (2§), Teosto’s (3§) and Gramex’s (2§) contracts for transfer of rights. They all stipulate that it is left to 
the society to decide to what extent the CMO’s represent their customers. Referred contracts are available in Finnish on 
the homepages of the mentioned societies. In fact, members of collectives should in theory ask permissions from CMOs 
also in order to use their own content if regarded possible despite the opposite assumption. If no permission was required 
for using one’s own content, a member could put his or her content openly available for everybody obscuring the purpose 
of having exclusive rights. For example, Teosto (a Finnish Composer’s Copyright Society) offers on certain conditions 
licenses to its own members for using their own music on the Internet. See (only in Finnish): http://www.teosto.fi/teosto/
websivut.nsf/7d7cb8d7c8ceffa0c22565c9004cf780/c42fe8c067eacd05c22575cc00285258!OpenDocument. It is possible 
that CMO’s have different types of customer contracts and reciprocal representation agreements.
421 Another thing is that users would most likely often prefer completely free use i.e. not to ask permissions or pay compensations 
at all. 
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9.2.  COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT ORGANIZATIONS AND 
POSITION OF AUTHORS
As individual authors assign their rights to CMOs it is CMOs who conduct the 
administration of rights in practice. CMOs are legal persons, which often are 
monopolies having also other legal persons as members.422 Already this indicates that 
CMOs as legal persons seem to fall outside fundamental rights protection aiming to 
protect certain essential rights (“essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, 
of basic shelter and housing …”) of authors as natural persons. CMOs neither create, 
copy nor communicate any content as postulated by the individualistic copyright 
theory.423 They neither need to have any content themselves nor necessarily even 
knowledge of precise whereabouts of exact pieces of content used by users.424 It 
would also be impossible for them to take into consideration individual opinions of 
thousands of right holders in each licensing situation. If this was possible, individual 
licensing should be possible too. Leading role of CMOs may also be read from a 
statement of the managing director of Teosto (a Finnish Composers’ copyright 
society) who has described objectives of CMOs in a following manner: “Premises 
and objectives of CMOs are based on collective administration, which also defines 
its means and possibilities to act. A CMO is not an agent for individual customers, 
but acts on behalf of the collective it represents”.425 In fact even if all the individuals 
in CMOs would constantly have mutual understanding regarding administration of 
content, the understanding would not be an opinion of an individual, but opinion 
of a collective. Consequently it may be described that the administration of rights 
by CMOs in practice creates a “collective power”, which is separate from individual 
administration.426
There are certain rulings that pose limitations to CMOs. In GEMA 
ruling Commission stated that CMOs cannot reserve rights from 
422 In this respect see e.g. Vilanka 2010 (passim) and Olli Vilanka, Nordic Extended Collective Licensing – a Solution for 
Educational and Scientific Users and Prosumers to Copy and Make Content Available on the Internet, (hereafter Vilanka 
2012) published in Business Law Forum, Vantaa 2012, p. 263 – 264. It could also be mentioned that status of right holders 
in CMOs may vary. Some may are members whereas some are customers of CMOs.
423  In theory they of course communicate e.g. their own homepages and other information created by their employees. They 
also may have archives for certain types of works, but their business is not based on mentioned types of content.
424 For example, a location of a printer or a computer hard drive (etc.) producing a certain copy is irrelevant from a right 
holder’s perspective. In theory even the address of a possible user is meaningless, if the user in question pays adequate 
compensations to the CMO. 
425 See Teosto’s response “Tekijänoikeuden suuntaviivoja” to the Ministry of Education and Culture’s request for comment, 
p.8 (authors translation), available at (in Finnish): 
 http://teosto.fi/teosto/websivut.nsf/0/2aab350e34f23dcbc22572ea00297f5d/$FILE/OPM%20
Tekij%C3%A4noikeuden%20suuntaviivoja%20280507.pdf. See similarly also Huuskonen, p. 193 – 194. 
426 It could already at this point also be mentioned that for this reason it is difficult to draw distinction from an individual 
author’s perspective between collective licensing based on liability rules (i.e. to rules such as compulsory licensing entitling 
authors to obtain mere compensations) and exclusive collective exercise of rights: in both cases individual authors who 
have assigned their rights to CMOs have accepted that individual administration of rights is not possible and they may at 
best expect to get compensations. 
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authors unreasonably widely.427 For example, it was not considered 
reasonable to demand authors to assign all their current and future 
rights globally. Discriminating against authors based on the duration 
of membership and nationality was problematic also. In so called Daft 
Punk-case Commission stated that regarding use of content on the 
Internet CMOs should allow authors administer rights individually.428 
The rule may be derogated on reasoned and objective grounds. Recital 
9 of the proposal for Directive on Collectives429 also seems to place 
individual administration of rights as the main rule as it pertains 
to relationship between individual and collective administration of 
rights. The proposal for Directive on Collectives in Article 6(3) also 
states collecting societies should provide appropriate and effective 
mechanisms of participation for their members as it pertains to 
decision making processes of collecting societies. However, despite this 
it has been argued that in practice role of individual authors should 
be rather petty.430 Such arguments contradict GEMA and Draft Punk 
rulings, the Directive on Collectives emphasizing role of individuals and 
individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory. If disputes arise case 
law should provide guidance to the question in the future.
However, not all authors assign their rights to be administered collectively. 
Nevertheless they may be affected by collective administration. In the Nordic 
countries this happens through extended collective licenses. Consequently position 
of these “non-affiliate” right holders shall be evaluated next.
9.3.  COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION AND RIGHTS OF NON-
AFFILIATE RIGHT HOLDERS
Non-affiliate authors are all authors and legal persons owning copyrighted content 
who have not assigned their rights to any CMO. In this respect the book has already 
evaluated the position of right holders in an author – prosumer relationship and legal 
person – prosumer-relationship. However, how should we understand rights of right 
holders in cases the legislator already itself suggests that individual administration 
427 See GEMA I (OJ L 134/15, 20.6.1971) and GEMA II (OJ L 166/22, 24.7.1972).
428 Banghalter & Homem Christo v. SACEM (COMP/C2/32.219, 12.8.2002).
429 A proposal for a Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on collective management of copyright and 
related rights and multi-territorial licensing of rights in musical works for online uses in the internal market, Brussels, 
11.7.2012, COM(2012) 372 final, recital 9.
430 For example, according to Kivistö possibilities of authors to “tailor” what rights are assigned to CMOs in practice are rather 
narrow. See Martti Kivistö, Tekijän ja järjestön välinen perussuhde tekijänoikeuksien kollektiivihallinnossa, published in 
Lakimies 7 – 8/2013, p. 1254.
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of rights is not possible by enacting a collective license, but an individual author 
does not assign his/her rights to a collective? 
As explained, enacting a legal tool for collective administration of rights on the 
grounds that individual administration is not possible already questions rationality 
of having individual rights in the first place. In fact, precisely for this reason the 
analysis in this book earlier suggested that use should be exempted from copyright 
in cases when concluding individual transactions is not possible. Thus, according 
to this view, legislators should not secure essential economic rights of authors by 
granting exclusive rights to them if administering those exclusive rights is considered 
impossible. 
This has also been the solution in some of the cases when Nordic collective 
licenses have been enacted as there are two types of Nordic collective licenses, 
namely a compulsory and a contractual license. The main difference between the 
compulsory and the contractual license is that the compulsory license allows use 
against compensation (i.e. forms a liability rule), whereas the contractual license 
retains an element of exclusivity as it necessitates permission from a CMO prior to 
use. This means that through a compulsory license the legislator has superseded 
exclusive rights.431
However, also a contractual license may extend its effects to non-affiliate 
right holders. If this is the case a contractual license is referred to as an extended 
contractual license as it extends its effects to non-affiliates. The extension exists 
because never all the right holders assign their rights to a CMO from their particular 
field of art or science.432 In other words, if collective licenses do not have the extended 
effect the result would be that due to masses of information especially users interested 
in using large quantities of content would be unable to obtain a license from a CMO 
with sufficient coverage as it would not be possible for the user to sort out from the 
information mass content of those authors who have not assigned their rights to the 
CMO in question. Consequently, without an extended effect users would inevitably 
end up violating rights of non-affiliates or, alternatively, should refrain from using 
content at all in order not to violate rights of those who have not assigned their 
rights to the CMO in question. Neither of the options is desirable as the first would 
endanger rights of non-affiliates and the second rights of affiliates and users.433 
431 In practice CMOs administer use of content although a compulsory license is used. A user still needs to agree on the level 
of compensation with a CMO administering use as described by a certain paragraph for a compulsory license as it would 
not be possible to agree on the price of use individually with each right holder.
432 There may be many reasons not to assign rights to a CMO (in theory every non-affiliate may have a reason of his/her own). 
According to Ficsor “the repertoire of works in respect to which a CMO has been explicitly given the power to manage 
exclusive rights, in fact, is never truly an entire world repertoire (because, in certain countries, there are no appropriate 
partner organizations to conclude reciprocal representation agreements, or because certain authors do not trust and CMO 
with the exercise of their rights). Ficsor II, p. 60–61. See also Gervais 2010, p. 4. 
433 Rights of affiliates would be endangered because they could not obtain compensations through licensing as the user could 
not buy the license. It could be mentioned that in Denmark it seems that a user has an option to decide whether it wants 
a contractual license with the extended effect of not. See Tarja Koskinen-Olsson, Collective Management in the Nordic 
Countries, published in Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, Second Edition, edited by Daniel Gervais. 
Kluwer Law International 2010, p. 302 – 303. 
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Thus, this dilemma has been solved by extending the effect of collective licenses to 
non-affiliate right holders in certain occasions through paragraphs extending the 
effect of contractual licenses. 
The extension limits de jure rights of non-affiliates emphasizing the paradox of 
applying individualistic copyright theory based on exclusive rights if rights are de 
facto administered collectively. In order to alleviate effects of this limitation to rights 
of non-affiliates certain additional rights have been granted to non-affiliate right 
holders. Consequently, it needs to be evaluated whether these rights are capable 
of protecting fundamental rights of non-affiliates.
9.3.1. A NON-AFFILIATE AND A SEPARATE RIGHT TO COMPENSATION
A separate right to compensation is the first attempt to secure position of non-
affiliates in an extended collective licensing system. It means that a non-affiliate 
has a right to ask compensations for use of his/her content from a CMO, which 
collected the compensations from a user. The right exists regardless of whether a 
compulsory license or an extended contractual license has been enacted.
However, despite the right to compensation it is difficult to see that the position 
of a non-affiliate could be as strong as a member’s position. For example, non-
affiliates do not receive any information whether their content has been used or 
not. A non-affiliate’s right to collect compensation also expires unless it is used 
during a certain time period. For example, in Finland and Sweden the right expires 
unless a demand for compensation is made within three years counted from the end 
of the year when the use took place. One should also be able to demonstrate that 
the use took place. Although CMOs occasionally have itemized reporting systems 
regarding certain forms of use (e.g. for radio and television broadcasts), in other 
occasions information regarding used content is based on studies applying sampling 
as a method. Thus, it is clear that no one can provide evidence of all of the possible 
events where a certain piece of content may have been used, but non-affiliates may 
at best have haphazard information regarding the use of their content. If the burden 
of proof that the use took place between CMOs and non-affiliates is placed on a 
non-affiliate, it is clear that their possibility to claim compensation is often non-
existent. Therefore, it is not surprising that the right to claim compensation is rather 
rarely used and especially for foreign non-affiliates often remains as a theoretical 
possibility. For example, according to Koskinen-Olsson in 2004 Teosto (a Finnish 
Composers’ Society) represented thorough reciprocal representation agreements 
the total of 48.198 right holders and 6.275 (i.e. approximately 13%) of them were 
non-represented (i.e. non-affiliates). Despite this Teosto allocated only 3, 1% of the 
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revenues to non-affiliates.434 In addition, according to my own interviews, clearly 
less is often paid to non-affiliates.435 
This indicates that a non-affiliate’s right to compensation is a rather theoretical 
right. It protects non-affiliates as a fundamental right only if it secures their 
essential interests. There is no evidence suggesting that this would be the case.436 
Consequently, it is difficult to see that the separate right to compensation could 
function as a securer of fundamental rights protection for non-affiliate authors 
although it in certain cases might in theory end up securing essential interests 
of individual non-affiliates. In practice, CMOs often end up keeping the collected 
compensations of non-affiliate authors as they only rarely seem to be collected. 
9.3.2. A NON-AFFILIATE AND A SEPARATE RIGHT TO OPT OUT
A right to opt out from the license (or “ban the use”) in the extended contractual 
licensing system is the second separate right granted to non-affiliates. It grants a 
non-affiliate the right to opt out from the license granted by a CMO, if specifically 
stated in a paragraph providing a contractual license.437 
From the viewpoint of fundamental rights, the role of the right to opt out is 
curious as it is difficult to see that the right to opt-out would have much relevance 
when evaluated as a tool protecting essential economical interests of authors. This 
is because an exclusive right is granted to authors in order to secure their essential 
economical interests through individual transactions. Now, a right to opt from a 
license already itself implies that concluding a transaction in order to secure basic 
economic interests of the author is not on the mind of an author as s/he is on the 
contrary opting out from a license. It may be argued that the author possibly wants 
to opt out from the collective license in order to conclude a direct transaction with 
better terms with the user in question. However, such an argument is close to theory 
as justification for collective licensing is impossibility of individual licensing. It is also 
434 Koskinen–Olsson, p. 297. 
435 According to my interviews two CMOs (Teosto and Kopiosto) in Finland both distributed approximately 10.000 (ten 
thousand) euros annually to non-affiliates, which is insignificant amount in comparison to collected compensations 
(approximately 40 – 45 million annually by the referred CMOs). See in more detail Vilanka, Chapter 4. However, see 
also next footnote.
436 For example, there has been one publicly discussed case in Finland in which a large group of well known British artists 
(according to some sources such as Elton John and Paul McCartney) had organized themselves under an agency (Rights 
Agency Ltd/RAL) and claimed compensations from Gramex (a CMO in Finland for performing artists and phonogram 
producers) as non-affiliates. It is possible that if these types of cases increase, amounts of paid compensations to non-
affiliates may end up being higher especially in comparison to cases where individual authors as “average Joes” attempt 
to collect them. However, it is difficult to see that such cases would protect essential interests of recipient authors if their 
essential economic interests’ are already secured as if often case regarding well known authors. The RAL v. Gramex case 
was settled before it went to court and consequently no public information regarding distributed compensations exists.
437 It should be mentioned that a compulsory licenses do not acknowledge a separate possibility to opt out/ban the use for a 
non-affiliate as such a right would undo the purpose of the compulsory license, which allows use against compensation. 
Or alternatively opting out would mean that a right holder decides not to collect any compensations at all.
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difficult to see that an individual author as a natural person could be in a position 
to negotiate better terms of use in order to secure his/her essential interests than 
a CMO, which in Europe are monopolies in their respective fields of art or science. 
There are also other severe challenges related to applicability of the right to 
opt out. Firstly, already existence of the separate right to opt out/ban the use 
demonstrates that a right holder has lost his/her possibility to control the use of 
his/her content – the new right to ban the use is granted as an attempt to give 
exclusivity back to him/her. Secondly, the right does not exist for all usage forms, 
i.e., one cannot always use it even if s/he wanted to. Thirdly, the right is also 
logically problematic because if it was possible to pose individual bans for each usage 
situation, it should also be possible to grant individual licenses. As the reasoning 
for collective licensing is that individual licensing is impossible, it is difficult to see 
that posting individual bans for separate usage situations could be possible either 
(or from the user’s perspective go through all set bans).438 Consequently, it is not 
surprising that attempts to ban the use are very rarely used. For example, during 
years 1980 – 1990 in Finland the ban was attempted to apply approximately 10 
times related to use of music in radio and television broadcasts.439 These examples 
illustrate the theoretical nature of exclusive rights as rights for an individual author. 
At this point it could be mentioned that formal/casuistic reading of 
the law often suggests that compulsory licenses limit rights of authors 
more than contractual licenses as a compulsory license allows use 
of content against compensation in general whereas in a contractual 
licensing system a CMO has an exclusive right to decide about licensing. 
However, the role of individuality is insignificant regardless of the 
collective licensing model used: neither of the models can guarantee 
possibilities for individuals to administer the use of content in practice – 
such an argument would already contradict the justification of collective 
management which is impossibility of individual administration – or 
even guarantee specific distribution of compensations. This questions 
whether it is meaningful to make separation between compulsory and 
contractual licenses from an individual’s perspective. 
438 In fact it could be reminded that a non-affiliate right holder retains a possibility to license individually. However, it is 
likely that no wide scale direct individual licensing takes place when collective licenses have been enacted as the reasoning 
for collective licensing is impossibility of individual licensing. Earlier analysis in this book also suggests that individual 
authors are not interested in direct individual licensing with prosumers.
439 See Committee Report 1990:31, p. 72. Despite these logical and practical problems, there may be attempts to create “ban 
lists” for certain usage forms. However, even if one creates such lists, it is difficult to see how the lists could be respected 
as masses of content grow constantly. How could any user/prosumer constantly (possibly globally) go through all the 
“ban lists” before producing or communicating each piece of content? It is impossible to even obtain accurate information 
whose content has been used in mass use situations. See also Ficsor, p. 45 - 47. Furthermore, even if one could store all 
the information that is being communicated in the information society, it is questionable if anyone could constantly go 
through the growing and evolving information mass in order to analyse whether the bans were respected. See also Vilanka, 
Chapter 4.
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Despite this Mihály Ficsor has argued that mandatory collective 
management (resulting to mere rights to remuneration) imposes similar 
(limiting) conditions for a right holder as enacting a compulsory license 
would impose. He sees that in mandatory management situations right 
owners would be in a position to act only “in a certain way”, exploit their 
rights only “in a certain manner” and could exercise their rights only 
“thorough a certain system”.440 Later, he also explains that a lack of a 
possibility to opt out (ban the use) would make a blanket license system 
“doubtful”.441 However, it is difficult to understand what the practical 
relevance or meaning behind the quotations is from an individual’s 
perspective regardless of which of the collective licenses have been 
implemented: An assumption is that individual administration is 
impossible no matter which one is enacted. Moreover, in both models, 
an individual can at best expect to obtain compensations. Furthermore, 
as explained, the right to “opt out”, is merely a theoretical attempt 
to protect exclusive rights of individuals. Ficsor has also argued that 
it would be illogical to demand (a non sequitur argument) that “if a 
right cannot be exercised in a way in which it has been traditionally 
exercised, it should be eliminated or considerably restricted.”442 
However, as in collective licensing systems an individual may at 
best obtain compensations, it is difficult to see how any argument 
favoring a right compensation could be illogical. Instead it is difficult 
to regard logical to invoke rights based on individualistic copyright 
theory if one accepts when assigns his/her rights to a collective 
that individual administration is impossible. Therefore, one could 
argue that it is difficult to see that maintaining rights derived from 
impossible premises (“an individual author controlling the use of his/
her works”) is rational.443 Furthermore, considering that all the legal 
systems create rights and obligations, it is curious that Dr. Ficsor, 
who seems to favor exclusive based extended collective management 
system (with a possibility to compensation and opt out for a non-
affiliate) in comparison to compulsory licensing, does not explain any 
problematic features such system might contain from the viewpoint of 
the individualistic copyright theory. A system where CMOs in practice 
hold all the relevant cards – including an exclusive right to refuse from 
licensing – may indeed contain certain problematic features from the 
440 Ficsor II, p. 42 – 44. 
441 Ficsor II, p. 61 – 62. 
442 Ficsor, p. 17. 
443 See also Juha Pöyhönen (nowadays Karhu), Sopimusoikeuden järjestelmä ja sopimusten sovittelu, Suomalaisen 
Lakimiesyhdistyksen julkaisuja A-sarja N:o 179, Vammala 1988, p. 4, where Pöyhönen states that ”However it is not 
rational to maintain an idea that there are rights which are impossible to fulfil.” (author’s translation). 
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viewpoint of individual members. For example, as CMOs in practice 
reserve all the relevant rights in the assignment contracts, individual 
members in principle need permissions from CMOs also in order to use 
their own material. Furthermore, if a CMO for some reason refuses to 
grant a license to a user, members of CMOs do not get compensation 
at all. As a compulsory license secures compensations for individual 
authors (and enables use) it is difficult to see that from an individual 
author’s perspective a compulsory license would be more limiting than a 
contractual license. One might attempt to argue that the exclusive right 
contained in the contractual license is indirectly more beneficial for 
individual authors as the contractual licensing system grants CMOs, in 
words of the legislator, “very extensive authority” leading to possibility 
that users may not be able to operate at all as “...high compensation 
level combined to a strong negotiation position may in practice prevent 
the use of works.”444 This could be understood so that the exclusive 
element might give stronger leverage for CMOs to negotiate on the 
price with users. In other words, one could argue that the benefit a 
contractual license in comparison to a compulsory license provides for 
an individual author is an increased level of compensations. However, 
although the risk may be smaller, it is possible that a user and a CMO 
end up to a non-contractual situation also if a compulsory license is 
being applied e.g. due to disagreement on price. Therefore, as CMOs 
in the Nordic countries (and Europe) already are monopolies in their 
respective fields of art/science, it is unlikely that the variation in the 
level of collected compensations could be too significant from an 
individual author’s perspective regardless of the used license model.445 
444 Tekijänoikeustoimikunnan V mietintö Äänitteiden, ja audiovisuaalisten teosten kopiointi ja levitys (Committee Report 
1990:31), p. 67. A society may also attempt threat to withdraw a license. See e.g. case of the Swedish Market Court 
1996:23 and Agne Lindberg – Daniel Westman, Praktiskt IT-rätt, andra upplagan, Stockholm 2000, p. 234 describing a 
case rejecting a possibility to withdraw from a licence. For a user the situation is especially problematic if the user is 
dependent on the used right. A risk for refusal increases if several content types are used. In such situation a user is unable 
to use if even one CMO from certain field of art declines from licensing. 
445 At the moment Finnish competition authorities all the major collecting societies in Finland have a dominant (in practice 
monopolistic) position as defined in the Act on competition restrictions 12.8.2011/948 (formerly 480/1992). See cases of 
Competition Council of Finland dno:5/359/95 (concerning Teosto, p. 32 ff.) and dno:3/359/95 (concerning Gramex, p. 27 
ff.). Both decisions were given in 5.10.1995. Kopiosto’s dominant position has been defined in a case of the Competition 
Office between Kopiosto and Confederation of Finnish Industries in 6.11.100 (Dnro 752/61/99). See also the letter of the 
Competition Office discussing Kopiosto’s position (given in 31.1.1994, dno: 595/61/93), which defines it a legal person 
carrying on a business. See also The Court of Justice of the European Communities, case Ministere Public v. Tournier 
and Lucazeau v. Sacem (combined sessions 110/88, 241/88 and 242/88, section 33). The monopolistic situation may 
partly change in the future as the Commission has e.g. found that reciprocal agreements between collecting societies 
licensing author’s public performance rights in Europe restrict competition. See, Commission decision of 16.07.2008 
C2008 3435final, relating to a proceeding under Article 81 of the EC Treaty and Article 53 of the EEA Agreement (Case 
COMP/C2/38.698 – CISAC). See also Commission of the European Communities, Brussels, 30.9.2005, Commission 
Recommendation on collective cross-border management of copyright and related rights for legitimate online music 
services. However, it remains to be seen whether the decision leads to any increase in competition. Collecting societies 
have also appealed against the decision of the Commission to the Court of First instance. See e.g. Martti Kivistö, A Push 
Towards Competition, Complaints of Societies are Pending before the Court of First Instance, IPRinfo Magazine, 2/2009, 
p. 24 – 25. 
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For the aforementioned reasons it is difficult to agree with Dr. Ficsor as 
it pertains to relationship between contractual and compulsory license 
from an individual authors perspective. 
Finally, it should be asked if collective administration should be made mandatory 
as has also been suggested. This would be consistent with the notion that role of 
individual authors is insignificant as it pertains to collective licensing of content. 
9.4.  RIGHTS OF AUTHORS AND MANDATORY COLLECTIVE 
LICENSING?
Arguments supporting mandatory membership in collective management 
organizations may be found.446 This means that the law would directly stipulate 
certain forms of use either under compulsory licensing447 or under exclusive collective 
exercise of rights.448 Arguments to this direction are coherent with an assumption 
that individual administration of rights is not possible. In fact, in Finland the law 
may even be read in manner indicating that collective administration through 
contractual licensing is not anymore an exception to a rule.449 
Helfer has evaluated possible mandatory obligation to join a CMO from a 
viewpoint of freedom of association. He compares the situation to possible compulsory 
memberships in labor unions and concludes that compulsory memberships in CMOs 
could be considered in developing countries at least until economic and cultural 
conditions in them are improved.450 
However, even if in the light of employment law, mandatory collective 
administration could occasionally be considered to be a plausible solution, the 
situation becomes challenging in principle when we evaluate possible mandatory 
memberships from the viewpoint of individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory. 
446 See e.g. Michály Ficsor, Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights at a Triple Crossroads: Should it Remain 
Voluntary or May It Be “Extended” or Made Mandatory, Copyright Bulletin, October 2003, p. 3 – 8.   
447 See e.g. Articles 11bis(2) and 13 of the Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, of September 
9 1886 with later amendments.
448 See e.g. Articles 3 and 9.2. of the The Council Directive 93/83/EEC of 27 September 1993 on the coordination of certain 
rules concerning copyright and rights related to copyright applicable to satellite broadcasting and cable retransmission 
(hereinafter the Satellite and Cable Directive).
449 Since the implementation of the copyright directive new heading of the Chapter 2 of the Finnish Copyright Act has stated 
the following: “Restrictions to Copyright and the Rules Governing Contractual License” (emphasis added). This would 
indicate that a contractual license is not a restriction anymore. According to Government Bill 28/2004, the intention was 
to “emphasize the nature of contractual licenses as a means for the collective administration of rights”. Government Bill 
28/2004, p. 81.  Hence, the new heading of Chapter 2 of the FCA and the wording in the preliminary material allows 
the interpretation that contractual licensing is no longer a limitation. It should be mentioned that the Constitutional Law 
Committee has referred to its own memorandumse evaluating collective labour agreements and stated that extended collective 
licensing poses also limitations in relation to rights of authors. However, as it pertains to collective labour agreements 
they limit rights of employers whereas collective licenses for copyright rights of authors (”employees”). This questions 
whether the Constitutional Law Committee has understod the nature of collective licensing. See also Olli Vilanka, Rough 
Justice or Zero Tolerance? – Reassessing the Nature of Coypyright in Light of Collective Licensing (Part I), published in 
In Search of New IP Regimes, Helsinki 2010, p. 145 ff and 156 ff.
450 Helfer, p. 93 ff.
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This is because it may be asked whether it is rational to speak of fundamental rights 
protection based on individual copyright theory at all, if collective management 
systems (similar to those that were historically favored in totalitarian countries) are 
being made mandatory.451 For example, it could be asked if the traditional concept 
of property (based on Locke’s views on individual ownership) would change, if 
there was a mandatory obligation to administer “property of an individual” through 
a collective? Would there be, instead of a fundamental right, a “fundamental 
obligation” for authors to assign their rights to legal persons such as CMOs - and 
finance them at the same time? Would there be some consequences for individual 
authors if they refused to assign their rights to a CMO or refused comply with their 
rules by, e.g., concluding direct transactions with users (to the extent it is possible)? 
For example, would authors acting in such manner “steal from the collective” or 
from themselves? 
Consequently, although collective administration systems may in practice 
occasionally provide functional solutions, making collective administration systems 
mandatory for authors would in many ways be problematic from the viewpoint of 
individualistic copyright theory. In fact, provided such a decision is made it may 
be asked whether collectives would “own” expressions to the extent stipulated in 
law. Such situation would resemble the theoretical outcome described earlier in 
chapter 9.1.1. Mandatory membership also effectively nullifies relevance of freedom 
of contract of authors as they could not have freedom to decide whether they want to 
assign their rights to a collective or not. Through mandatory collective administration 
we would formally move to a collective administration system where the rights 
of authors would become a rhetorical statement. Of course, to a large extent this 
may already today be the case as it pertains to collective administration of rights. 
This only highlights how difficult it is to extend fundamental rights protection to 
collecting societies, especially in the light of individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright 
theory. Consequently it shall next be asked how we should then evaluate collective 
administration of rights in the light of fundamental rights.
9.5. COLLECTIVE MANAGEMENT AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
CMOs in Nordic countries often are formally ideological associations. Therefore, 
CMOs may in theory have specific types of values and objectives stated in their 
451 As explained Martin Kretschmer (who does not specifically examine Scandinavian collective licenses but collective 
administration in general) states that: “the collective administration of [...] copyrights does not straightforwardly reflect a 
single underlying concept of private property – perhaps not even a notion of copyright as property.” See Martin Kretschmer, 
The Failure of Property Rules in Collective Administration: Rethinking Copyright Societies as Regulatory Instruments, 
E.I.P.R Issue 3, Sweet & Maxwell Limited 2002, p. 132 – 135. See also Kivimäki who stated that adopting collective 
licensing systems would lead to the crisis of the individualistic copyright system. See Kivimäki, p. 66 and especially 
footnote 4. 
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articles of association in comparison to other legal persons such as limited liability 
companies, which primary interest is to pursue for profit. However, as the book 
evaluates collective administration from the viewpoint of fundamental rights, the 
following shall not evaluate articles of association as enacted by different CMOs. 
Instead, it evaluates to what extent it seems plausible that CMOs attempt to follow 
values and objectives as provided by fundamental rights and especially Article 27.2 
of the UDHR and Article 15(c) of the ICESCR protecting rights of authors. This is 
because it would be difficult to see that an objective of a CMO would in the first 
instance correspond with a certain fundamental rights unless the CMO also de facto 
honors the protected value or objective behind that fundamental rights.452 In other 
words all ideological associations (also those promoting e.g. certain breeds of cats 
or dogs or motorcycling) may state having certain values and objectives, but they 
are relevant from the viewpoint of fundamental rights only if they correspond with 
the values and objectives embedded in fundamental rights and the association in 
question also de facto honors them.
As it pertains to Article 27.2 of the UDHR and Article 15(c) of the ICESCR, a 
fundamental right connection would in the first instance mean that a CMO’s primary 
aim should be distributing collected compensations to those (“ailing”) authors whose 
essential economic interests are endangered. This means, inter alia, that if essential 
economic interests of those authors who receive compensations have already been 
secured (as often is the case regarding transnational corporations or international 
rock/pop stars) it is difficult to see that the distributed compensations secure 
fundamental rights. Thus from this point of view, one may connect fundamental 
rights protection to CMOs provided CMOs de facto follow the aim of securing 
rights of those authors who are in most need. It could also be specified that it would 
be difficult to talk of a system with a principal aim to secure fundamental rights, 
if it only occasionally happened to fulfill essential economic interests of authors. 
If such an argument was accepted, we could argue that all legal persons have a 
fundamental right connection as they may (and most probably often do) secure 
essential economic interests of people working for them. Thus, in order to enjoy 
fundamental rights protection primary aim of CMOs should be securing economic 
interests of authors whose essential economic interests (“essential foodstuffs, of 
essential primary health care, of basic shelter and housing…”) are endangered. 
CMOs should also de facto act accordingly.
However, it is difficult to find any evidence that CMOs would in the first 
instance follow the aim of fundamental rights by distributing compensations in a 
transparent manner to those authors who are in most need.453 No paragraph in the 
452 If they are not honoured accordingly, any stipulations for objectives would be mere rhethorical statements hangin in the 
air.
453 In order to do so CMOs should in fact have sufficient information about economic situation of recipients in a similar 
manner as unemployment funds have. 
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Finnish Copyright Act (and to the authors knowledge in any other copyright act) 
obliges CMOs to do so. In fact, often compensations are paid to legal persons.454 
Compensations are also distributed to foreign countries. Provided they do not end 
up to (“ailing”) authors in need but e.g. according to popularity (e.g. to rock and 
pop stars and large publishing houses) adding fundamental rights extension to the 
picture becomes difficult.455 Moreover, in Finland no public completely transparent 
information is available as it pertains to who eventually gets the compensations 
distributed by CMOs.456 Only rough estimations may be given. 
Kretschmer has generally described the role of collective management 
in the following way: “Organisations are self-organising actors that 
develop their own dynamic. If an organisation is to act in the conflicting 
interests of third parties, complex principal agent problems arise. For 
collecting societies, there has been a tendency towards empire-building 
and inefficient bureaucracy. The cost of collection in many areas of 
usage amount to a quarter of revenues distributed -while for other 
complex services (such as health insurance) administrative deductions 
of five per cent are seen as high. Governance structures are often less 
than transparent. Notorious is § 14 of GEMA’s terms of association 
according to which the “board” may consist of only one person (under 
this clause, Vorstand Erich Schulze ruled GEMA from 1947-95 when 
he awarded himself an annual pension of DM 546,000). Another 
doubtful practice must be hereditary succession (French society 
SACEM has been controlled by the Tournier dynasty for most of the 
twentieth century).”457 Although the citation has been presented in a 
critical context (some CMOs are more efficient than others), the citation 
454 For example, a Finnish collective management organisation Kopiosto has only few direct members as natural persons 
although thorough its member organisations it has approximately 50.000 proxies. In practice it distributes majority of the 
compensations to its member organisations. An interview between Jukka-Pekka Timonen (executive vice precident of 
Kopiosto) and Olli Vilanka 5th of October 2009
455 It could be mentioned that in 2010 out of 43,1 million euros collected by Teosto, 21,7 was paid to foreign authors and 
music publishers (i.e. 21,4 million stayed in Finland). See Annual Report of Teosto 2010 , p. 12. A distribution system 
favouring those authors whose “basic material interests” are threatened would most probably create tension between 
those whose content has been used. However, in order to even argue that the distribution system functions in order to 
fulfil requirements set by fundamental rights this should be the case. Legal persons should be excluded from the analysis 
altogether.
456  However, it could be mentioned that a requirement for transparency has been stated e.g. in General Comment 17, paragraph 
48. 
457 See Martin Kretschmer, The Failure of Property Rules in Collective Administration: Rethinking Copyright Societies as 
Regulatory Instruments, E.I.P.R. Issue 3, Sweet & Maxwell Limited (2002), available at:  http://www.cippm.org.uk/pdfs/
kretschmer_eipr_032002.pdf.  It should again be noted that Kretschmer does not specifically analyse Nordic extended 
collective licensing. Despite this his analysis may be used in order to describe in general problems that may be connected 
to collective administration as collective administration is may always be separated from individual administration and 
consequently in all collective administration systems principal – agent problems are present. Moreover, no legislation 
stipulates in detail how CMOs should distribute compensations in the Nordic countries leaving the question who eventually 
gets the compensations open.
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summarizes the relevant: one cannot assume that compensations are 
distributed (with “zero tolerance”) to those individual authors whose 
content has been used or to those whose essential economic interests 
have been endangered.458 
It could also be mentioned that it is difficult to connect collective administration 
to concept of individual property ownership either. This is firstly because expenses of 
CMOs are deducted from the collected compensations before they are distributed to 
possible individual members.459 Thus already for this reason compensations cannot 
be rigorously distributed to those individuals whose content has been used making 
it also unconvincing for CMOs to demand “zero tolerance” respect for individualistic 
droit d’ auteur copyright theory. Furthermore, one may often only roughly evaluate 
whose content has been used.460 Occasionally, it is not even intended that collected 
compensations are distributed to adequate individuals as they are used for “common 
cultural and social purposes”.461 
These notions imply that the work in CMOs does not seem to be genuinely 
fundamental rights driven (i.e. in theory work close to a volunteer work/work with 
minimum wage for “ailing” authors). Consequently it is difficult to see that CMOs 
could enjoy fundamental rights protection as provided by Article 27.2 of the UDHR 
458 It could also be mentioned that as it comes e.g. to Teosto (Composers’ collective society in Finland) according to Hietanen 
in 2004 “…only 190 Finnish song writers out of 16,110 received more than 20,000 € in annual royalties and half of the 
members did not get any.” Herkko Hietanen, The Pursuit of Efficient Copyright Licensing, How Some Rights Reserved 
Attempts to Solve the Problems of All Rights Reserved, a thesis for a degree of Doctor of Economics and Business 
Administration, Acta Universitatis Lappeenrantaensis 325, Digipaino 2008, p. 243, footnote 126. Respectively it could be 
mentioned that in 2007 Teosto had approximately 19,000 customers and 208 of them received more than 20,000 euros a 
year in annual royalties. Still in 2007, half of the members did not receive any royalties. Annual Report of Teosto 2007, 
p. 1 and 12. Provided these approximately 200 persons who receive the largest amounts of compensations are already 
wealthy, if not even the wealthiest, it would be especially difficult to extend fundamental rights protection to collective 
administration of rights. As there are no completely transparent distribution systems, it is difficult to know who eventyally 
obtains the compensations. There is either no information whether the small portion receiving the most amounts are legal 
or natural persons.
459 Also history connecting collective standpoints to totalitaristic countries makes it difficult to connect Lockean individual 
property as a fundamental right to collective administration. 
460 Regarding the problem related to pinpointing adequate right holders WIPO has stated the following: ”The ideal solution 
would be to obtain all the data concerning all performances of all works and to distribute the royalties accordingly. This 
is, however, impossible, or, at least, not feasible. … As a consequence, an element of “rough justice”, more or less, but 
necessarily, appears in the distribution system.” See WIPO’s Introduction to Collective Management of Copyright and 
Related Rights, Document prepared by the International Bureau of WIPO. The citation is extracted from sections 53 and 
54 of the document.
461 As Ficsor, referring to deductions made for common cultural purposes, puts it: “freedom of right owners who might not 
agree with such deductions is fairly restricted (and one may only hardly allege that all rights owners are equally altruistic 
and influenced by the idea of what is called the principle of solidarity between authors, performers, etc.).” Mihály Ficsor, 
Collective Management of Copyright and Related Rights, WIPO Publication No. 855 (E) (hereafter Ficsor), p. 150. It 
should also be mentioned that according to some criticism administration of rights in CMOs is not democratic. For example, 
Erkki Puumalainen, manager of a recording company called “Poptori”, has often publicly criticized CMOs, among other 
things, for lack of democracy. See e.g. Erkki Puumalainen’s respons to Otto Donner, who has been a representative of 
Teosto. Available at (in Finnish): http://www.google.fi/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=2&cad=rja&ved=0
CE0QFjAB&url=http%3A%2F%2Fwww.poptori.fi%2Fpress%2Ftaman%2520paivan%2520Iltalehdessa.rtf&ei=OestUJG
yBO754QTci4GAAQ&usg=AFQjCNEiM9JWng5T5Sx7iw7asbId9Tab6Q. See also Erkki Puumalainen, Kukaan ei ole 




and Article 15(c) of the ICESCR. Thus it may be asked what we could assume that 
are the principal values and objectives of CMOs.
This may also be seen from the viewpoint of other fundamental rights. Formal 
reading of the law identifies “collective power” with protectionism of individual 
(“ailing”) authors enabling CMOs to claim that e.g. already a 0,07 euro theoretical 
damage may be considered as a crime in a manner that prevents use of expressions 
in open environment as provided by Article 27(1) of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(a) 
of the ICESCR.462 As in Finland the maximum sentence is two years imprisonment, 
formal reading of the law also implies that CMOs do not need to care about a 
prosumers right to privacy as provided in Article 12 of the UDHR or right to life, 
liberty and security of person as provided by Article 3 of the UDHR either. It is 
also difficult to find arguments presented by representatives of a CMO aiming to 
secure these fundamental rights of prosumers. Therefore, also this indicates that 
they do not have an objective to honor fundamental rights. Instead seems plausible 
to suggest that CMOS have the same primary objective as their possible corporate 
affiliates have an aim to maximize profits.463 The fact that CMOs demand respecting 
exclusive rights of authors under the pain of criminal sanctions, but are at the same 
content with living on the assets of individual authors regardless of whether they 
are affiliates or non-affiliates and do not work with minimum wage, are perhaps 
the clearest indication of the aim of CMOs to maximize profits.464 
9.6. CONCLUSION
9.6.1. COMPARING COLLECTIVE ADMINISTRATION AND RIGHTS OF PROSUMERS
The above analysis illustrated that role of authors is petty as it pertains to administration 
of content collectively. It was also difficult to see that the compensations were 
distributed as the aim of fundamental rights protection postulates, i.e., in the 
first instance to those authors in need. From the viewpoint of fundamental rights 
462 Referred 0,07 euros is a license fee a Finnish collecting society Teost offers for posting a composition openly available 
on the Internet for uploading. See Teostos www-pages at http://www.teosto.fi/sites/default/files/files/P13_Download%20
2013.pdf. 
463 Superseding profit maximization with other values would be in conflict with the objective of possible corporate affiliates 
CMOs may have. In fact this would also be problematic from the viewpoint of those individual authors who consider 
collective management organisations as tools to maximize profits. It would be naive to postulate that no such authors 
exist. It is possible that CMOs do not in practice attempt to interfere each possible copyright violation. However, despite 
this they do not actively advocate e.g. securing rights of prosumers as provided by Articles 3, 12 or 27.1 of the UDHR. 
On the contrary it seems that they are content with the current situation and doctrine emphasising formal reading of the 
law. They may even demand respecting copyright with ”zero tolerance”. See e.g. Vilanka 2010, p. 133. This implies 
that fundamental rights doctrines are not primarily of interest of CMOs. Claims that primary objective of CMOs in 
general would be to embrace fundamental rights would be problematic because it would mean that they should take into 
consideration also rights of users. It is difficult to find evidence indicating that CMOs as interest groups had ever been 
keen to embrace rights of users. In other words it is the legislator who should take into consideration fundamental rights 
drawing to different directions.
464 CMOs have collected compensations of non-affiliates in Nordic countries all the way from the 1960s. As explained, only 
rarely non-affiliate authors collect them from CMOs.  
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analysis, rather curiously, there are either no specific stipulations in the international 
treaties or EU-directives obligating to distribute compensations in order to achieve 
this objective. It was also difficult to see that collected compensations could be 
distributed rigorously to those authors whose property had been used.465 It would 
also be challenging to see that indirect protection especially aimed to protect small 
businesses could be applied in cases of CMOs, which are in a monopolistic position 
and may also have large corporate affiliates. One could attempt to argue that CMOs 
administering rights collectively secure essential economical interests of authors 
as second generation collective right. However, a problem of this type of argument 
is that there is no openly available objective information regarding who receives 
distributed compensations. In other words, as long there is no information that 
the compensations are used to secure essential interests of authors, it is difficult 
to see that collective administration mechanisms could earn fundamental rights 
protection. Even if the compensations were occasionally distributed to those 
individual authors whose essential economical interests are endangered, it might 
be questioned whether it would be justified to extend fundamental rights protection 
to collective administration. This is because in such case it could be argued that 
any legal person or compensation system occasionally securing essential interests 
of natural persons would earn fundamental rights protection. Therefore, keeping 
these premises in mind, it would be questionable if collective standpoints similar 
to those used by totalitarian regimes such as Nazis and old Soviet Union could 
obtain fundamental rights protection as enshrined in Universal Declaration of 
Human rights or comparable to property right based on Locke’s ideas on individual 
ownership. This does not mean that collective power would follow ideologies as 
advocated by the referred totalitarian states. Instead, it may be assumed that their 
main interest in practice follows the very same as contemporary corporations 
(which may be members of CMOs) have, i.e., pursue for profit and power.466 
The criticism does neither mean that CMOs could not participate in human right 
work, e.g by giving donations, sharing compensations in the first instance to those 
authors who are in need and by respecting rights of prosumers. Instead it means 
that it is difficult to see that their primary purpose and actual actions aim to do so. 
States neither have an obligation to secure interests of collectives, but individual 
authors and prosumers.
465 Considering these notions it is not convincing from representatives of CMOs to demand respecting copyright especially 
as an author’s right with “zero tolerance”. It would also be difficult to invoke freedom of contract as the sole basis for 
collective administration of rights. Making such a claim would mean that CMOs should also accept that users are also 
free to decide whether they conclude a contract with a CMO or not. 
466 It should be mentioned that CMOs are in economic sense rather small actors in comparison to transational corporations 
owning copyrighted content. However, as they already by definition administer rights collectively, which is by definition 
opposite to individual adiministration, CMOs and collective administration of rights hightlights the theoretical problem 
related to the relationship of fundamental rights and corporate power. 
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 Consequently, it is difficult to see that rights of prosumers could be endangered by 
collective exercise of rights. Another thing is relationships between CMOs and other 
legal persons who are more unlikely to pose a threat to each other on a fundamental 
right level. Therefore, as fundamental rights should protect natural persons it is 
again understood in this book, that fundamental rights analysis should break formal/
casuistic reading of law, which equalizes collective administration through legal 
persons to individual authors whose essential needs should be secured.467 This again 
that other means but exclusive rights should be used in order to secure rights of 
prosumers and authors when rights are being administered collectively.
As it pertains to position of individual authors in CMOs, it may be argued that 
following individualistic copyright theory suggests individual authors should have 
equal possibilities to participate decision making in CMOs. Moreover, individualistic 
copyright theory postulates that individual authors should be protected and in fact 
even favored in relation to possible corporate members as it pertains to distribution 
of compensations by CMOs. However, there are signs indicating the development 
is leading even further from the aim of securing different fundamental rights as 
shall next be illustrated.
9.6.2. SPECIFIC CONCERN – COLLECTIVE POWER UNLIMITED?
Formal/casuistic reading of the copyright law does not distinguish administration of 
content between individual authors and CMOs (or large corporations) administering 
exclusive rights collectively. However, as explained, it would be questionable, if 
collective power could endanger not only the right to science and culture but also 
the right to privacy and right to life, liberty and security of prosumers. Despite this 
even General Comment No. 17 of the Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights states the following: 
“States parties are obliged to prevent third parties from infringing 
the material interests of authors resulting from their productions. 
To that effect, States parties must prevent the unauthorised use of 
scientific, literary and artistic productions that are easily accessible 
or reproducible through modern communication and reproduction 
technologies, e.g. by establishing systems of collective administration 
467 It should be mentioned that if one demanded respecting freedom of contract as the protected core right (instead of 
protectionism for essential economic rights of authors) one should also accept that a prosumer has a right to decide whether 
or not to conclude a contract with a collective when using content as provided by Article 27(1) of the UDHR or 15(1)(a) 
of the ICESCR. Thus it is difficult to see mere freedom of contract form foundations for liability. Accepting freedom of 
contract as a starting point would also make the distinction between individualistic and collectivistic copyright theories 
obsolete. 
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of authors’ rights or by adopting  legislation requiring users to inform 
authors of any use made of their productions and to remunerate them 
adequately.”468 
The statement is ambiguous as it does not define what “collective administration” 
aiming to “prevent … use” means. It is difficult to find any fundamental rights 
entitling to “prevent” use of copyrighted content. Even the aim and purpose of 
individualistic copyright theory is to secure rights of authors and users by enabling 
use, which in a property right system should take place through individual 
transactions. It is even more difficult to find justifications to “prevent use” through 
collective administration as the purpose of collective administration is especially to 
enable use in cases where individual administration is not possible. 
It may be asked if the emphasis of the citation is on preventing unauthorized 
use. However, if this is the case it is difficult to see how the task of “preventing” 
could be accomplished “by establishing systems of collective administration of 
authors’ rights”. As explained, the purpose of collective administration should be 
enabling use as individual licensing is deemed impossible. Moreover, preventing 
unauthorized uses (“stealing”) should belong to public officials, in practice to the 
police. For example, the Finnish Constitution is skeptical regarding the possibilities 
to grant public power to bodies other than public authorities. As the Section 124 of 
the Constitution of Finland states:
“A public administrative task may be delegated to others than public 
authorities only by an Act or by virtue of an Act, if this is necessary for 
the appropriate performance of the task and if basic rights and liberties, 
legal remedies and other requirements of good governance are not 
endangered. However, a task involving significant exercise of public 
powers can only be delegated to public authorities.”
According to the Government Bill 1/1998 a public administration should be 
understood as covering a wide range of different tasks.469 However, no open political 
debate has taken place regarding delegation of public power to legal persons in 
general or to collective management organizations administering copyrighted 
content in Finland.470  
Even if it was attempted to assign public power to CMOs so that they could 
protect essential economic interests of (“ailing”) authors it would remain unclear 
how preventing use could secure this objective: In short preventing use is opposite 
to concluding transactions, which aims to secure essential economic interests of 
468 The Committee on Economic No.17, paragraph 31 (emphasis added). 
469 See Hallituksen esitys eduskunnalle uudeksi Suomen Hallitusmuodoksi (Government Bill) 1/1998, p. 179.
470 Government Bill 28/2008 related to the implementation process of the Infosoc directive on the contrary specifically states 
that collective management organisations do not represent public authorities while acting as provided by the copyright 
law. See Government Bill, 28/2008, p. 104 – 105.
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authors as postulated by Article 27.2 of the UDHR and Article 15(1)(c) of the 
ICESCR.471 Therefore, it is difficult to see how tools of collective administration of 
rights could be used as “rights” for “preventing” even unauthorized uses. Thus, it 
is likely that nature of collective administration of rights have been misunderstood 
in the General Comment no. 17.472 
Provided that the statement is not a misunderstanding, it would be very 
problematic from the viewpoint of the right to science and culture if collective power 
could “prevent” prosumers from enjoying their rights as provided by Article 27(1) 
of the UDHR and 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR. Such situation would also be problematic 
from a viewpoint of a prosumers right to privacy (provided the prosumer enjoys his/
her right at home) and the prosumers right to life liberty and security of persons if 
a collective merely attempts to use coercion in order to prevent the use. Moreover, 
as explained earlier, different types of costs (inter alia taxes, salaries, administrative 
costs, accounting, costs for recreational activities…) also always incur for CMOs, 
their corporate affiliates and even for individual authors. For these reasons it would 
be difficult to consider proportionate that that rights prosumers should be close 
to non-existent in relation to interests of collective administration even if CMOs 
attempted solely to secure essential economic right of (“ailing”) authors. This is the 
concern this chapter highlights: as if there were no borders for collective power in 
relation to fundamental rights of prosumers because formal reading of law protecting 
individual (“ailing”) authors entitles even preventing use by collective means. It is 
especially questionable if legislator allows CMOs to demand that prosumers should 
rigorously honor individualistic copyright theory while CMOs themselves at the 
same time end up keeping compensations of non-affiliate authors who have never 
given consent for the use. It would be as though CMOs were considered to be above 
the rules others are expected to follow. 
However, collective licenses may alleviate problems related to securing rights of 
prosumers if functional collective licensing systems for use of content on the Internet 
exist. The more theoretical the problems described above remain and the more 
easily collective licenses may be accepted. Therefore, as collective licensing systems 
have been introduced it shall next be evaluated whether they provide functional 
solutions regarding use of content on the Internet. 
471 It is possible that preventing certain uses is e.g. in the interest of affiliate corporations of CMOs in their attempts to regulate 
markets: preventing use of content by prosumers on the Internet may be more lucrative than granting affordable licenses 
as such licenses might compete with other forms of use generating more revenues. 
472 The misunderstanding may be due to limited amount of literature discussing collective administration more comprehensively 
i.e. also from the viewpoint of users. For example, also in Finland the Constitutional Law Committee has stated that non-
affiliate authors have wider rights to obtain compensations from CMOs than affiliated authors because non-affiliates have 
a separate right to ask compensation. See Statement of the Constitutional Law Committee PeVL 7/2005, vp., p. 7. It is 
quite clear that the separate right of non-affiliates to claim compensations from authors may at best in theory make their 
rights “wider” (or “better”) in comparison to member affiliates. This is because it is artificial to call a separate right to 
compensation “wider” unless it enables non-affiliates more compensations than to affiliates. If this is the case we may 
ask why we have CMOs granting collective licenses if one’s economic position better (“wider”) when staying outside the 
system. Thus it is evident that neither did the Finnish Constitutional Law Committee did not understand what it is doing 
when it evaluated collective licenses.
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10   POSSIBILITIES TO OBTAIN COLLECTIVE 
LICENSES IN FINLAND
10.1. IN GENERAL
When evaluating possibilities to administer use of expressions through collective 
licenses it should first be noted that it is difficult to find attempts to cover all areas 
of science and art with collective licenses in the Western countries. For example, it 
is challenging to find CMOs or stipulations in law for collective licenses regarding 
the use of computer programs or videogames. In theory this should mean that 
obtaining direct licenses in these cases is possible. If this is not the case copyright 
system based on exclusive rights seems inactive as authors are not able to obtain 
compensations and prosumers are not able to use as rights in Article 27 of the 
UDHR suggest. 
Due to the focus of this book this chapter evaluates possibilities of prosumers 
and educational institutions as users of science to obtain collective licenses for use 
of content on the Internet. However, as licenses are offered nationally the chapter 
evaluates licenses offered in Finland. In order to do so paragraphs in law for collective 
licenses shall be compared to licensing options as offered by five CMOs.473 In this 
respect, it should be noted that no researcher is able (even if allowed) to go through 
all the proxies, assignment contracts or other agreements CMOs may have concluded 
regarding their possibilities to represent different right holders. Consequently, 
the following evaluation is based on information they publicly provide on their 
homepages.474 Despite the mentioned problem, some type of picture regarding 
473 The examined CMOs during fall 2011 – spring 2012 were Teosto (Finnish Composer’s Copyright Society) Gramex 
(Copyright society for performing artists whose performances have been recorded on phonograms and producers of 
phonograms), Tuotos (Copyright association for audio-visual producers in Finland), Kopiosto (Copyright organization 
for authors, publishers and performing artists) and Kuvasto (a Copyright organization for artists from the field of visual 
arts). In Finland CMOs are in practice private registered associations as provided by Associations Act (26.5.1989/503). 
According to the Government Bill 28/2004 CMOs act based on proxies and on other agreements on transfer of rights and 
hence do not use public power. See Government Bill 28/2004, p.104 – 105. Regarding countries in general there are no 
clear answers whether collective administration is conducted via a public or a private entity. See e.g. David Sinacore-Guinn, 
Collective Administration of Copyrights and Neighbouring Rights, International Practices, Procedures, and Organizations. 
Little, Brown and Company, Boston, Toronto, London, 1993, p.220. According to Ficsor in “market-economy countries, 
private organizations dominate...” Ficsor, p. 136. 
474 Thus nothing in theory prevents CMOs to change what they stipulate on their homepages regarding licensing possibilities. 
It should be noted that this problem does not exist in cases of compulsory licensing as paragraphs in the law define the 
scope of the license.
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licensing possibilities on the Internet may be formed. Before going into details, 
the scope of contractual and compulsory licenses shall be evaluated in general.
10.2.  SCOPE OF COMPULSORY AND EXTENDED CONTRACTUAL 
LICENSE
In order to evaluate licensing possibilities, the scope of existing collective licenses 
shall be examined in general. Originally, extended collective licenses in Finland 
were drafted to certain specific paragraphs of the Finnish Copyright Act (hereafter 
FCA). These paragraphs described collective licensees for certain usage forms/
technologies as e.g. for broadcasting and photocopying. Previously, the specific 
paragraphs provided also the extended effect to the licenses. 
However, later on general paragraphs for collective licenses have been added 
to the FCA (in 1995 paragraph 26§ for contractual licenses in general and in 2005 
paragraph 47a for a compulsory license described in paragraph 47).475 The general 
paragraphs provide common rules for collective licenses such as a requirement that 
CMOs granting extended collective licenses should be approved by the Ministry 
of Education and Culture for the task. Consequently, it may be asked what the 
reciprocal relationship between specific and general paragraphs in the licensing 
systems is and especially whether it affects the scope of the licenses.
Regarding compulsory licensing specific paragraphs in the law stipulate that 
the whole scope of the license allows the use of content against compensation as 
widely as stated in the specific paragraph. It is irrelevant whether right holders 
under the defined use have assigned their rights to a CMO or not. 
For example, paragraph 47 of the FCA enacts a compulsory license for 
using content of performing artists and phonogram producers for public 
performing, communicating to the public and simultaneous unaltered 
radio and television broadcasting. However, it does not cover “making 
available to the public ... works in such a way that members of the public 
may access them from a place and at a time individually chosen by 
them” i.e. on demand type services.476 
A general paragraph connects a compulsory license in a specific paragraph to a 
certain CMO, which in practice necessitates that compensations must be collected 
475 See Act amending the Copyright Act (446/1995) and Government Bill 287/1994. Similarly in Sweden Chapter 3a of the 
Swedish Copyright Act starts with general regulations about the contractual licensing system. 
476 Thus paragraph 47 of the paragraph stipulates the compulsory license whereas paragraph 47a of the FCA states the general 
paragraph connects a CMO to the compulsory license.
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by a CMO that has been appointed for the task by the Ministry of Education and 
Culture. Thus, in practice the scope of the license is defined in the specific paragraph. 
As it pertains to contractual licensing defining the scope of the license is more 
complex. A starting point in contractual licensing is that a CMO represents those 
right holders who have assigned their rights to it, but if an extended effect is provided 
by law a user may also use content of non-affiliate right holders. As explained, 
previously also contractual licenses with the extended effect were enacted in specific 
paragraphs describing a certain form of use/technology such as broadcasting or 
photocopying. Thus if such a paragraph existed, a user was allowed to use both rights 
of affiliate and non-affiliate right holders as described in the paragraph provided 
a CMO granted a license. However, nowadays general paragraph 26 of the FCA 
provides that a license granted by a CMO has an extended effect to non-affiliate 
right holders, if the Ministry of Education and Culture has approved the CMO in 
question to administer content from certain field of art or science used in Finland. 
Thus, nowadays the general paragraph grants the extended effect in the contractual 
licensing system. The change causes a curious situation as it may be asked what 
is the function of still existing specific paragraphs for contractual licenses, if both 
authority of CMOs to grant contractual licenses and the extended effect comes 
from the general paragraph?
The only logical interpretation to give relevance for the separation between 
specific and general paragraphs in the extended contractual licensing system 
seems to be that although the extension to content of non-affiliates is stipulated 
in the general paragraph, the extension applies only in those situations which 
are described in the specific paragraphs (e.g. for broadcasting or photocopying) 
provided a certain CMO has been appointed to grant licenses accordingly. This is 
because it would be problematic to argue that extended effect comes merely from 
the general paragraph since if this was the case purpose of specific paragraphs would 
be unclear.477 Therefore, it is understood in the book that in order for the extended 
effect for a contractual license to exist CMOs should be appointed to administer 
rights as stipulated in specific paragraphs for contractual licenses. 
An additional feature making the scope of the extended contractual 
license system even more unclear in comparison to a compulsory 
license is that although the extended effect exists, it may be argued that 
scope of the offered contractual licenses may be narrowed by CMOs in 
477 It should be mentioned that a non-affiliate’s possible right to opt out from the license is also in the specific paragaph. 
However, it is difficult to see that anything would prevent moving also the right to opt out to one subsection under the 
general paragraph e.g. by stating that “a non-affiliate has always a right to opt out except in the following cases [list of 
forms of use/technologies]”. In cases of compulsory licensing the need for specific paragraphs is understandable as they 
provide the scope for the whole license.
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comparison to what specific paragraphs in law stipulate.478 Provided 
this is possible the scope of contractual licenses is even more obscure 
as a mere specific paragraph in law would not yet tell us whether a user 
is entitled to use content in a way the specific paragraph provides even 
if a CMO has been appointed to grant licenses accordingly. However, 
it should be mentioned that the described interpretation may also be 
disputed. Enacting a paragraph to law, which provides a collective 
license implies that individual licensing is impossible. Therefore, it may 
be asked if narrowing a license should be accepted, if it is not possible 
for a user to obtain corresponding license elsewhere. As explained, if 
the rights of users were denied in situations when obtaining licenses 
is impossible, we would be “maximizing misery” as authors would not 
get compensations and users were unable to use. Denying use would be 
especially problematic if use is covered by a certain fundamental rights. 
Thus, regarding collective licensing this alternative interpretation 
would mean that use should be exempted from copyright in cases when 
a specific paragraph for a collective license describing exists, but no 
corresponding licenses are being offered. Alternatively, other means 
should be used to secure rights of authors and users. 
Consequently, it may be concluded that a compulsory license allows use against 
compensation, as defined by a certain paragraph in law. In practice an appointed 
CMO collects the compensations. As it pertains to contractual licensing a contractual 
license may have an extended effect only if a certain CMO has been appointed by the 
Ministry of Education and Culture to grant licenses as defined in a certain paragraph. 
If the appointed CMO narrows down the license the user should have rational 
possibilities to obtain corresponding licenses elsewhere. If this is not possible one 
should allow use, as denying it would lead to “maximization of misery”. To what 
extent licenses are being offered in practice for prosumers shall be evaluated next.
10.3. LICENSES FOR PROSUMERS
This chapter evaluates to what extent it is possible to obtain collective licenses for 
prosumers to make content available to the public on the Internet as provided by 
subsection 1 of Article 27 of the UDHR and 15(1)(a) of the ICESCR.479 Considering 
478 If a license with an extended effect is narrowed, the result applies also to non-affiliates i.e. the extended effect allows 
users to use content of non-affiliates only to the same extent the contract allows them to use rights of affiliates. 
479 A fair access to market, which is connected to the principle of equality before law and to the right to work and freedom 
to engage commercial activity as stated in e.g. in article 23 of the Universal Declaration, could also be regarded as a 
right on a fundamental right level for prosumers in economical terms to be able to use content. However, if prosumers 
are understood as private natural persons acting in non-commercial it questionable if a fair access to market may be 
considered as a right for a prosumer. About the fair access to market see e.g. Juha Pöyhönen (nowadays Karhu), Uusi 
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the availability of different content types, an extensive license to make content openly 
available on the Internet should in theory be offered for prosumers in order to secure 
their rights and respectively rights of authors to the extent individual licensing 
is not possible. However, no specific paragraphs providing collective licenses for 
prosumers as private persons exists in the FCA. Despite this it may be understood 
that some collective licenses are being offered also to prosumers. 
For example, it may be interpreted that Teosto and Gramex (collecting societies 
in Finland) at least in theory offer licenses also for prosumers as private persons. 
This is because the licenses they are offering focus more on the “ways of use” instead 
off specific users such as educational institutions, archives, libraries or museums. 
They offer licenses for activities such as “downloading”, video on demand (“VOD”), 
“podcasting”, “Internet radio”, “Internet license”, “simulcasting”, “webcasting”, 
“voice samples” and “TV-simulcasting”.480 Teosto also specifically states that some 
of its licenses are offered also for private persons.481 Although the licenses do not 
contain an extended effect to non-affiliates as there is no specific paragraph providing 
the extended effect, it is positive from a prosumers viewpoint to the extent licenses 
are being offered.
However, the practical relevance of the offered licenses remains somewhat 
unclear. As there are no specific paragraphs in law for prosumers, the scope of 
the offered licenses does not extend to non-affiliates narrowing down the scope 
of offered licenses. Offered licenses also define certain forms of use. Due to the 
technological convergence it is questionable what the forms specifically cover.482 
It is also questionable whether the pricing may be regarded reasonable from a 
prosumers perspective. For example, Teosto’s Internet license for streaming music 
for maximum of 9 hours per month costs approximately 165 euro, if the amount of 
monthly visitors is 2.000 or less. If the monthly amount of visitors is 80.000, the 
monthly price is 647 euro. If a prosumer would like to share recorded music (which 
seems to be a popular way of sharing music on the Internet among prosumers) a 
problem is that a prosumer would need a license both from Teosto and Gramex. 
Even if a similar license with similar price were offered by both of the CMOs, it is 
clear that the price easily becomes an obstacle for any prosumer: the minimum fee 
would be 330 euros a month for making music available to the public for 9 hours 
per month for 2.000 visitors. 
varallisuusoikeus, Helsinki, Kauppakaari 2000. See also Raimo Siltala, Perusoikeusjärjestelmän sisäisestä logiikasta, 
Lakimies 4/2001, p. 737–744, and especially p. 740–741. 
480 Compare Teosto’s and Gramex’s homepages and the licensing options they offer for Internet use. On Teosto’s behalf:  http://
www.teosto.fi/kayttajat/luvat/273/m/305 and on Gramex’s behalf:  http://www.gramex.fi/fi/musiikin_kayttajat/sahkoinen_
media_ja_av-tuotanto. It should be mentioned that if recorded music is being used permissions should be asked from both 
of CMOs unless the compulsory license as stated in paragraph 47 applies to the situation regarding rights of performing 
artists and phonogram producers.
481 See Teosto’s Internet license (in Finnish) at: http://www.teosto.fi/kayttajat/luvat/273/m/305. 
482 Regarding technological convergence, see chapter 6.4.
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However, it should also be noted that Teosto has also started offering 
licenses for prosumers to upload music on the Internet (i.e. place 
music for others to download).483 Regarding these licenses pricing 
seems reasonable even for a prosumer.484 For example, in 2013 price 
for making content available to the public in order for receivers to 
download it was 0,07 euros per tack.485 This would mean that a license 
to make available to the public a CD with 10 tracks for others to freely 
download would cost 0,7 euros per download. If similar license was 
offered by Gramex for performing artists and phonogram producers, 
price for sharing the CD with 10 songs would be 1,4 euro per download. 
A problem in this respect is that Gramex does not offer corresponding 
licenses for prosumers to make content available to the public.486 
Therefore it may be concluded that at the moment it seems that prosumers are 
at best able to obtain rather narrow licenses, which they often unlikely afford to pay. 
In this respect, the situation seems problematic from the viewpoint of the right to 
culture and science provided in Article 27(1) of the UDRH and 15(1) of the ICESCR 
(provided collecting societies may endanger it in the first place).487
10.4. OFFERED LICENSES FOR EDUCATIONAL AND SCIENTIFIC 
PURPOSES IN FINLAND
When evaluating possibilities to use content on the Internet for educational and 
scientific purposes, it is positive to note that paragraph 14 of the FCA provides a 
specific paragraph for a wide contractual license to reproduce and make available 
all types of works on the Internet for educational and scientific purposes.488 As 
no paragraph for prosumers exists in the FCA, a wide paragraph 14 of the FCA 
provides a contrast to compare whether enacting paragraphs has an effect to the 
scope of offered licenses.
483 See Teosto’s homepage (in English) available at: http://www.teosto.fi/en/teosto/articles/internet-and-mobile-pricelists. 
484 If these licenses are offered also per song, it may be asked whether they are collective licenses or individual licenses 
granted by a collective. The difference is in practice ostensible. 
485 It should be noted that the used word ”track” leaves somewhat open if the price is per song or something else. See Teosto’s 
pricing list for 2013, available (in English) at: http://www.teosto.fi/sites/default/files/files/P13_Download%202013.pdf. 
486 Gramex seems to be unable (or unwilling) to grant licenses e.g. for downloadable music. See www-page of Gramex 
regarding use of recorded music on the Internet available at (in Finnish) http://www.gramex.fi/fi/musiikin_kayttajat/
sahkainen_media_ja_av-tuotanto/aanitteet_internetissa/aanitenaytteet_internetissa.
487 See also Helfer stating: “Nevertheless, the Committee’s [on Economical, Social and Cultural Rights] reference to the 
price that consumers pay to access copyrighted works as part of the overall balance of creators’ rights suggests that States 
must provide some form of meaningful regulation of [CMO] licensing practices to comply with their obligations und the 
Covenant [on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights].” Helfer, p. 91.
488 Literal reading of the law excludes television and radio broadcasts (they are provided in paragraphs 25f – 25i of the FCA) 
and producing copies by photocopying or in similar means (provided in paragraph 13 of the FCA) from the scope of the 
paragraph. (Producing copies in “similar means”, as stated in article 13, refers to producing copies by printing them on 
paper as the result is similar to producing photocopies.) See Government Bill 28/2004, p. 85. 
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Since paragraph 14 of the FCA is wide, it also in theory implies that everybody 
contributing content for educational and scientific purposes should join the CMO 
granting the licenses for use of content for educational and scientific purposes in 
order maintain a possibility to obtain compensations in case their content happens 
to be used. In fact, if we regard that all protected expressions may have educational 
or scientific relevance (as they may have in theory), paragraph 14 postulates that 
everyone producing content should assign their rights to an appointed CMO in case 
their content is being used.489 As it pertains to the distribution of compensations, 
this type of development would seem to lead in the long run to certain type of 
“democracy through collectives”, provided CMOs follow democratic principles in 
their decision making. However, as explained, one cannot merely focus on evaluating 
paragraphs in law when evaluating possibilities to obtain licenses as CMOs may 
narrow down licenses in comparison what the law stipulates. Consequently, the 
next chapters evaluate licenses offered by five CMOs in Finland for use of content 
for educational and scientific purposes on the Internet.490
10.4.1. KOPIOSTO
In practice, Kopiosto (a Copyright organization for authors, publishers and 
performing artists) has been offering licenses to certain educational institutions 
as provided by paragraph 14 of the FCA.491 It has been granting licenses to primary 
schools, vocational training and universities.
In general, licenses offered by Kopiosto are technology -neutral licenses, which 
allow staff and students of educational institutions to scan printed publications into 
digital form, copy text and pictures that are openly available on the Internet and 
communicate the scanned and copied content in the institutions closed network.492 
The licenses cover both content of foreign and domestic right holders and allow 
using their content for teaching, research, theses and practical works.493 Elsewhere, 
489 It should be noted that the paragraph does not specifically rule out prosumers from its scope. However, as prosumers as 
private natural persons are rely perceived users of content for educational or scientific content, it shall be assumed here 
that prosumers are not users as intended by the paragraph.  
490 Another thing is whether narrowing down licenses should prevent users from using as an existing paragraph for a collective 
license implies that obtaining individual licenses is impossible. As explained, if users were unable to use in a situation 
when no licenses are being offered we could talk of “maximizing misery” as right holders would be unable to receive 
compensations and users would be unable to use. 
491 Kopiosto e.g. administers use for taking photocopies and using radio- and TV-programs in education. In 2010 Kopiosto 
had 44 member organizations and it has approximately 41.500 proxies. At its www-site Kopiosto refers to paragraphs 
14 and 26 of the FCA and states that it has the right represent those publishers who have not assigned their rights to 
Kopiosto. This indicates that Kopiosto has also been appointed by the Ministry of Education and Culture to grant extended 
contractual licenses as provided by the mentioned paragraphs. See e.g.
 Kopiosto’s internet site: http://www.kopiosto.fi/kopiosto/teosten_kayttoluvat/digilupa/digilupa_ukk/fi_FI/digilupa_ukk/#a_
element_85644430453964959. 
492  Newspapers, books, magazines, research rapports and manuals have been regarded as printed publications. 
493 It should be mentioned that right holders have a possibility to ban the use. However, as mentioned the right is a rather 
theoretical one difficult if not impossible to supervise. For example, while this is being written only one publisher has 
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but in universities, a requirement also is that a user registers and “stamps” the 
content to the database of Kopiosto before using it. However, if a user is able to 
obtain an individual license (e.g. if a certain piece of content has been licensed 
with a Creative Commons license), s/he may use it according to the terms of the 
individual license.494 
It is positive from the viewpoint of this article that licenses for educational and 
scientific use are available. Considering possibilities to obtain licenses, the problem 
is that the scope of the contractual licenses offered by Kopiosto is in practice rather 
narrow. The licenses are offered for specific educational institutions (excluding the 
general license for Universities and vocational high schools) and allow only use for 
specific groups of students provided that the copies are produced or communicated 
by the teacher or someone on his/her initiative. They do not cover all content types 
(as they exclude notes, song lyrics, music, dramatic works, audio-visual works, 
work or exercise books, videogames and computer programs) and do not extend 
their scope outside educational institutions. Furthermore, the licenses do not allow 
making content available to students via email or posting content to Internet as an 
open network, but necessitates that the network is closed and only for the purposes 
of the educational institution in question. Thus, in the end the offered licenses are 
not for the Internet as an open network but for a closed group/environment. Used 
material must also be removed from the database of the institution no later than at 
the end of the academic year.495 Therefore, we may see that although a paragraph 
in the law describes wide possibilities to grant licenses, the offered licenses may in 
the end be rather narrow. 
attempted to opt out from the system. See: Kopiosto’s homepages: http://www.kopiosto.fi/kopiosto/teosten_kayttoluvat/
valokopiointi/fi_FI/kopioinnin_kieltaminen/. Even it has done so it has no practical means to supervise if or to what extent 
the ban is respected.
494 The requirement to stamp means reporting used content to Kopiosto in order for Kopiosto to distribute collected 
compensations to appropriate right holders. However, due to the immense content mass it is problematic to fulfil such a 
demand in practice. No such requirement either exist as it pertains to photocopied content either as the use is evaluated 
thorough studies using sampling as a method. Considering the masses of content on the Internet it is peculiar that an attempt 
to register each used www-pages (the obligation would be giving the web address of the used www-page) has been even 
made. A www-page as such does not yet explain what and whose content is there or has been. If the used www-page is 
closed one can neither evaluate it later. Kopiosto could of course attempt to create a large database for itself containing 
copies of all the used www-pages, but producing these copies to the database would require itself to ask permissions from 
each appropriate right holder whose content has been on the registered www-page. Consequently it is difficult to see how 
the requirement to stamp could be followed. 
495 See Kopiosto’s permission for primary schools and vocational training, available at (in Finnish): http://www.kopiosto.fi/




Also other CMOs have been offering licenses for educational purposes. Tuotos 
(a Copyright association for audio-visual producers in Finland) offers licenses to 
present and communicate domestic movies in premises of educational institutions. 
It is again positive that possibilities to obtain licenses for using domestic movies in 
educational institutions exist, but also in this case the problem is the narrowness 
of the license. According to www-pages of Tuotos the license is not an extended 
contractual license and is additionally limited to domestic movies and to premises of 
educational institutions.496 In other words, it is also limited to closed environments 
from the viewpoint of the Internet.497 
Kuvasto (a Copyright organization for artists from the field of visual arts) offers 
licenses to use pictures on the Internet, but does not specify educational institutions 
as possible users. Instead, it mentions municipal and foundation based departments 
for culture, public utilities, companies and commercial exhibitions.498 Therefore, if 
interpreted as written on the homepage of Kuvasto, no licenses for use of pictures in 
educational purposes are offered. This may be because the abovementioned licenses 
granted by Kopiosto cover also use of pictures in educational use and Kuvasto is a 
membership organization of Kopiosto.499 
Finally, as it pertains to possibilities to use music on the Internet in educational 
institutions, licenses offered by Teosto (a copyright organization for composers, lyric 
writers, arrangers and music publishers) and Gramex (a CMO administering rights 
of performing artists whose performances have been recorded on phonograms and 
producers of phonograms) shall also be examined as the license offered by Kopiosto 
does not cover music. It should first be noted that neither of the CMOs offer a 
license specifically intended for the use of music on the Internet in educational 
institutions. As explained, they instead offer licenses such as “downloading”, video on 
demand (“VOD”), “podcasting”, “Internet radio”, “Internet license”, “simulcasting”, 
“webcasting”, “voice samples” and “TV-simulcasting”.500 Therefore, regarding the 
use of music on the Internet CMOs seem to be more interested in different “ways of 
use” rather than particular users or institutions. Consequently, one might assume 
that licenses offered by Teosto and Gramex may be applied also in educational 
institutions, if music is used in a way described by the licenses. However, the licenses 
496 Tuotos provides a list of movies that may be used in education. See (in Finnish) at: http://www.tuotos.fi/index.php?id=480. 
497 The license is limited to movies Tuotos represents. See licences offered by Tuotos at (in Finnish) at http://tuotos.fi/index.
php?id=477. The license should have an extended effect, if Tuotos is appointed by the Ministry of Education and Culture 
as a CMO able to grant extended contractual licenses. 
498 See licenses of Kuvasto, available at (in Finnish): http://www.kuvastory.fi/index.php?cat=41&lang=fi&mstr=1. 
499 This would mean that Kopiosto would distribute some of the collected compensations to Kuvasto.
500 Compare Teosto’s and Gramex’s homepages and the licensing options they offer for Internet use. On Teosto’s behalf:  http://
www.teosto.fi/fi/internet_ja_mobiili.html and On Gramex’s behalf:  http://www.gramex.fi/fi/musiikin_kayttajat/sahkoinen_
media_ja_av-tuotanto. It should be mentioned that if recorded music is being used permissions should be asked from both 
of CMOs unless the compulsory license as stated in paragraph 47 applies to the situation regarding rights of performing 
artists and phonogram producers.
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offered by Teosto and Gramex are not identical.501 For example, in certain occasions 
the CMOs state that licensing situations should be evaluated case by case.502 Thus, 
it seems that no possibilities to obtain licenses always exist even if one contacted 
both of the CMOs. Moreover, it should be mentioned that even if an educational 
institution is able to find a collective license suitable for use of music it is unclear 
whether it would be ready to pay the required fee. Consequently, it is difficult to 
give explicit answers covering different situations regarding possibilities to obtain 
licenses for use of music for educational or scientific purposes making the situation 
obscure.
10.5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
The above analysis indicates that it is questionable whether collective licensing 
is a suitable manner to solve licensing questions on the Internet. To the extent 
collective licenses are being offered, they are rather narrow. For example, as it 
pertains to contractual licenses for copying and making content available for 
educational and scientific purposes, they apply only in closed environments and 
contain restrictions regarding use e.g. in relation to content types and ways/forms 
of use.503 As it pertains to possibilities of prosumers to obtain licenses, offered 
licenses are often too expensive or limited to certain forms of use. A problem also 
is that needed licenses from different CMOs do not necessarily correspond with 
each other even if one CMO was willing to grant more comprehensive licenses. 
Compulsory licenses would provide simpler solutions in comparison to contractual 
licenses, but it is difficult to find any that would be applicable compulsory licenses 
for use of content on the Internet. 
It should be mentioned that it is difficult to see that alternative means 
to secure use of content on the Internet would endanger position of 
authors. At the moment offered licenses are rather narrow, if they are 
501 For example, regarding podcasting Teosto refers to programs similar to radio, containing speech and music (emphasis 
here) but Gramex (a Finnish collective management organisation performing artists and phonogram producers) refers use 
similar both to television and radio. Regarding “podcasting” see e.g. homepages of Teosto (in Finnish: http://www.teosto.
fi/fi/podcasting.html) Gramex (in Finnish:  http://www.gramex.fi/fi/musiikin_kayttajat/sahkoinen_media_ja_av-tuotanto/
aanitteet_internetissa/podcasting) It could also be mentioned that Teosto also offers a license for downloading, but Gramex 
does not seem to offer a similar license. For example, as it pertains to use of recorded music on the Internet Gramex 
provides a list of different usage situations when it cannot grant a license. See e.g. homepage of Gramex, available at 
http://www.gramex.fi/fi/musiikin_kayttajat/sahkoinen_media_ja_av-tuotanto/aanitteet_internetissa. 
502 See e.g. Teosto’s license regarding video on demand (http://www.teosto.fi/fi/vod.html) and Gramex’s license regarding 
podcasting (http://www.gramex.fi/fi/musiikin_kayttajat/sahkoinen_media_ja_av-tuotanto/aanitteet_internetissa/
podcasting). 
503 It could also be mentioned that although paragraph 14 of the FCA came into force already in 2007, in practice no 
comprehensive licenses as described by it has been concluded between any CMO and educational institutions. Even the 
comprehensive license between the Ministry of Education and Culture and Kopiosto covering Universities and vocational 
high schools is narrowed to certain content types and closed networks of the educational institutions.
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being offered at all as it pertains to use of content by prosumers. This 
means that authors cannot receive any compensation in any case when 
no licensing possibilities exist. How could an alternative mean securing 
at least some compensation be worse from an author’s perspective? 
How come the situation would be worse for an author even if use of 
content by prosumers was considerd exempted from copyright as 
suggested by Article 27(1) of the UDHR as long as alternative means 
have been implemented? As long as no licenses are being offered and 
no alternative means implemented, authors cannot expect to receive 
compensations in any case.
A functional collective and especially contractual licensing system would 
necessitate that a sufficient amount of people organize themselves under adequate 
CMOs. In this respect it is difficult to see that merely enacting specific paragraphs 
for extended contractual licenses could solve licensing questions. In fact, as we all 
are content producers in information society, we should all in theory also organize 
ourselves under adequate CMOs. This would lead to some type of “democracy 
through collectives”, provided all the content types on the Internet shall be 
administered collectively and CMOs act in a democratic manner. 
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11 PLATFORM FEES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
11.1. IN GENERAL
Compensation mechanisms for compensating private copying for authors have 
existed in European countries for decades in the form of copying levies/platform 
fees.504 They are essentially meant to cover acts conducted in the private sphere as 
it has been assumed that administering use taking place between private persons 
cannot be done individually.505 Thus it may be described that justification for platform 
fees – impossibility of individual administration – is essentially the same as for the 
collective licenses. They have also been administered collectively in practice, e.g., in 
Finland through CMOs. However, they have not been exercised through exclusive 
rights in relation to prosumers. Nevertheless authors have obtained compensations. 
Therefore, as the analysis in chapter 6 indicated that direct licensing based on 
exclusive rights has not become much easier between authors and prosumers, it 
shall be evaluated from the viewpoint of fundamental rights if platform fees could 
provide a solution for securing rights of prosumers and authors.
Regarding platform fees in Europe Article 5(2) of the Infosoc directive allows 
use “(...) in respect of reproductions on any medium made by a natural person for 
private use and for ends that are neither directly nor indirectly commercial, on 
condition that the right-holders receive fair compensation which takes account of 
the application or non-application of technological measures referred to in Art. 6 to 
the work or subject-matter concerned.” The intention of the article is to compensate 
copying taking place in the private sphere, in practice by prosumers. 
In practice, it is CMOs (or similar organizations) that collect the compensations 
as stipulated in Article 5(2) of the Inforsoc directive.506 Direct payer of the fees is a 
504 See e.g. Prof. P. Bernt Hugenholtz, Dr Lucie Guibault and Sjoerd van Geffen The Future of Levies in the Digital Environment, 
Institute for Information Law 2003 (hereafter Hugenholtz, Guibault and van Geffen), p. 10 and 12. See also e.g. Committee 
Report 1974:21, Pohjoismaiden tekijänoikeuden tarkistamiskomitean mietintö osa I, Valokopiointi ja nauhoitus erityisesti 
opetusoiminnan piirissä, Helsinki 1974 and Committee Report 1982:63, Tekijänoikeuskomitean II osamietintö, Korvaus 
yksityisestä ääni- ja kuvanauhoitustoiminnasta, Tekijänoikeudellinen välimiesmenettely, Tekijänoikeusneuvosto, Helsinki 
1982. 
505 Hugenholtz, Guibault and van Geffen, p. 1, Huuskonen, p. 204 and Haarmann, p. 184. Levies (or other mechanisms for 
collecting compensations collectively) for reprographic activities are in most countries directed towards acts accomplished 
in an institutional setting e.g. by libraries, government institutions and businesses. Hugenholtz, Guibault and van Geffen, 
p. 13. 
506 Hugenholtz, Guibault and van Geffen, p. 14 ff. In Finland Section 26a(1) of the FCA states compensations for the 
reproduction of a work for private use “… shall be paid out to the authors through an organisation representing numerous 
authors of works in a certain field used in Finland in accordance with a plan for the use of the funds annually approved 
by the Ministry of Education.” In general see e.g. Yksityisen kopioinnin hyvitysmaksujärjestelmän kehittämistarpeet. 
Selvitys nykyisen hyvitysmaksujärjestelmän toimivuudesta, näköpiirissä olevista haasteista ja kehittämistarpeista. Opetus- 
ja kulttuuriministeriön työryhmämuistioita ja selvityksiä 2010:11,  p. 14 – 16. 
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manufacturer, importer or other party acquiring the used device.507 Consequently 
platform fees do not necessitate comparing exclusive rights of authors to different 
rights of prosumers. For this reason they are not either directly problematic from 
the viewpoint of a prosumers right to science and culture or from the viewpoint 
of a prosumers right to privacy or the right to life liberty and security of a person. 
In this respect platform fee or similar systems seem as potential tools for securing 
rights provided by Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR. 
However, due to collective nature of the system it is difficult align compensations 
to authors according to use of prousmers. This means that in the system prosumers 
occasionally have to pay even if they did not use content of authors, whereas authors 
on the other hand may not receive compensations even if their content was used. 
Provided users are nevertheless able to use and essential interests of authors are 
secured, these problems may be considered from a fundamental right perspective 
tolerable. However, it is often argued that it is not allowed to take private copies 
from illegal sources. Consequently, it has been claimed that it is not possible to 
apply the levy system to copies from illegal sources either. If the latter argument is 
accepted, the applicability of platform fees is narrowed down to copies from legal 
sources. Therefore it shall next be evaluated how a demand for a legal source has 
been reasoned from the viewpoint of fundamental rights. Why should it not be 
possible to apply platform fee system in order to secure the right to science and 
culture and rights of authors, if the source of use is illegal? What is been protected 
in such case?
11.2.  A REQUIREMENT FOR LEGAL SOURCE AND 
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS 
11.2.1. A FORMAL REQUIREMENT?
Although the Infosoc directive does not specifically enact that private copies cannot 
be produced from illegal sources, statements to that direction have often been 
presented.508 Consequently it may be asked how both fundamental rights as provided 
by Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR relate to possible “illegal sources”. 
At first, it should be noted that unless an author grants permission, copies are 
always produced from an illegal source unless an exemption/ limitation exists. 
507 In words of Hugenholtz, Guibault and van Geffen: “As a rule, the obligation to pay the remuneration imposed on recording 
or reprographic equipment as well as on blank recording media does not lie on the consumer, but rather on the manufacturers, 
importers, or intra-community acquirer of such devices and media. … In the majority of cases, manufacturers and importers 
of reproduction equipment or media pass the charge on to the consumers by means of the sales price such equipment 
or media. Geller observes that ‘where levies are imposed, for example, on the sales price of a copy machine, facsimile 
machine, or blank-recording tapes, there is only an intrusion at that point where these instruments enter commerce, not 
in private life.” Hugenholtz, Guibault and van Geffen, p. 18. 
508 See e.g. Haarmann, p. 159, Hugenholtz, Guibault and van Geffen, p. ii – iii and Ismo Kallioniemi, Tekijänoikeudellisista 
kysymyksistä vertaisverkossa, Defensor Legis N:o 3/2001 (hereafter Kallioniemi), p. 503 – 504.
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Thus, it may be asked if there is some type of a “special right” behind the “legal 
source-requirement” explaining why platform fees or alternative similar limitations/
exemptions making an illegal source legal could not be used. In other words, what 
is being protected if concluding individual transactions is impossible, collective 
licenses do not provide a solutions but it is not allowed to use a platform fee or a 
similar system to protect rights of prosumers and authors as enshrined in Article 27 
of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR? If such “special right” exists, the “legal source”-
requirement would seem to elevate itself above fundamental rights of prosumers 
and authors. Therefore, in order to evaluate the situation we must find reasoning 
for the “legal source” requirement. 
Considering the above mentioned, it is not surprising that it is difficult to find 
specific material justifications why illegal sources should be in a particular position. 
Instead the provided reasoning why content may be used only from a legal source 
is rather formal. It has simply been stated that it would not be right if an illegal 
copy could become a legal copy if it was produced with the help of a limitation. 
If this were the case, illegal copies would become legal. According to the Finnish 
legislator these types of situations would be unacceptable “in principle”.509 The 
justification is somewhat curious as all copies are from illegal sources unless a 
limitation has been enacted (or permission granted). Perhaps there is some logic 
in the reasoning when we follow the traditional formal relationship of exclusive 
rights (main rule) and provided excemptions/limitations (exceptions to the main 
rule). However, the approach it may be eventually criticized when we attempt to 
find material justifications for it.
A problem of a mere formal argument based on internal logic of copyright system 
(main rule versus exception to the main rule) is that it does not take into consideration 
material argumentation at all. In other words, as the aim of limitations is always 
to make illegal use legal, a mere formal argument based on internal illogicality of 
copyright system does not define at all what the right that should be protected 
“in principle” is. If material arguments are being ignored, not only objective of 
copyright itself (to secure essential economic rights of authors), but also material 
rights protecting users are being forgotten even if they belonged to core area of a 
certain fundamental rights.510 In other words, why could we not allow producing 
copies from illegal sources if compensations for authors were secured and users 
were allowed to use as postulated by Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR? 
509 See Government Bill 28/2004, p. 52 and similarly Kallioniemi, p. 503 – 504. 
510 The same problematic assumption may found from the Finnish contractual licensing system. Government Bill 28/2004 
(p. 74) postulates that use under contractual licensing necessitates that a user has obtained the work legally. It is difficult 
to understand why a user should have a legal copy at hand in order use it with permission from a right holder, in this 
case a CMO representing adequate right holders. It is true that the person who conducted the illegal act before should be 
held liable for it. However, if someone is willing to obtain permissions against compensation for the subsequent uses and 
a right holder is willing to grant them, why should this be prevented? Who benefits and how from preventing interested 
right holders and users from conducting business with each other? 
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Who would lose/what would be protected if users were able to use and authors 
would get compensations? Moreover, in addition that the requirement is merely a 
formal one, it may be asked if it is (at least in Finland) also theoretical. 
It could already at this point be stated that to the extent copyright 
primarily protects corporate interests, the situation would mean that 
interests of private legal persons have been elevated above fundamental 
rights of prosumers and authors with rhetoric’s demanding “legal 
sources”.511 From a corporate perspective, it would be logical to prevent 
use of content on the Internet even through a platform fee or similar 
system, if it is considered that the generated revenues are smaller than 
losses the system would cause to other content markets. However, this 
is problematic as it is difficult to see that “market control” or similar 
interests could be elevated above fundamental rights. 
11.2.2. A THEORETICAL REQUIREMENT?  
Regardless of the above mentioned national legislations may entitle 
using content produced from an illegal source. For example, producing 
copies for private purposes from illegal sources is possible in Finland. 
It has been regarded that although it is illegal to produce copies from 
illegal sources it is not punishable to do so, if a prosumer produces only 
few copies. The justification for not making it punishable is that it is not 
possible to always know whether a certain expression has been placed 
on the Internet with the permission of the right holder.512 A prosumer 
may have to pay compensations and be subject to forfeiture of the copy, 
if s/he knew that the copy was produced from an illegal source.513 
Thus, although producing private copies is illegal, the outcome is that the system 
in practice already resembles a platform fee (or similar) compensation system: a 
prosumer is able (although formally not allowed) to produce copies. If s/he knew 
that the copies were from an illegal source, s/he should pay compensation.514 This 
511 This would be a rational aim for a corporation in practice if it believed that platform fee/levy systems are not capable of 
maximizing its profits as they would compete with other, more lucrative, sources of income.
512 Relevance has also been given to small quantities (and quality) of copies taken by prosumers in individual cases. See e.g. 
Section 56a of the FCA, Government Bill 28/2004, p. 52 – 53, and Haarmann, p. 159. 
513 See Sections 57 and 58 of the FCA, Statement of the Constitutional Law Committee 7/2005, p. 4 and Harenko, Niiranen 
& Tarkela, p. 89 – 91. 
514 It is true that a prosumer is also subject to forfeiture of the copies if s/he knew that they were from an illegal source. 
However, it may be asked why this should be the case if the proumer pays adequate compensation i.e. the result is as 
postulated by Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCR: a prosumer obtains a copy and the author get compensations. 
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implies that, as it pertains to copies produced by prosumers, the requirement for 
a legal source is close to theoretical.515 
One has deviated from the legal source-requirement also in certain other 
occasions. For example, temporary reproductions enabling use on the Internet as 
provided by FCA 11a of the FCA (corresponding Article 5(1) of the Infosoc directive) 
has also been allowed in Finland even if the source is illegal. This is understandable 
from the viewpoint of freedom of expression as e.g. use of Internet would not be 
possible as it is used today if copies referred in Article 5(1) of the Infosoc directive 
were not exempted. Moreover, the legal source-requirement in Finland does not 
concern public displaying and public presenting of expressions. Only producing 
copies from illegal sources is unacceptable.516 This would mean that platform fees 
could be used to make content available on the Internet. It has also specifically 
been allowed to take citations (Section 22 of the FCA) even if the source of the 
content is illegal. 
Moreover, it is worthwhile to note that certain acts in archives, libraries 
and museums (Section 16 and 16a – 16c of the FCA) and use of work when the 
administration of justice or public security so requires (Section 25d, subsection 2 
and 5 of the FCA) have been allowed even if the source was an illegal copy. For 
example, Section 16(b) of the FCA (Use of works in libraries preserving cultural 
material) allows a defined library to “make copies of works made available to the 
public in information networks for inclusion in its collections” without an obligation 
to pay compensations to authors. This is noteworthy as from the viewpoint of 
fundamental rights we do not need to see these exemptions as exemptions protecting 
first generation individual rights such as the right to science and culture, but instead 
as exemptions protecting collective cultural rights.517 In other words, if exemptions 
may be enacted in such cases it should be even more easier to enact them in 
order to protect rights of prosumers as first generation liberty rights especially 
as the mentioned institutions (libraries as a clear example) particularly exist for 
prosumers.518 This again implies that no weight in the evaluation has been given 
to the right to science and culture as provided in Article 27(1) of the UDHR and 
15(1)(a) of the ICESCR. 
515 If one does not accept the interpretation that e.g. the Finnish situation already resembles a patform fee system, we come 
back to the original question: who benefits from preventing use against compensation?
516 See Section 11, subsection 5 of the FCA. See the Finnish Copyright Act (1961/404) in more detail (in English) http://
www.finlex.fi/en/laki/kaannokset/1961/en19610404.pdf. See also Kristiina Harenko, Valtteri Niiranen and Pekka Tarkela, 
Tekijänoikeus – kommentaari ja käsikirja, Porvoo 2006 (hereafter Harenko, Niiranen & Tarkela), p. 88 – 89.
517 For example, Harenko, Valtteri Niiranen and Pekka Tarkela in general terms speak of “important societal interests” when 
referring to use of work when the administration of justice or public security so requires. See Harenko, Valtteri Niiranen 
and Pekka Tarkela, p. 198.
518 It could be mentioned that the section also allows even communicating published works to a member of a public on certain 
conditions. See Section 16(b) of the FCA and Harenko, Niiranen and Pekka Tarkela, p. 133 ff.
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11.3. CONCLUDING REMARKS ON PLATFORM FEES
Levies/platform fees have been introduced for the same reasons as collective 
licenses: it has been considered impossible to administer rights individually. As 
they are collected from other actors but prosumers, they do not pose similar direct 
problems in relation to the rights of prosumers as exclusive rights do. 
It is difficult to see that a requirement for a legal source could prevent using 
platform fees as it is unclear what a requirement for a “legal source” materially “in 
principle” protects from the viewpoint of fundamental rights. In other words if a 
levy/platform fee system secures rights of prosumers and authors it is difficult to 
see why it could not be used.519 This is also supported by a notion that national 
legislation may allow use of content from illegal sources in occasions that are not as 
strongly protected as rights of prosumers from the viewpoint of fundamental rights 
analysis. In other words if producing copies is allowed for libraries, it is difficult 
to understand how it could be denied from prosumers. Moreover, in practice the 
Finnish system already resembles a platform fee system: if a prosumer knowingly 
produces a copy from an illegal source, s/he must pay compensations for producing 
it. Thus, it is difficult to see that in the light of fundamental rights something could 
prevent using platform fee or similar alternative compensation models in order to 
secure rights of prosumers and authors. Another thing is that compensations should 
be directed to those (“ailing”) authors in need in order to claim that a platform 
fee/levy system has a fundamental right extension from an author’s perspective.520
519 Even if (for some reason) one argued that impossibility to use content is not problematic for authors, the situation would 
clearly be problematic from the viewpoint rights of prosumers as provided by Article 27(1) of the UDHR and 15(1)(a) of 
the ICESCR (or the right to privacy if considered as the proper right). Moreover, it should be remembered that producing 
copies from illegal sources may also in some occasions lead to indirect benefits for authors (e.g. through network effects) 
even if no direct compensation was secured for authors.
520 At the moment compensations are not distributed rigorously to those authors whose expressions were used. For example, 
in Finalnd collecting and distributing mechanisms for the compensations are based on the size of platforms. Moreover, 
according to paragraph 26a of the FCA some of the compensations are distributed also for “common purposes”. See 
also Committee Report 2002:5, Tekijänoikeustoimikunnan mietintö, Tekijänoikeudet tietoyhteiskunnassa, Ehdotukset 
tietoyhteiskuntadirektiivin edellyttämiksi lainsäädännön muutoksiksi. Muut tekijänoikeuslain muutosehdotukset, p. 76. 
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12  CONCLUSIONS, ALTERNATIVES AND 
SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE
12.1.  THE RIGHT TO SCIENCE AND CULTURE AND RIGHTS OF 
AUTHORS
This dissertation has evaluated possibilities to fulfill the right to science and culture 
and rights of authors as provided by Article 27 of the UDHR and 15 of the ICESCER. 
The evaluation focused on use of content on the Internet, which was understood as 
an open network. In order to accomplish this task, the book first evaluated the right 
to science and culture as provided by Article 27.1 of the UDHR and Article 15(1) of 
the ICESCR. As a counter balance to rights of authors, it was concluded that the right 
to science and culture grants everyone the right to use knowledge and expressions 
in different forms. As General Comment 21 states, “the right of everyone to seek, 
receive and share information on all manifestations of culture in the language of 
the person’s choice, and the access of communities to means of expressions and 
dissemination.”521 However, its core area was understood to cover limited amounts 
of content, which States have particular obligation to secure. Indeed, the Finnish 
constitutional doctrine does not accept that core areas of fundamental rights could 
be criminalized. 
This thesis continued by evaluating copyright from the viewpoint of individualistic 
droit d’ auteur copyright theory and its application as a property right. It was found 
that the core of copyright as a fundamental right protects the essential economic 
interests of authors.522 Applying copyright to the Internet involved certain theoretical 
challenges. It is easy to accept that expressions are being created and exist, but it 
is theoretically difficult to evaluate expressions when they are transformed into 
digital form. Regarding the possibility of administering copyrighted expressions 
as property, it was concluded that authors have only minimal possibilities to 
factually administer the use of their content. Thus, it was considered that the right 
of reproduction and a right to make content available should be seen as legal rights, 
which stipulate when permission should be asked from an author.523 However, a 
right holder must be able to conclude transactions for the functionality of exclusive 
521 General Comment 21 paragraph 16(a). 
522 Evaluation of so called moral rights was excluded from the scope of the book.
523 In this respect copyright resembles a certain type of busines model embedded to law: an assumption is that expression 
creation is funded by asking permissions from right holders in certain points defined in copyright law. 
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rights. If concluding transactions is not possible, a right holder cannot expect to 
obtain compensation. Based on the right to science and culture, it is difficult to 
see why prosumers should be denied access to content in cases where concluding 
transactions is not possible. If authors are unable to obtain compensation and 
prosumers are denied their right to science and culture there is be a certain type 
of ”maximization of misery,” as both the right to science and culture and authors 
rights would be endangered. 
Regarding the applicability of exclusive rights on the Internet, it was found 
to be impossible for anyone to supervise when a certain piece of content is being 
reproduced on a certain platform on the Internet in a manner that necessitates 
permission from a right holder. Consequently, it was suggested that economic rights 
of right holders could be perceived as rights to communicate content, as the right of 
reproduction was compared to the basics of communications research. If this were 
accepted, we would not need to focus on copies forming haphazardly on different 
platforms of the internet but instead on the persons communicating them.
When the protected core area of the right to science and culture was compared 
to individualistic copyright theory as a property right, it was difficult to see how 
exclusive rights could provide a functional solution to secure the right to science and 
culture and essential economic interests of authors. This is because it is challenging 
to fulfill the basic material interests of authors through exclusive rights in an 
author – prosumer-relationship when the right to science and culture is taken 
into consideration. If a prosumer needs permission from an author in order to 
enjoy his/her right to science and culture, the right to science and culture is being 
subordinated to the exclusive rights of authors. This is problematic given that it 
should not be possible to criminalize (as stealing) core areas of other fundamental 
rights.524 Such a situation would be putting a price – even if a reasonable one – 
on the fundamental rights to science and culture. Even if supremacy of exclusive 
rights of authors over the right to science and culture were accepted and collected 
compensations were used to secure essential economic interests of those authors, 
it would be difficult to consider the criminalization of the activities of prosumers 
a proportional reaction to a nominal monetary damage to an author (e.g. a 0,07 
euro damage corresponding to fee required by a Finnish CMO per downloaded 
track).525 Moreover, as fundamental rights protect only certain essential interests, 
524 Making comparisons between copyright and traditional goods as property was also challenging. How could an author be 
deprived from his/her right “to peacefully enjoy his property” if s/he is completely able to use his/her property despite 
someone takes a copy of it? It is also difficult to grant fundamental rights protection for authors if their essential economic 
interests have already been fulfilled or if the author does not have any intention to use a certain piece of work in order 
secure his/her economic interests. 
525 As explained, the proportionality test of the ECJ aiming to balance or weigh approach to fundamental rights asks first 
whether limitation of a right by an act of the Community institutions has a legitimate or justified aim or purpose from the 
standpoint of the objectives of the Treaty on European Union. One should also take into consideration whether the act 
limiting a fundamental right is indispensable for the achievement of its goal. It is inquired from the viewpoint of human 
rights if more lenient means would be available for reaching the desired goal. Finally one should examine if the restrictions 
169
from a practical viewpoint a prosumers challenge would be to predetermine whether 
an author is in need of a fundamental right protection or whether a certain use by 
an individual prosumer had an impact on the economic position of the author.526 
It was also difficult see how it would be possible to conclude individual 
transactions between authors and prosumers for using content on the Internet. 
Excluding so -called Creative Commons and similar open licenses, it was also difficult 
to find empirical evidence indicating that individual prosumers and authors were 
interested in concluding individual transactions with each other regarding use of 
content on the Internet, even if it were possible.
These findings indicated that exclusive rights do not exist primarily to secure 
essential economic interests of individual authors nor to enable the use of content by 
prosumers as provided by the right to science and culture. Consequently, they also 
support claims arguing that copyright is primarily used by legal persons for business. 
For this reason, a prosumer’s right to science and culture was next compared to 
the position of corporations from a fundamental right perspective.
12.2.  THE RIGHT TO SCIENCE AND CULTURE AND 
CORPORATIONS
As the direct role of authors regarding use of content on the Internet seemed 
negligible, reciprocal relationship between prosumers and corporations as copyright 
right holders was evaluated from the viewpoint of fundamental rights, which poses 
the same basic theoretical challenges as when the relationship between the right 
to science and culture was compared to rights of authors as natural persons. If it 
was considered that a prosumer needed permission from a legal person before 
use, exclusive rights of legal persons would be elevated above the right to science 
and culture. 
The above challenges would be mitigated if licenses with reasonable terms were 
offered to prosumers. In theory legal persons owning copyrighted content – or in 
general terms traditional content industry – should strike a deal with prosumers as 
they traditionally have done with new users. However, in practice, prosumers are 
often unable to afford the necessary licenses. This creates a particular problem, as 
it seems as though copyright is not being applied in order to enable use. Instead, it 
seems that copyright is de facto being used by legal persons for business protection 
and in this respect to prevent use of prosumers. This is not only probelmatic from 
are proportionate and tolerable interference to the human rights in relation to the pursued aim.
526 Rigorous examination whether essential economic interests of certain authors have been endangered due to a certain use 
should not be considered as an unreasonable requirement. As has been explained, already now one examines in theory 
whether individual words exceed threshold for copyright protection or whether they have been produced as copies on 
different platforms.  
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the viewpoint of the right to science and culture, but also from that of the right to life, 
liberty and security of person and the right to privacy, as in cases when corporation 
attempts to use coercive power against prosumers in their homes. 
This is particularly relevant given that it is challenging for a legal person to claim 
fundamental rights protection although P1-1 of the ECHR so formally provides. It 
is primarily difficult to see that legal persons could fulfill requirements for earning 
fundamental rights protection as, in principle, fundamental rights protect natural 
persons.  In particular, individualistic droit d’ auteur copyright theory excludes legal 
persons from fundamental rights protection. Furthermore, there are no stipulations 
in international copyright treaties or EU-directives obligating corporations to 
distribute compensations to those whose essential interests need protection, as the 
aim of fundamental rights protection postulates. Instead, maximization of profits 
to owners is often the principal aim for legal persons. It is noteworthy it is not an 
aim or a value protected by any fundamental rights but instead set in regular law. 
In fact, obligating legal persons to first pay compensations to those who are in 
most need would often be in conflict with the aim to maximize profits. Thus, it is 
generally difficult to add fundamental rights protection aiming to secure certain 
essential interests (“essential foodstuffs, of essential primary health care, of basic 
shelter and housing…”) to legal persons as right holders.527 In other words, States 
are not obligated to secure the “essential interests” of legal persons, only authors 
and prosumers as natural persons. 
Considering the aforementioned argument, it is problematic that the formal 
reading of law entitles legal persons (including large corporations) to claim damages 
from natural persons who act as the right to science and culture postulates. The 
only exception to the exclusion of legal persons from fundamental rights protection 
is if smaller legal person are considered to enjoy indirect fundamental rights 
protection through their owners. However, even if prosumers and authors/smaller 
legal persons were interested in concluding direct transactions with each other, 
it could be questioned whether it would be proportionate to that authors could 
criminalize even “stealing” 0,07 euro worth of property when the right to science 
and culture, right to privacy and right to liberty, life and security of a person of 
prosumers is taken into consideration. It is also disproportionate, if staling a candy 
bar worth 1 euro may at best (in Finland) lead to 6 month imprisonment as a petty 
theft (in practice a small fine would be given), why should copying a music track 
lead to 2 years of imprisonment? Provided copyright allows systems containing an 
element of “rough justice” (i.e. not rigorous sanctions if an author does not obtain 
every cent) in order to secure rights of authors, applying it should also be possible 
527 It is possible that legal persons occasionally have other main objectives as profit maximization. For example, legal persons 
focusing on charity work may have same principal objectives which are embedded to fundamental rights. If this is the case 
articles of that particular association/corporate charters should in these cases specifically state this objective. Moreover, 
those legal persons should also de facto act accordingly.
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when one attempts to secure the rights of prosumers.528 In short, the problem of 
the Infosoc Directive (and the laws following it) is that it fails to acknowledge the 
proportionality principle suggesting that more lenient forms of punishment should 
be used. Property right may be considered to be the easiest example: why should 
causing a 0,07 euro damage entitle using police force (using tax payers money) to 
imprison the person for two years (using tax payers money), thereby preventing 
the prosumer from working and contributing to a society? If copyright is actually 
in the first instance used to protect economic interests of legal persons – in words 
of Gervais for “professionals”529 to “organize markets for certain types of works of 
art or the intellect530 – it may be asked whether it directly protects property right 
at all as property of prosumers seems to be completely forgotten. In this situation, 
the law seems to consider the property of right holders as to be somehow “better”. 
It is difficult to believe that majority of people – i.e. those who do not receive 
compensations from content industry – would accept that their property should 
be of less value or that their right to science and culture, right to privacy and right 
to liberty, life and security be worthless. However, treating “property right” in this 
manner corresponds with the amoral aim of corporations to maximize profits as 
described by Harding, Kohl, Salmon and especially Bakan. To the extent that a 
formal reading of law is accepted, corporations are able to elevate themselves above 
fundamental rights in their pursuit of profit and power. From the viewpoint of 
fundamental rights of prosumers, the situation is concerning: legal protection would 
not exist for those in most need, i.e., those who in economical sense are the weakest, 
but for those who are often the strongest, economically. The disproportionality of 
the situation is highlighted in cases when large corporations demand rigorously 
respect of copyright, but do not necessarily compensate the initial authors at all. 
Consequently, as it pertains to the use of content on the Internet, it would be 
problematic from the viewpoint of the right to science and culture if legal persons 
would be able to influence its core area. As states should secure essential interests 
of authors, but authors and prosumers seem uninterested in concluding individual 
transactions with each other, alternative mechanisms for securing rights of authors 
should be considered. Adopting a fundamental right approach would likely force 
industries to renew their business models (or suffer losses if unable to do so) while 
protecting the fundamental rights of prosumers. States might also consider using 
alternative support mechanisms for industries, if considered necessary. Thus, from 
the viewpoint of fundamental rights, the content industry should be unable to 
criminalize activities in a society, which belong to a protected core area of a certan 
fundamental right even if they argue that they are protecting the fundamental rights 
528  See Vilanka 2010 (passim).
529  See Gervais 2010, p. 10 and 14 and Gervais 2006, p. 8. 
530  Gervais 2010, p. 15. In the citation Gervais refers especially to economical rights of a right holder. 
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of their employees, just as other industries are unable to criminalize activities in 
society by claiming that they protect their employees. 
In order to by pass the challenges related to fulfilling the right to science and 
culture and rights of authors, it was evaluated whether intermediaries could act 
as agents of prosumers regarding the use of content on the Internet. This was 
found challenging if the Internet is understood as an open network. Making the 
claim that an intermediary is liable for use of copyrighted content is problematic 
because such a claim turns an intermediary into a user, which contradicts its original 
status as an intermediary. It is also difficult to see how an intermediary could ask 
permission on behalf of a prosumer before a prosumer has posted a certain piece 
of content on the Internet. It was then evaluated whether collective licenses could 
provide a solution as it pertains to the use of content on the Internet by prosumers. 
However, the collective licenses currently available the use content on the Internet 
seem to be very narrow (at least in Finland). Collecting management organizations 
administering collective licenses are also legal persons, which would, in the above 
mentioned way, make the situation problematic from the viewpoint of fundamental 
rights in cases where a CMO successfully claims that a prosumer violates its rights. 
These findings made it questionable whether fulfilling the aim of copyright and 
the core area of the right to science and culture regarding use of content on the 
Internet may be secured through exclusive rights at all. Consequently, alternative 
mechanisms for securing fundamental rights of prosumers and individual authors 
could be suggested as it pertains to the use of content on the Internet.
12.3.  ALTERNATIVE SUGGESTIONS FOR SECURING THE RIGHT 
TO SCIENCE AND CULTURE AND RIGHTS OF AUTHORS ON 
THE INTERNET
12.3.1.  MUST A STRICT AND RIGOROUS APPROACH TO COPYRIGHT BE A 
PREMISE? 
It shall fist be briefly evaluated if a rigorous and strict approach to copyright must be 
a premise that we cannot deviate from. According to Stephen E. Siwek, value added 
by core copyright industries in 2007 in U.S was 904.3 billion dollars whereas value 
added by total copyright industries in 2007 was 1,583.6 trillion dollars. In 2011, U.S. 
copyright industries employed over five million workers, who on average are paid 
significantly more than the average wage in the U.S.531 Now, would all creativity 
and existing copyright industry vanish, if an alternative, less rigorous approach to 
copyright regarding use of content on the internet was applied? Although it may 
531 See Stephen E. Siwek, Copyright Industries in the U.S. Economy, The 2011 Report, prepared for the international intellectual 
property alliance, p. 2 and 4. In general see also Ville Oksanen, Five Essays on Copyright in the Digital Era, a doctoral 
dissertation, Turre publishing 2008, p. 23 ff.
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be argued that freer distribution of content may harm the traditional copyright 
industry,532 this book finds it unlikely that alternative compensation models for 
authors would cause unbearable damage to the traditional content industry.
This is because theory does not suggest that a strict approach is necessary, as it 
is not clear whether or not copyright is beneficial for the society in the first place. In 
the words of Posner: “Unfortunately, economists do not know whether the existing 
system of intellectual property rights is, or for that matter whether any other system 
of intellectual property rights would be, a source of net social utility, given the costs 
of the system and the existence of alternative sources of incentives to create such 
property.”533 As presented in chapter 3, there are also theories supporting the benefits 
of a more open access to content. There are also research results indicating that 
the industries benefitting from fair use and other limitations are much larger than 
the copyright-based industries. According to Rogers and Szamosszeg “industries 
benefiting from fair use and other limitations and exceptions make a large and 
growing contribution to the U.S. economy. The fair use economy in 2006 accounted 
for $4.5 trillion in revenues and $2.2 billion in value added, roughly 16.2 percent 
of U.S. GDP. It employed more than 17 million people and supported a payroll of 
$1.2 trillion. It generated $194 billion in exports and rapid productivity growth.”534 
Moreover, the immense, constantly evolving mass of information freely available on 
the Internet is empirical proof that incentives to create expressions exist, even when 
exclusive rights are not been applied.535 Alternative means but an exclusive right to 
secure rights of prosumers and authors is not revolutionary from the viewpoint of 
history of copyright. Indeed, platform fees were introduced because it was considered 
impossible to administer use of content individually in cases enabling private use 
for non-commercial purposes; as is the case today when it comes to the relationship 
of prosumers and authors regarding use of content on the Internet. 
When we evaluate the possibility of securing both the rights of prosumers and 
authors we may see that there is no inherent need for strict copyright approach. 
These examples were not intended as claims that exclusive rights have no benefits. 
Instead, they are presented here as arguments proving that creativity exists even 
when exclusive rights are not applied. For that reason, alternative approaches 
532 For example, according to a study conducted by Lyhty (an organisation for right holders supporting creative work and 
entrepreneurship) in 2010 already in Finland Internet piracy caused losses amounting to 355 million euro. See Lyhty’s 
www-pages (in Finnish) at: http://www.kulttuuriuutiset.net/gallupit/piratismin_tuomat_menetykset_2010. It should be 
noted that Lyhty is a society representing right holders.
533 Richar A. Posner, Intellectual Property: The Law and Economics Approach, Journal of Economic Perspectives – Volume 
19, number 2– Spring 2005, p.59. See also e.g. Pirkko-Liisa Aro, Ennakkokäyttöoikeus patentinhaltijan yksinoikeuden 
rajoituksena. Vammala1972, p. 28 ff and Martti Castrén, Vahingonkorvaus immateriaalioikeudessa, silmälläpitäen patentti-, 
tavaramerkki-, mallioikeus-, tekijänoikeus ja valokuvauslakia. Vammala 1979, p.7.
534 Rogers, T., & Szamosszegi, A. (2007). Fair Use in the U. S. Economy: Economic Contribution of Industries Relying on 
Fair Use, p. 9. 
535 Benkler, p. 35 – 41 and Shaver, p. 159 - 160 with references. It may also be questioned whether it is rational that a doctrine 
from the industrial society should prevent using technologies of information age. 
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to copyright may be suggested when evaluating the possibility of securing the 
prosumers’ right to science and culture and the rights of authors.536
From the viewpoint of fundamental rights, this would mean that the legislature 
secured the right to science and culture for prosumers and the essential economic 
interests of authors in an alternative manner, but both through exclusive rights. 
As previously explained, prosumers and authors do not seem to be interested in 
concluding transactions with each other as fulfilling exclusive rights postulates. 
On one hand, as legal persons are in principle excluded from fundamental rights 
protection, the system should enable the use and distribution of content without 
their interference to secure the right to science and culture. In other words, from a 
prosumers perspective one should be able to use limited amounts of content as the 
core area of the right to science and culture postulates. On the other hand, from an 
authors perspective compensations should be distributed to authors whose essential 
economic interests have been endangered. In order to maintain individuality in the 
system, this would mean authors whose content has been used at some point, but 
who do not fare economically well despite this use. How the systems could look 
like in practice shall be evaluated next.
12.3.2. BASIC PLATFORM FEES AS AN ALTERNATIVE TO EXCLUSIVE RIGHTS?
In chapter 6.4, it was suggested that the Internet could be perceived as a 
singular platform for copying and communicating content. Hence, to enable 
the use of content between prosumers and authors, a platform fee system could 
be employed, covering different platforms used in communication processes 
on the Internet. In chapter 11 it was argued that this should not be a problem 
from the viewpoint of fundamental rights if both the rights of prosumers and 
authors may be secured. On the other hand, as long as prosumers are not able 
to use content as provided by Article 27.1 of the UDHR, legislature is neglecting 
its obligation to fulfil the aforementioned right.537 One problem related to a 
platform fee system would be defining its extent: what should be considered 
a relevant platform? It is also difficult to rigorously pinpoint whose content 
has been used on certain platforms. This is not only problematic from the 
viewpoint of authors but also from the viewpoint of prosumers’ property rights 
since a platform fee system collects compensations even when the content of 
536 It could be mentioned that also findings supporting compulsory licensing support claims for finding alternative avenues 
in order to secure rights of prosumers and authors. In this respect see e.g. Huuskonen (passim).
537 Similarly television license fees have been used to enable broadcasting and consequently economics of authors (although 
they have not been considered directly as fees for copyright holders). Furthermore e.g. in Finland Act on Public Lending 
Right Compensation Grants and Subsidies (236/1961) secures compensations to writers and translators for the use of 
libraries (“lainauskorvaus”). Also these mechanisms indicae that alternative solutions in order to secure rights of authors 
and prosumers could be concidered. 
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right holders was not used by the prosumer. If this is accepted by both parties 
as “rough justice,” history would suggest that the problem could be tolerable. 
Although the system would enable only non-commercial use by prosumers, in 
practice it would most likely be opposed by the content industry as it would 
cause difficulties in controlling markets. Consequently, it shall next be asked 
whether government granted licenses could be a solution. 
12.3.3. GOVERNMENT GRANTED LICENSES
As granting and obtaining individual licenses for use of content on the Internet 
often seems impossible, one solution could be the governments granting licenses for 
prosumers. As it would be difficult to maintain a register for each existing expression 
possibly exceeding a required threshold for copyright protection, the licenses could 
be blanket licenses for certain content types such as e.g. music, audiovidual products 
etc. In practice, these licenses would compete with commercial services (such as 
Spotify, Netflix, etc.) in a similar manner as public broadcasting services compete 
with commercial broadcasters. They would also compete with collective licenses 
of CMOs, provided they ever are able to offer wide enough licenses. A government 
granted license would thus release a prosumer from liability and be a certain type 
of a compulsory license from an author’s perspective. As has been explained, it is 
often impossible for authors to conclude individual transactions based on exclusive 
rights with prosumers. This was one reason why platform fees were suggested. 
A government -granted license would provide a tool for prosumers to act legally 
and secure some compensation for authors. While not all prosumers would buy 
itthere would be thea possibility to buy a license, which is not the case at the 
moment. Unlike platform fees, government -granted licenses would also take the 
property of prosumers into consideration as it would not be mandatory to obtain 
one if a prosumer decided not to use any content. As monthly fees for commercial 
services are from 5 to 10 euro, a similar amount could allow a prosumer to copy 
and share, e.g., 36 - 72 music tracks a month as if a cost for a music track would 
be 0,14 euro.538 However, the number given number is a gross estimation.539 This 
suggestion offers a simple solution, which is not influenced by legal persons, and 
could be applied to enable use and compensations in a roughly correct manner.540 
538 As explained, a Finnish CMO offers licenses for 0,07 euros for communicating music on the Internet on certain conditions. 
The CMO in question represents composers, lyricist, arrangers and music publishers, but not performers and phonogram 
producers. For that reason the license fee offered in the example was 0,14 euro. 
539 As mentioned, according to some sources a popular music service Spotify pays approximately 0,005 euros per download 
to an author. See Hans Handgraaf, Spotify royalties, available (in English) at: http://www.spotidj.com/spotifyroyalties.htm. 
From this point of view a five euro monthly price should allow much wider use than 36 – 72 tracks for the prosumer.
540 As has been explained, an element of rough justice has already been introduced to copyright and thus applying it in order 
to secure rights of prosumers should not be a problem.
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It should be irrelevant for authors whether compensations are being paid through 
a commercial service (such as Spotify) or another system. From the fundamental 
rights viewpoint, collected compensations should be distributed in the first instance 
to those authors whose essential economical rights have been endangered.541 Finally, 
it shall be suggested that a specification to Limited Liability Companies Acts could 
provide solutions to the situation.
12.3.4. CORPORATIONS AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
One of the concerns that has arisen in this book has been the fact that legal persons 
(corporations) attempt to elevate themselves above existing fundamental rights 
doctrine. This problem could be tackled by an amendment to the limited liability 
companies acts and other acts regulating legal persons. For example, it could be 
specified in these acts that the purpose of a company would be generating profits for 
the owners but only to extent that it takes into account fundamental rights of others 
as specified (e.g.) in the UDHR and ICESCR. Although this should theoretically 
already be the case, such an amendment would cement the meaning of fundamental 
rights and prevent companies from arguing that their main – blind – purpose is to 
maximize profits to owners. Thus, the suggestion would not forbid legal persons 
from pursuing for profit, but it would rank that objective as a secondary objective 
behind fundamental rights. This type of amendment would also allow corporations 
to make decisions that take fundamental rights into consideration. As explained by 
Bakan, corporations are obligated to follow the main rule of profit maximization 
even though it is not always necessarily desired by their personnel. Profit as the 
primary aim of companies has also been criticized in recent economic literature.542 
12.4. SUGGESTION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH
12.4.1. ACKNOWLEDGING PROPERTY RIGHT OF PROSUMERS
One way to bring balance to copyright could be acknowledging prosumers’ property 
rights in relation to the rights of authors. A prosumer’s property right could be 
perceived as a mirror image to the exclusive rights of authors. In practice, this 
would mean that prosumers (particularly passive end users) should be liberated 
from paying compensation if they do not receive any content or do not want to 
541 In theory a problem would be that in the information society we all are authors. Thus in practice compensations should 
be distributed those authors who de facto attempt to maintain themselves through by content creation. 
542 See e.g. Steve Denning, The Origin Of ‘The Worlds Dumbest Idea’: Milton Friedman, published in Forbes in 
26.6.2013, available at:  http://www.forbes.com/sites/stevedenning/2013/06/26/the-origin-of-the-worlds-dumbest-idea-
milton-friedman/. 
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receive any content. As this is already the case regarding traditional property, why 
should we not respect a prosumer’s negative property right to money they have in 
their wallets as it pertains to the use of copyrighted content? Or in other words: 
why is “stealing” from prosumers accepted whereas it is rigorously demanded that 
exclusive rights of authors should be followed with “zero tolerance”? How this might 
work in practice is illustrated below. 
A prosumer – traditionally in the role of consumer/end user – is always the 
eventual payer of copyright compensations. This is the case if music is played in 
restaurants, shops, taxis or any public place. A prosumer pays as an end user even 
if the prosumer does not hear any music.543 This is simply because turning of or 
otherwise not listening to the music does not affect a prosumer’s restaurant bill or 
taxi fare, although the cost is passed on to the prosumers as end users. Moreover, 
jails and hospitals may be considered a public places where a license is needed in 
order to play music. Despite this, as a tax payer, a prosumer has to pay for content 
used in those institutions although s/he would never personally use them. Although 
this may at first feel as a far-fetched example, one should remember that regarding 
copyright it has been rigorously evaluated whether rights of authors have been 
violated or not. As a mirror image to copyright, property of prosumers should be 
similarly respected. Consequently, the question remains: why should a prosumer 
pay for products s/he does receive or does not want to receive? Why is the property 
of prosumers not protected with “zero tolerance” i.e. in a similar manner as it is 
considered that property or authors should be protected? 
Therefore, if a prosumer’s negative property right is accepted as a mirror image to 
author’s property right, it may now be asked if someone violates the property rights of 
a prosumer when a prosumer looses his/her money for products s/he never received 
or wanted to receive. In fact, from the viewpoint of prosumers’ property rights, one 
could ask whether those who receive compensations from prosumers in these cases 
are actually stealing from prosumers.544 In other words, if it is not acceptable to steal 
from right holders, why should be acceptable to steal from prosumers? It would be 
unconvincing for copyright holder to argue that the examples are exaggerations as 
copyright holders themselves demand rigorous respect regarding their property. As 
previously mentioned, even a singular word may exceed the threshold for protection 
and it may be rigorously evaluated whether the word is being copied on a certain 
platform. Keeping this in mind, right holders should also rigorously respect property 
of prosumers: if one demands others to rigorously honour his/her property s/he 
should also rigorously honour the property of others.
543 Because e.g. the taxi driver has turned off the radio or the prosumer has asked him/her to do so because s/he prefers to 
be in silence or just dislices that particular song.
544 From this point of view one may only ponder the economical damages prosumers have suffered throught the times of 
copyright when they have paid for products they have never received or wanted to receive. 
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On the other hand if one accepts that principle of proportionality should be 
taken into consideration, as is suggested in this book, it could be recommended 
that the property right of prosumers and authors should be taken into consideration 
more generally when relevant usage situations are defined. This could mean that 
property right of prosumers would kick in in situations when a prosumer goes to 
public places where his/her primary interest is not using the content. For example, 
it is unlikely that a prosumer goes to a jail or uses a taxi in order to listen to music. 
However, it may be postulated that music plays a role when a prosumer decides 
goes to a restaurant, night club or watches television/listens to radio (justifying 
why broadcasters should pay compensations to authors). Thus acknowledging a 
prosumers property right would bring balance when evaluating relevant usage 
situations. Consequently, evaluating this topic further may be recommended.
12.4.2. OTHER TOPICS
One of the main concerns presented in this book has been excessive use of power 
by legal persons in relation to the lives of private individuals. In this respect, it 
should be noted that digitalization also enables the observing of activities of private 
individuals in a manner that was not previously possible. For example, the traditional 
content industry has been keen to observe individuals behaving in a manner not 
desired by it. Moreover, also other companies providing different types of services 
(e.g. social media and search engines) on the Internet are widely exploiting the 
information of individual persons. For example, according to annual report 2012 of 
the Finnish Security Intelligence Service, “Internet moguls” of the future will have 
more real time information about individuals than Governments have.545 Although 
the accuracy of this statement may be questioned due to recent leaks regarding 
surveillance of States, particularly the Unites States, it is clear that a topic for future 
research should be evaluating the relationship of a right to privacy as provided by 
Article 12 of the UDHR in relation to possibilities of corporations and States to 
exploit the personal information of private persons.546
Finally, one sidedness and certain inconsistencies in copyright law raise concerns 
of improper motives behind copyright law.547 For example, it is not plausible to 
believe that the majority of people would wittingly allow defining the concept of 
545 See Annual report of the Finnish Security Intelligence Service 2012, p. 4.
546 One needs not to be a lawyer in order to undersand significance of the topic. See e.g. speech of Mikko Hyppönen 




547 In fact, already maintaining an idea that copyright first and foremost would be for individual authors as natural persons 
who administer their content is misleading. 
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property in a manner that does not benefit the majority by considering the majority’s 
property as inferior in comparison to right holder’s property. This notion is not 
merely connected to the position of prosumers and intermediaries. For example, 
in chapter 4.2.2, products used to circumvent digital rights management systems, 
which in practice are used by legal persons, may easily exceed the threshold for 
copyright protection as expressions. However, it may be a crime to create and share 
them – based on norms often placed in copyright laws. In other words, copyright 
law may consider it a crime to act as copyright theory postulates, whereas it at the 
same time may demand that basics of copyright should be rigorously honored. Why 
should people respect copyright if the legislator does not follow its basic tenets? This 
is ambiguous, as in both cases the law follows the interests of traditional content 
industries. Demanding such behavior is coherent with corporate amorality. Indeed, 
a corporation may reject the very basic tenets it uses if occasionally rejecting them 
may enable it to maximize profits. This raises concerns of the excessive influence of 
corporations on the legislative bodies drafting copyright laws. It is unclear to what 
extent politicians are aware of the content corporations’ coercive power extending 
to every person and every home. For this reason, it may be put under question 
whether actual decisions regarding copyright have been made elsewhere, rather 
than in the minds of politicians, where they should have been made. Consequently, 
these notions raise concerns of the possible effects of corruption as it pertains to 
legislating processes regarding copyright, which shall consequently be suggested 
as a topic for future research.548 
548 For example, Lawrence Lessig has connected corruption to copyright. See e.g. Lawrence Lessig, Institional Corruption 
– Opening Lecture, Cambridge, MA, October 8, 2009, available at: http://blip.tv/lessig/institutional-corruption-opening-
lecture-2731510. See also Lawrence Lessig, Free Culture, How Big Media Uses Technology and the Law to Lock Down 
Culture and Control Creativity, The Penguin Press 2004 (passim.). Also Hugenholtz has raised the concern of excessive 
one-sided lobbying. See e.g. Bernt Hugenholtz, Why the Copyright Directive is Unimportant, and possibly Invalid. 
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